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Preface 
 
This Dominican Republic Country Strategy Evaluation (CSE) has been carried out as one of a 
series of CSE exercises on EC assistance programmes worldwide, undertaken on behalf of the 
Evaluation Unit in the Joint Service for the Management of Community Aid to Non-Member 
Countries (SCR).1    
The report is based on a mission to the Dominican Republic by Messrs. C. Montes (team 
manager), T. Wolfe and C. Vellutini that took place from 23 February to 10 March 2000, and 
a subsequent visit by the team manager to Washington DC.   
The evaluators carried out an extensive review of Delegation files, available mid-term 
reviews and evaluations, and interviews with Delegation staff, other donors, Government 
officials, and private sector and civil society organisations (64 interviews in total).2  
The careful study of files – which contain the record of official documents and 
communication between the various stakeholders – all w d the evaluators to gain a high level 
of understanding of  project and programmes, minimising the time taken fro  EC or 
Government officials.  
The recommendations are built on assessments of both the preparation and the 
implementation of the EC’s strategy in the Dominican Republic.  The evaluators’ assessments 
were discussed with Delegation advisers throughou  the mission to the Dominican Republic.  
Preliminary findings were presented in Brussels on the 3rd of April, and the draft report for 
comments was submitted on the 9th of May.  
This report would not have been possible without the collaboration and assistance of the 
Commission Delegation in Santo Domingo and that of Dominican Government officials, as 
well as the generous assistance of members of civil society and the private sector, to all of 
whom we are extremely grateful. 
 
 
Evaluation Directors  EC Country Strategy Evaluations: Carlos Montes 
Stefano Migliorisi 
 
 
Copies of other Country Strategy Evaluations are available on the web-site of the Evaluation Unit, Common 
Service for External Relations (SCR), which is currently at http://europa.eu.int/comm/scr/ valuation/program .   
Copies can also be obtained from the Head of the Evaluation Unit, SCR, European Commission. 
 
 
                                            
1  A CSE is meant to be forward-looking, contributing directly to the preparation of a new 
strategy.   
2  See Annex 2 for a complete list of people interviewed. 
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Executive summary 
This is the executive summary of the Evaluation of the EC’s Country Strategy in the Dominican Republic for 
the years 1996-2000.  It is part of a series of Country Strategy Evaluations of EC aid. 
The report is based on a mission to the Dominican Republic that took place from 23 February to 10 March 
2000 and a subsequent visit to Washington DC.  The mission involved an extesive review of Delegation 
files, available mid-term reviews and evaluations, and interviews with Delegation staff, other donors, 
Government officials, and civil society organisations (64 interviews in total, see Annex 2, p. 79).  
 
 
Ch. 1 focuses on the rel vance of the EC’s country strategy in the Dominican Republic.  Key aspects of the 
country context are reviewed and used to assess the relevance of the EC’s country strategy (before 
implementation).  Ch. 2 looks at the performance of the EC’s programme in the Dominican Republic, 
focusing principally on its impact with respect to the EC’s priority objectives.  Ch.3 looks at key factors 
which explain the performance of the programme.  Ch. 4 presents r commendations.  
1. Relevance of the strategy (p. 1) 
Country analysis 
1. Political situation.  The transition from an 
authoritarian, clientelistic system to a more 
democratic political system has been 
difficult.  However, the transition is 
consolidating, particularly with the 1996 and 
2000 elections. The political system has 
contributed to long-standing weaknesses in 
public administration: poor budget 
management, institutional fragmentation, 
and a weak civil service.  The high 
discretionality and limited accountability of 
the executive exacerbate the confrontational 
nature of party politics.   
2. There is recognition of the increasing role 
of civil society in the reform process.  Civil 
society actors have been involved in a 
number of efforts at consensus building, the 
most recent being the 1999-2000 mesas de 
trabajo led by the Catholic university 
(PUCMM) and the World Bank  (see box on 
page 3) and Foro Ciudadano.  There has also 
been a process of consolidation of 
community-based organisations, particularly 
in Santo Domingo. 
3.  On coming into office in 1996, the 
Fernández administration moved an 
ambitious reform programme (including 
governance) onto the national agenda.  
However, a clear strategy does not seem to 
be being followed and governance problems 
remain. 
4. Economic situation.  The economy has 
been growing particularly rapidly since 
1995, with little inflation.  This is partly 
attributed to the growth of the US economy, 
to foreign investment, to the success of the 
1990 reform measures and the role of the 
Central Bank.  However, there is marked 
duality and a number of possible sources of 
vulnerability. 
5. Social developments.  Discussion of 
poverty is severely limited by the poor 
knowledge of its extent. The country is 
middle income, but inequality is high, and 
the neighbouring country (Haiti) is the 
poorest in the Americas.  There is a 
perception that high growth has not 
benefited the poorest.   
Expenditure on basic social services has 
historically been low and inefficient and has 
not targeted the poor.   
6. Environmental problems have increased, 
particularly deforestation and pollution in 
coastal areas.  Solid waste collection and 
disposal is weak.  Drug trafficking and 
money laundering appears to have increased.  
7. Integration into the world economy and 
into the region: good progress. The 
economy has become increasingly integrated 
into the world economy, with significant 
investment from abroad and diversification 
away from primary exports, with rapid 
growth of free trade zones and tourism.  
Some sectors are still protected, but a 
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gradual process of trade liberalisation was 
begun in 1991.  The Fernández 
administration has signed free trade 
agreements with Central American countries 
(CACMA) and CARICOM and membership 
of the WTO, ACS and work for the FTAA.  
The integration to the world economy has 
been one of the key priorities (and 
successes) of the Fernandez administration. 
8. Relations with Haiti have historically been 
difficult, but the two Govts. have become 
much closer since 1996.   
9. Donors in the Dominican Republic. The 
level of official development assistance is 
relatively low, and the country is not under 
an IMF structural adjustment programme.  
However, the IDB and the World Bank have 
recently increased their portfolios.  Relations 
between the Govt. and donors are motivated 
in large part by trade and geopolitical 
objectives.    
10. Major donors are beginning to identify 
weak governance as a key constraint in the 
Dominican Republic.  There has been 
insufficient focus by donors on the 
transparency and efficiency of the budget 
process and public administration reform.   
11. The Govt. has weak aid coordination 
mechanisms. Most aid is handled by the 
Secretariado Técnico de la Presidencia 
(STP), but is not integrated with the 
Government budget planning and 
implementation process (which is very  
weak).   EC aid is handled by its own 
Ministry, the NAO office, which in practice 
has limited interaction with the STP.   
Relevance of EC strategy to 
country needs (p. 10)  
Preparation of the strategy 
12. The EC’s country strategy was prepared 
under the Balaguer Govt., before the 
Presidential elections of 1996.  However, the 
Country Strategy Paper (CSP) did not 
consider the scenario of a change in Govt.  
Consequently it was revised only a few 
months after approval.  Reform and 
modernisation of the State was introduced as 
a new principal sector, but with limited 
analysis of the prospects of success of the 
reform programme.  
13. While donor coordination was in general 
weak at that time, Member States were 
consulted on the CSP.  Consultation with 
other donors was weaker.  The CSP did not 
pr sent an analysis of complementarity. 
14. There was very limited consultation with 
representatives of civil society. 
Assesing the strategy documents (p. 13) 
15. The CSP offered a clearly presented 
analysis of the principal constraints on 
development, but did not benefit sufficiently 
from assessments of previous interventions.   
16. The revised CSP and the 1997 NIP 
included 3 focal sectors: reform and 
modernisation of the State, water in urban 
areas, and health and education.  There was 
limited justification of the choice of sectors, 
and concentration was further diluted by 
including interventions in the private sector, 
farming, regional programmes with Haiti 
and interventions (outside the NIP) such as 
Sysmin.  
17. The revised strategy gave emphasis to   
governance, civil society and poverty.  
However, there was insufficient analysis of 
the viability of key interventions (in 
institutional reform, decentralisation, and 
financial management) and of their demands 
on staff.  The choice of sectors was not 
based on the EC’s relative advantages.   
The EC’s programme (p. 17) 
18. The Dominican Republic signed the Lomé 
Convention in 1989.  The 1st NIP included €
85 million of project aid, while the 2nd NIP 
(since 1997) amounted to € 106 million.  7th
EDF commitments also included structural 
adjustment support (€ 31 million) and 
through the Sysmin (€ 23 million).  Budget 
line contributions have been relatively small.  
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2. Performance of the EC’s programme (p. 21) 
The analysis focuses on 7th EDF interventions, and on the likely impact of 8th EDF interventions. 
Governance and the rule of law 
19. 1st NIP programmes were not targeted at 
governance or the rule of law, even though 
weaknesses of Govt. systems and financial 
controls contributed to significant 
implementation problems (including in 
support to the NAO office).  Financial 
management problems affected the EC’s 
relationship with the NAO office and were 
very time-consuming for Delegation staff.    
20. The 2nd NIP includes two major 
programmes in this area.  PARME (support 
for State reform, € 29.5 million) is the most 
important and includes components for 
judicial reform, reform of the central public 
administration, and decentralisation (the 
largest component).   
21. The second largest project in the 2nd NIP, 
SABAMAR (water and sanitation in Santo 
Domingo, € 21.8 million) has been 
innovatively designed, with components 
linking local government and community 
organisations.  It is consistent with a bottom-
up approach to improving governance.    
22. These programmes increase the relevance 
of the EC’s strategy, but their success may 
be curtailed by over-complex design, and by 
insufficient institutional analysis and 
coordination with other donors (see below).  
Poverty reduction (p. 23) 
1st NIP 
23. 1st NIP interventions focused on poverty 
through programmes which targeted the 
poorest areas, though their impact has been 
limited by the weakness of Govt. institutions 
and by a somewhat greater emphasis on 
construction than institutional components. 
24. For example, PRIDEP (€ 6.2 million), 
which targeted basic education in 3 of the 
poorest provinces, was found by evaluations 
and audits to have weak results and poor 
management.  Structural Adjustment support 
operations appear to have shown similar 
problems.  PROLINO, an integrated rural 
development programme (€ 23.6 million), 
was relatively more successful, but a mid-
term evaluation still found it to be less 
successful than initially intended (although  
findings are disputed by the Delegation).     
PRISA (health-care in some of the poorest 
provinces, € 10.5 million), had important 
successes, e.g. working with NGOs in basic 
sanitation, but institutional strengthening 
may have been constrained by weaknesses in 
the Ministry of Health.  Interventions 
supporting the private sector (PASP, Los 
Toros and Sysmin) did not target  poverty.   
2nd NIP 
25. 2nd NIP interventions continue the poverty 
focus but with  more policy and institutional 
components, increasing their likely poverty 
impact.  For example, learning from the 
experience of PRISA, the Health Sector 
Reform programme (€ 12 million) aims to 
strengthen institutions in the health sector at 
both central and decentralised levels.  
However, while the Technical and 
Professional Education programme (€ 11.8 
million) includes institutional components, it 
does not focus on poverty. 
26. SABAMAR is a key innovative 
intervention in this area and targets water 
and sanitation for approximately 480,000 
inhabitants in 16 marginal districts in Santo 
Domingo.  If successful (see ection below) 
it would have a high impact on poverty.  
 27.  Moreover, if successful, the focus on 
governance should also have an important 
impact on poverty (e.g. PARME), through 
improving the efficiency of service delivery 
by central and local governments.   
28. A number of smaller projects are likely to 
have a positive (though localised) impact in 
reducing poverty: Reconstruction of Schools 
(€ 7.2 million) and Reconstruction of Road 
Infrastructure (€ 6.5 million).  Bi-national 
projects with Haiti in the regional 
programme appear to offer considerable 
scope for replication (with due care for 
design and financial controls).   
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Environment and gender (p. 29) 
29.  Evaluators found insufficient focus on 
gender and environment issues in EC aid 
programmes. However, recent interventions 
show a greater inclusion of gender equality 
components and in a few programmes 
gender equality indicators are being used to 
monitor the Govt.’s progress relative to its 
policy commitments.   
30.  Even though there are significant 
environmental problems in the Dominican 
Republic, the EC programme has had a weak 
environmental focus.  The EC lacks an 
overall  strategy and has learned few lessons 
in this  area (q.v. weakness of the Sysmin 
evaluation).  It is expected that  SABAMAR 
could begin to redress this imbalance.  A 
few EC projects have included specific 
activities targeting the environment, 
including the new Environmental Trans-
Border Project (€ 4 million regional 
programme).   
Regional cooperation (p. 31) 
Improved cooperation with Haiti 
31. The EC’s programme is likely to have had 
a positive impact on relations between the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti, which in the 
past have been poor.  This is a result in part 
of the accession of the two countries to the 
Lomé agreement in 1989, their work in 
CARIFORUM, and their experiences in the 
management of bi-national projects in the 
Regional Indicative Programme.   
32. There appear to be benefits from joint 
project identification and implementation in 
bi-national projects, though projects have so 
far been relatively small.  They contribute to 
high-level contacts between Govt. ministers 
and officials of the two countries, as well as 
regular meetings between the Heads of the 
EC Delegations and the NAOs.   
Greater integration into the world 
economy and free trade agreements (p. 
32) 
33. The Govt. believes that membership of 
Lomé has supported the Govt.’s strategy of 
integration into the world economy through 
a series of free trade agreements, in 
particular with regional groupings.  Lomé is 
to have contributed by building the country’s 
economic and political relationship with the 
EU and other ACP countries – in particular 
other Caribbean states.  The negotiations on 
the free trade agreement with CARICOM 
also appear to have benefited from 
experiences within the Lomé framework.   
34. However, while the Caribbean regional 
programme may have contributed to greater 
mutual understanding, recent evaluations 
found a number of weaknesses which limit 
the impact of the Caribbean regional 
programme on regional integration.  It is 
ap reciated by Govts. often for its 
contribution to national interests.  Regional 
project designs are often fragmented, with 
limited regional links between components, 
and complex project management structures.  
Some of these weaknesses may reflect the 
weak situation of  CARIFORUM. 
3. Explaining the EC’s performance (p. 37)  
Strengthening institutions 
Central government 
35. The focus on strengthening Government 
institutions has increased considerably in the 
2nd NIP  (PARME, Health Sector Reform, 
Technical and Professional Education) but 
considerable care is still needed.   
36. 1st NIP interventions had limited success 
in this area and in a number of cases faced  
financial management problems (including 
support to the NAO office, PRIDEP, 
PROSIP). 
37.  Factors limiting the effectiveness of EC 
efforts include: insufficient analysis of 
institutional and political constraits, and 
the inter-dependence of reforms.  The 
success of sectoral reforms is dependent on 
the overall reform of the budget process and 
civil service reform.   
38. Difficulty in selecting appropriate 
Government institutions for support.  Donors 
should only support sector reform if there is 
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already evidence that reform actions have 
been taken.  Selection is also complicated by 
institutional fragmentation in Government 
and the duplication of institutions.  A 
specific problem is that donors often work in 
the same sector with different counterparts.  
In some cases the fact that the EC works 
with the NAO has meant that EC 
programmes do not have the highest 
institutional support.  
· The EC supported State reform before the 
Government had carried through actions 
demonstrating commitment to reform.  
The EC’s counterpart is the Presidential 
reform commission (CPRyME), which 
has received limited financial support 
from the Govt., which may indicate 
limited political support.  IDB has a 
different counterpart. 
· EC support to health sector reform has not 
ensured commitment and management 
capacity from the Ministry.  IDB and the 
World Bank support reform through a 
different counterpart. 
· In Technical and Professional Education, 
while the design of the EC’s programme 
recognises institutional constraints, the 
Directorate General within the Ministry 
has not yet demonstrated either 
commitment or capacity.   
· SABAMAR – stakeholders suggest that 
the strength of CONAU (the coordinating 
counterpart) does not match the demands 
of this programme. 
39. Over-complex design contributes to  
projects with too many components, 
complex management structures and 
difficulties in monitoring (e.g. possible 
problems for PARME and SABAMAR).    
Evaluations show that ‘hardware’ 
components tend to be given priority over 
capacity-building (e.g. PRIDEP), though 
some 2nd NIP programmes involve ‘phases’, 
with ‘hardware’ components only beginning 
on completion of an initial ‘software’ phase. 
40. Excessive use of PMUs and international 
consultants and the use of salary 
supplements to civil servants have been 
identified as having a detrimental effect on 
government institutions and the morale of 
civil servants.  Donors, including the EC, 
continue to use project management units.  
This is compounded by the slowness and 
lack of flexibility of EC procedures for 
institutional support (e.g. resulting in critical 
delays in the support to justice reform)
 
Civil society and local government (p. 45) 
41. EC interventions in the 1st NIP and 
particularly the 2nd NIP provide important 
support to civil society, but the EC still lacks 
an overall strategy in this area.     
42.  Some 1st NIP interventions  
· Puerto Plata supported delivery of 
services through civil society and 
promoted a process of concertation 
between local authorities, civil society and 
the private sector.   
· A success of PRISA was the collaboration 
with NGOs with well-known technical 
and organisational capacities, which in 
turn were able to mobilise social 
participation.   
43. However, in some 1st NIP projects, 
infrastructure components took priority at 
the expense of community participation 
elements (e.g. PRIDEP).   
2nd NIP  
44. The EC reinforced its support to local 
governments and civil society, principally 
through PARME.  60% of PARME funds are 
for decentralisation, strengthening local 
government and partnerships with civil 
society.   
45. Also SABAMAR offers innovative support 
to local government – civil society 
partnerships.  About half of SABAMAR will 
be implemented either by NGOs or micr -
enterprises or will support the capacity of 
community-based organisations and their 
partnership with the municipality (ADN).   
This should empower civil society 
organisations and contribute to 
sustainability.   
46. Factors limiting effectiveness.  The EC 
does not yet have an overall strategy to 
strengthen civil society organisations in the 
Dominican Republic, and consultations are 
not carried out in a systematic manner. 
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47. In addition, Delegation staff have limited 
expertise in the analysis of civil socety and 
decentralisation.  As a consequence, the EC 
has had some difficulties gaining the 
endorsement of ADN within SABAMAR.  
The EC also needs more resources for better 
coordination, e.g. to monitor the INTEC-
IDB programme and the PUCMM-WB 
consensus-building exercise. 
48. A particular difficulty is selecting 
appropriate civil society organisations to 
support, which is usually labour-intensive.  
The Microprojects programme is supported 
by a PMU, but EC approval is still required 
for each project selected.   
Donor coordination (p. 49) 
Government’s  coordination role
49. The Government does not have a strong 
planning and budgetary process in which 
donor initiatives could be integrated.  
Moreover, there is no single Government 
department that coordinates all donor aid.  In 
practice, the Secretariado Técnico de la 
Presidencia (STP) is in charge of all donors 
except the EC which has a special ministry 
dedicated to it.  The STP is also in charge of 
planning and implementation of the Govt. 
budget. 
50.  The location of the NAO office affects 
the coordination of EC programmes because 
the STP has stronger institutional links with 
line ministries and the budget and also 
coordinates other donors. Interaction 
between the STP and the NAO has been 
weak.  Moreover, in the past, audits of the 
support to the NAO office and counterpart 
funds have identified weak internal financial 
management in the NAO office.  This has 
been time-consuming for the Delegation. 
51. At sectoral level, the duplication of Govt. 
institutions has led different donors to work 
with different Govt. units on similar tasks.  
52. Some donors argue that the Govt. prefers 
donors to act separately, so that funds can be 
accessed with fewer conditions of 
transparency.  At the same time, the Govt. 
notes that donors are often in competition 
with each other for the allocation of funds.   
Coordination at strategic level (p. 51) 
53. Coordination has been very weak but has 
improved since 1998, particularly through 
the efforts of the new Head of Delegation.   
However, meetings were only at 
Ambassadorial level (limiting their technical 
usefulness).  Only now (February 2000) 
have sectoral coordination meetings begun 
and lead sectoral donors been selected.  
Little complementarity was observed 
between most key donors.     
Coordination of specific interventions (p. 
52) 
54. While relations between the EC and other 
donors are often good, interventions are 
designed with little coordination among key 
donors.  This can result in overlap or 
fragmentation of reform efforts, and in 
competition for Government  resources. 
55. The EC and the IDB are working with 
different counterparts in both public 
administration and health sector reform.  
While there may be debate as to which is the 
most appropriate counterpart, it is more 
important that donors choose the same 
counterpart when supporting sectoral 
reform.  In SABAMAR and Technical 
Education more coordination between the 
EC and other key donors is also needed.  
The EC is trying to coordinate its private 
sector support with other key donors. 
Sectoral reform should include a mechanism 
to ensure coordination and complementarity.   
56. The EC, IDB and USAID expressed to 
our mission a keen willingness to improve  
the coordination of their interventions.   
57. The Govt. generally follows each donor’s 
own implementation procedures.  Little 
focus has been given so far to strengthening 
the Govt.’s budgetary and implementation 
procedures.   
Factors limiting coordination (p. 55) 
58. As well as the Govt.’s institutional 
weaknesses, coordination is also constrained 
by the limited in-country decision-making 
and staff resources of the EC and by the 
EC’s extensive use of international 
consultants.  
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Commission resources and 
procedures (p. 56) 
EC programme shows weak focus         
59. Limited focus has made it difficult for 
staff to develop expertise in key areas.  Each 
Delegation adviser manages a portfolio of 
projects often across a wide range of areas.    
60. The 2nd NIP further reduced the focus of 
the EC programme by (a) moving from 
programmes with a relatively narrow 
geographical scope to programmes involving 
institutional strengthening in central Govt. as 
wel as support for civil society, and (b) 
introducing new sectors (e.g. State reform) 
and sub-sectors (e.g. technical education).  
EC staff resources are over-stretched (p. 
59) 
61. Staff resources are over-str tched by a 
high commitment and disbursement 
requirement, time-consuming administrative 
procedures, complex projects, reliance on 
consultants of variable quality, and shortage 
of staff with specialist skills (in institutional 
strengthening and support for civil society, 
poverty, gender, and the environment).    
62. Staff therefore have little time to devote to 
project design, monitoring either projects or 
wider developments in the country, or 
consultation with beneficiaries.   
Weak learning systems (p. 60) 
63. Learning and knowledge-creation within 
the Commission is weak.  As a result of the 
pressure on staff time, insufficient analytical 
work is carried out by the EC in the 
D inican Republic.  Most analysis is tied 
to projects. 
64. Monitoring and evaluations are not 
carried-out systematically and there are 
important gaps in financial audits. There 
have so far been few final evaluations, mid-
term reviews are often carried out too late in 
the project (allowing for limited possibility 
of changes to he project), and the use of 
impact indicators is weak.    
65. Nevertheless, in a number of cases mid-
term reviews and evaluations have given 
important feedback to Commission staff, 
which has acted on this information.   
4. Key recommendations (p. 65) 
These recommendations (to help prepare the Country Support Strategy) take into account the Cotonou 
Agreement and its emphasis on good governance, on a new partnership that embodies the participation of 
civil society, and on poverty reduction as the central objective of the new partnership.  They also take into 
account the Commission’s guidelines on the 9th EDF programming process. 
A. Ensuring relevance of the strategy 
66. The EC’s country support strategy should 
focus on two principal objectives: (i) good 
governance, (ii) the reduction of poverty. 
67. Flexibility in financial allocations needs to 
be built into the strategy, with different 
scenarios specified, as well as EC responses 
to these scenarios.     
68. The strategy should be closely linked to 
specific actions in institutional reform (e.g. 
implementation of budget reform law, 
progress in public administration reform) 
and the Govt.’s focus on poverty, which 
should trigger a ‘high case’ scenario if 
carried out.   
69. The trigger actions hould be assessed 
critically and should help determine both:  
· amount of aid to the country.    
· type of interventions.  The weaker the 
Govt.’s performance, the greater the 
emphasis on supporting local 
governments and civil society. 
70. Preparation of the country support 
strategy should be linked to the results of 
civil society processes that are working to 
build a consensus around a national 
development agenda (e.g. the PUCMM-led 
mesas de trabajo, F ro Ciudadano).   
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B. Increasing the focus of EC aid (p. 66) 
71. The EC should focus its programme in a 
small number of narrowly defined areas in 
which it has – or can develop – a 
comparative advantage. Our analysis suggest 
that the EC should focus its programme in 
two areas:  
1. sectoral reform in the health sector, and  
2. strengthening overnance, civil society 
and local governments.   
A secondary area of intervention should be: 
3. bi-national projects with Haiti.   
72. The EC should be cautious in the use of 
programme aid.  Structural adjustment funds 
are not contemplated for the new strategy 
because the country is not eligible.  If this 
was to change, there should be a careful  
evaluation of previous experience, and 
budget support should only be used in a joint 
approach by major d nors that focused on 
simple and clear benchmarks of progress in 
the transparency and efficiency of the budget 
and public administration reform (e.g. 
possibly linked to health sector reform).  If 
Sysmin and Stabex are to be used, they 
should be targeted at good governance and 
poverty reduction.  A more careful 
evaluation of Sysmin is also important.     
73. Areas of intervention to reconsider:  
· education.  EC projects have been varied, 
with mixed results and limited poverty 
focus.  The EC has not been involved in 
sectoral reform, backstopping support 
from Headquarters has been limited.   
· private sector support.  Analysis does not 
provide a clear case for EC support to the 
private sector.  If, in the context of a 
future Regional Economic Partnership 
Agreement with the EU, it is seen as 
necessary, it should target poverty 
reduction. 
C. Health sector reform (p. 67) 
74.  The EC should take a lead role in 
supporting  health sector reform, but support 
should be based on assessments of progress 
in Govt. management capacity and 
commitment to reform.   
75. The EC should support other donors 
which take the lead on public administration 
reform.  Support to core areas of governance 
reform (such as in PARME) should continue 
only as part of a larger reform programme 
drawn together by key donors.  
76. Donors should work together, deciding 
jointly their support to sector reform and 
using the same Govt. counterpart.   
77. Support should work within ex sting Govt. 
structures, avoiding creating project 
management units or other new institutions.  
It should focus on incentive systems and 
local structures, minimising the use of  
international consultants.   
D. Governance and civil society (p. 69) 
78. The EC should support good governance 
through:  
· l cal government – civil society 
partnerships ( upport to capacity of local 
governments and to capacity of civil 
society organisations as partners to 
governments in service delivery). 
· supporting civil society independently of 
government (to strengthen governance 
from the bottom up).   
79. Support to justice reform and public 
administration reform should continue, but 
should be integrated into other donors’ 
programmes.  
80. Support for local government – civil 
society partnerships should focus on one 
sector – possibly either water and sanitation 
or sustainable rural development.  The 
choice should depend on evaluation results.     
81. Support for civil society should be 
directed through funding intermediaries with 
operational independence from the 
Commission and clear and transparent 
funding criteria.  This would limit the 
workload of the EC Delegation, allowing the 
EC to provide support across many sectors 
(with objectives of good governance and 
poverty reduction).   
82. The EC should focus more on local 
delivery systems and incentives, and should 
limit the input of international consultants.  
PMUs should be accountable to 
decentralised institutions or community-
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based organisations, and should be subject to 
regular external financial audits and 
evaluations.     
E. Improving aid coordination practices 
(p. 72) 
83. The EC and other donors should support 
the reform of the Govt.’s aid coordination 
institutions, including the NAO office.  
Ideally, external assistance by all donors 
should be coordinated by a single Govt. unit 
with a direct link to budget planning and 
implementation.   
84. The EC should allocate more staff 
resources to supporting more efficient 
coordination at technical level (e.g. using 
web-sites, piloting knowledge networks). 
85. The EC and other donors should jointly 
support consensus-b ilding processes for a 
national agenda and try to use the results of 
these in their strategy preparation. 
86. The EC should continue its support to the 
recent process of selecting lead donors for 
each sector, possibly revising some of the 
current selections.   
87. The EC should be particularly active in 
sectoral coordination in the health sector, 
where complementarity and joint operations 
should be actively sought.    
88. The EC should work actively towards 
joint pools for technical assistance, common 
funds to support sector reform (if the Govt. 
meets common benchmarks of progress), 
and co-financing.  
89. The EC should support joint monitoring 
of macro developments and evaluations.  
Systematic consultation on project 
preparation should be piloted with the IDB 
and USAID.   
F. Using EC resources and procedures 
more efficiently (p. 74) 
90. Flexibility between programme 
components is needed to respond to 
changing conditions in a sector.   
91. Procedures should be simplified, through 
deconcentration of authority from 
Headquarters to the Delegation, systematic 
and rigorous ex post audits, service delivery 
standards, and to facilitate the recruitment of 
international consultants. 
92. Specialist skills hould be reinforced 
within the Delegation and the Delegation 
should be provided with rapid funds to 
support its own technical capacity (including 
for non-project support).   Projects for which 
an individual staff member is responsible 
should all be related to one another.   
93. A position of programme administrator 
should be created, to focus on financial 
administration and programme performance.  
Contact staff on gender and the environment 
issues should be nominated in the 
Delegation.  A quality support group at 
Delegation level should be introduced.   
94. Delegation advisers should become more 
involved in (and have greater ownership of) 
project design, and ensure closer supervision 
of consultants’ work. 
95. The EC should avoid complex projects or 
projects with too many components. 
96. There should be systematic monitoring 
and evaluation, including rigorous  audits –
by international accredited companies when 
necessary- of all key interventions,  with
participation of other donors and civil 
society. 
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Table of evaluators’ recommendations  
A) Ensuring relevance of the strategy:  the EC’s strategy objectives should be good governance and 
poverty reduction.  Flexibility should be built into the strategy, with different scenarios.  The strategy 
should be closely linked to trigger actions in institutional reform and in the Government’s focus on 
poverty, which should help determine the amount of aid and the type of interventions (support to 
central Government or local governments and civil society).  The EC strategy should be linked to civil 
society processes working to build a national consensus.
B) Increasing the focus of EC aid:   
i. the EC should focus on 2 narrowly defined areas of intervention: (1) health sector reform, and (2) 
strengthening governance, civil society and local governments.   
ii. a secondary area should be bi-national projects with Haiti.   
iii. if the Dominican Republic became eligible for structu al adjustment support, the e should be a 
careful evaluation of previous experience, and support should only be given in a joint donor 
approach focusing on clear benchmarks of progress  in budget and public administration reform.   
iv. if Sysmin and Stabex were used, they should target good governance and poverty re uction.  A 
careful re- xamination of Sysmin would also be needed. 
v. the EC should reconsider its support for education and for the private sector. 
C) Health sector reform:  the EC should take a lead role in health sector reform, but support should 
be based on assessments of progress in capacity and commitment.  Donors should work jointly and use 
the same Government counterpart.  Support should work within existing Government structures, 
focusing on incentive systems, not international consultants.  EC should support the lead of other 
donors on public administration reform and other sectors (justice). 
D) Governance and civil society:  The EC should support good governance through: 
i. local government – civil society partnerships.  Support should focus on one ector – possibly  
water and sanitation or sustainable rural development . 
ii. supporting civil society independently of Government.  This should be through funding 
intermediaries, which would allow support across many sectors. 
PMUs should be accountable to d centralised or community-based institutions and be subject to regular 
financial audits and external evaluations.. 
E) Donor coordination:  the EC should: 
i. support (with other donors) reform of the Government’s aid coordination institutions, including the 
NAO office.  Ideally, all external assistance should be coordinated by a single Government unit. 
ii. allocate more staff to coordination at technical level. 
iii. support consensus-b ilding processes in civil society, with other donors, and use the results in 
strategy preparation. 
iv. be particularly active in sectoral coordination in the health sector, seeking complementarity. 
v. work actively towards joint pools of TA, common funds to support sector reform, and co-
financing. 
vi. support joint donor actions in monitoring and evaluation.  Systematic consultation on project 
preparation with the IDB and USAID should be piloted. 
F) Resources and procedures:  the EC should: 
i. simplify procedures, including deconcentration and ex post audits. 
ii. reinforce specialist skills in the Delegation. 
iii. create a programme administrator position, nominate contact staff on gender and environment, and 
a Delegation-level quality support group. 
iv. allow Delegation advisers more involvement in project design. 
v. avoid complex projects or projects with too manycompo ents. 
vi. Introduce systematic monitoring and evaluation, including rigorous audits –by internationally 
accredited companies when necessary- of all key interventions,  with participation of other donors 
and civil society. 
Table for use in the European Commission’s Fiche Contradictoire. 
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1. Relevance of the strategy 
The first part of this chapter reviews key aspects of the political, economic and social context 
and the role of donors in the Dominican Republic.  The second part is an assessment of the 
relevance of (and constraints on) the EC’s strategy before implementation. 
A.  Country analysis 
Key characteristics of the Dominican Republic are reviewed to identify factors which should 
underlie the EC’s strategy choices.  The analysis includes both factors which were present 
when the last Country Strategy Paper was prepared (1995-96), as well as more recent 
developments.    
Political situation 
As with most political transitions, the Dominican Republic’s transition from an authoritarian, 
clientelistic political system to a more democratic political system and the rule of law has 
been  difficult.3   However, recent developments have been encouraging. 
Though there has been a formal democracy since the mid-1960s, elections have been crisis-
ridden as recently as 1994.  Opportunities to overhaul the political system (in particular 
following the election of the PRD in 1978) were lost as a result of the incentives faced by 
parties reaching the executive to use the power of the executive to maintain their position.  
Until recently there has been little change in the control of the executive, with the Trujillo 
administration remaining in power for three decades, followed by President Balaguer 
(president for 22 of the last 34 years). 
The extensive power, high discretionality and limited accountability exercised by the 
executive office (the ‘winner takes all’ in elections- as described in the World Bank CAS, 
Annex E paragraph 12) exacerbate the confrontational nature of party politics.4  This political 
system has contribued to long-standing weaknesses in public administration:  
· poor budget management.  The budget is not institutionalised and lacks transparency 
and accountability.5 There are weak internal and external controls (Independent 
Auditor’s office and Government Geral Accounting Office), and in procurement 
there are often non-c mpetitive practices.6  The high level of executive discretion in 
the budget process further reduces the transparency and political accountability of the 
budget.7  Under this system, it is very difficult to allocate resources to the reduction 
of poverty efficiently (see below). 
· institutional fragmentation.  There is low accountability in public administration, and 
a very high duplication of functions. There are an estimated 143 government 
institutions that depend directly on the Office of the Presidency.  On a bureaucracy 
                                            
3  See  J. Hartlyn, ‘The Struggle for Democratic Politics in the Dominican Republic’, University of North 
Carolina Press, 1998 and Moya Pons, F. ‘The Dominican Republic’, Hispaniola 1995.  
4  The WB Country Assistance Strategy 1999 includes an annex on The Political Economy of 
Reform that cites as key structural elements affecting reform: the strong presidency, the 
culture of confrontation, and the aversion and resistance to parties alternating in power. 
5  See  p.47 of the most recent IMF Staff Country Report, October 1999.   
6  See chapter IC of the recent World Bank Country Assistance Strategy 1999. 
7  For a discussion on the discretionality in the budget see A. Dauhajre, ‘Programa 
Macroeconomico de Mediano Plazo para la Republica Dominicana: 1996-2000’, pp.353- 67. 
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development index, the Dominican Republic scores 2, among the lowest scores in the 
developing world (compared with 13 for Singapore and 1 for Kenya).8 
· weak civil service.  The civil service has very limited capacity, and wages have been 
low.  A career civil service has not been developed and a high proportion of civil 
service positions are political appointments, giving the executive powers of 
patronage, but resulting in very high turnover after a change in the executive.  
· human rights.  According to the US Department of State, the country’s human rights 
record is mixed.9  Civil liberties and workers’ rights are well established, and 
politically motivated killings or imprisonment are not reported.  However, according 
to the State Department, the police reportedly committed well over 200 extra-judicial 
killings in 1999, prison conditions are particularly harsh, and Haitian immigrants are 
poorly treated.10    
Recent developments i  political situation 
The political situation, however, appears to have considerably improved with the 2000 
elections, the increased role of civil society organisations and some progress on the reform 
agenda and consensus building (including the PUCMM-WB initiative). 
Elections: The elections in 1996, 1998 and 2000 were carried out without a major crisis, and 
this could point to a less confrontational political system.  The state of democracy in the 
Dominican Republic now appears considerably more secure than it did prior to the 1996 
elections. 
· In 1996, Balaguer kept his promise to hold new Presidential elections after 2 years, 
following the controversial 1994 election.  The PRD was defeated in the second 
round by the smallest party, the PLD – a party with a reform agenda but which was 
supported by Balaguer.    
· In 1998, a constitutional change of 1994 came into play, creating a 2-year la  
between Presidential and Congressional elections, and for the first time different 
political parties have controlled the executive (PLD) and the legislature (PRD).  This 
could contribute to a less confrontational political system, but not without 
difficulties.11 
· In 2000, the PLD decided not to take the Presidential election to a second round even 
though they had a constitutional right to do so, since the PRD had captured  49.6% of 
the vote,  short of the 50% threshold.  The PLD justified its decision in terms of a 
desire to maintain social peace. 
Increased role of civil society organisations.  Civil ociety organisations have been important 
in ensuring electoral integrity (the Grupo de Acción por la Democracia in 1994-1996 a d 
Participación Ciudadana).  There is also recognition by the State, by political parties and by 
                                            
8  Rauch, J and Evans, P: ‘Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less 
Developed Countries’, National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER, May 1997.   Quoted in 
IDB project report for its Programa de Apoyo a la Reforma y Modernización del Poder 
Ejecutivo (DR-0073). 
9  1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Dominican Republic, U.S. Department of 
State, February 2000. 
10  Suspects are frequently detained without trial for extended periods, prisons are seriously 
overcrowded, and torture and physical abuse are reported.  Possibly tens of thousands of 
Haitians, including children born in the Dominican Republic of Haitian parents, are deported 
each year as illegal immigrants, often unfairly and often after being maltreated. 
11  1999 was marked by a number of political disputes between the Government and the PRD, for 
example in the nomination of the Camara de Cuentas, the JCE (‘Central Electoral Committee) 
and the Liga Municipal Dominicana. 
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donors of the increasing role of civil society in the reform process (e.g. see consultation 
process for the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy).  More generally, recent years 
have seen the consolidation of community-based organisations, particularly in Santo 
Domingo where they have recently been recognised lgally by the municipality (e.g. see the 
process of consolidation through the Foro para la Participacion Municipal and the role of the 
Comisión para el Desarrollo Barrial and Confedejuntas).12 
Donors (particularly USAID) have used civil society organisations for the implementation of 
projects and have benefited from greater linkages between NGOs (e.g. Red de Redes, Insalud, 
Alianza ONG).  The Government has also discussed poverty programmes with Red de Redes, 
through DIAPE.  
Reform agenda.13  On coming into office in 1996, the Fernández Government laid out an 
ambitious programme of reform and nominated a number of Presidential Commissions 
(including the Comisión Presidencial para el Reforma y Modernización del Estado –
CPRyME).  While this has moved governance eform (e.g. budget and public administration) 
onto the national agenda, a clear strategy of public reform does not seem to be being followed 
and governance problems remain.  
A privatisation process has been initiated with the aim of reducing Government  control.   In 
addition, there has been  reduction in discretionary expenditure by the Office of the 
Presidency, although this has not been accompanied by institutional changes in the budget 
process and the number of agencies that depend directly on the Office of the Presidency has 
increased.  
The power and discretionality of the executive has not been significantly reduced by the 
country’s first experience of cohabitation with an opposing majority in Congress (1998-
2000), although Congress has blocked a number of bills. 
There has been a significant increase in civil servants’ remuneration (e.g. 40-100% in the 
health sector in 1997), but without any links to improved recruitment and performance.14   
The process of decentralisation is slowly progressing and offers  potential.  Some progress is 
seen particularly in the health sector, in the creation of CDPs (Consejos y Comisiones de 
Desarrollo Provincial y Local) in all provinces, and in the allocation of 4% of the budget to 
municipalities.  The Santo Domingo municipality appears committed to improve its budgetary 
management (with IDB support). 
Efforts at consensus building.  An obstacle to reform has been the extremely conflictual 
nature of politics and the incentives to retain power.  There have been a number of fforts at 
consensus building in the past (e.g. leading to the Constitutional changes of 1994, and the 
work of the GAD on building a national agenda from a civil society perspective).  More 
recently President Fernández initiated a dialogue with other political parties and civil society 
but in which the PRD did not participate.  Both the Foro Ciudadano and the PUCMM are 
important current initiatives for creating consensus and for building a national agenda (see 
Box). 
 
                                            
12  See Articulacion y Coordinacion entre las Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil Dominicana’, 
Cela, J.sj y Pedrazuela, I.  Consultancy for INTEC-IDB, ‘Fortalecimiento de las 
Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil en Republica Dominicana’.  The Comisión para el 
Desarrollo Barrial has institutional relations with the municipality of Santo Domingo, the 
Health ministry and the Comisión Presidencial para el Desarrollo Barrial. 
13  In comments on our draft report, the former Desk Officer emphasised the importance of  
reform measures of the Fernández administration.   
14  While this reverses a long-term negative trend, these salary increases do not advance the civil 
service reform process.   
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Economic situation: very rapid growth and price stability 
The country is lower-middle income, with a GNP per capita of US$ 1,800.15  The economy 
has been growing very rapidly since 1992, with very little inflation.  Growth has been 
particularly high since 1995 (7.8% per annum).  This growth is partly attributed to the growth 
of the US economy, to foreign investment and to the success of the 1990 reform measures.  It 
is expected that recent privatisation measures will also strengthen economic growth.  Growth 
has been particularly strong in services (communications and tourism sectors), construction, 
and within the free trade zones.  Protectionist barriers are gradually being reduced, and key 
sectors of the economy are well integrated into the world economy (see page 8 on the 
country’s recent participation in regional trade agreements): 
· net exports from free trade zones (US$ 1,500 mill) are one and a half times the value 
of other goods exports (excluding free trade zone exports). 
· receipts from tourism (US$ 2,500 mill) are two and a half times ‘other goods 
exports’. 
· remittances from workers living abroad reach US$ 1,500 million, mostly from the 
USA. 
                                            
15  World Bank classification is: low income up to $760 GNP per capita, lower-middle income up 
to $3,031, and upper-middle income up to $9,360. 
National agenda dialogue: PUCMM-WB initiative 
An important recent (1999-2000) consensus-building initiative has involved a series of mesas de 
trabajo (work groups) discussing key reform areas with a view to achieving cross-party consensus 
on an agenda for national development.  
The process was led by the PUCMM (including Monsignor Nuñez, who has had an important role 
in previous consensus-building initiatives), and participants included representatives of the main 
political parties and key civil society organisations.  S me donors (including the World Bank, which 
funds the exercise, as part of the Comprehensive Development Framework initiative) were invited, 
as observers only.   
The mesas de trabajo covered 5 areas: social policies to combat poverty, economic policies for 
development, reform of the State, politics and management of the environment, and cross-border 
development and relations with Haiti. 
Interviews with Government,  civil society and other donors suggest that this initiative is generally 
viewed as positive - particularly in a difficult election year. Moreover, some working groups, e.g. on 
Haiti, have made important contributions to the national agenda. However, some concerns were 
also expressed:  
· Need for greater transparency and more  participation from  grass-root organisations.   
· Need for greater links with other consensus building initiatives (e.g. Intec, Foro Ciudadano) 
· In some cases, specific Government proposals and measures have not been taken into account 
by working group discussions. 
· Need for more participation of other donors to avoid a perception of a WB-driven process 1 and 
to allow for the conclusions of the process to be incorporated in donors’ support strategies.     
· Some expressed doubts whether the conclusions will be acted on by the political parties.  
 
1.  Co-financing by other donors is already being contemplated for the second phase of this initiative. 
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· foreign direct investment reached US$ 1,300 mill. in 1999 (up US$ 650 mill. from 
1998, with a 47% rise in the power sector and a 23% rise in tourism), with the Central 
Bank expecting a level of US$ 1,000 mill over the next few years.   
The macro-economic balance has been maintained during this period mainly by measures 
taken by a strong and competent Central Bank.16  The Central Bank has played a key 
stabilising role given the strong political cycle in the Dominican Republic.  This role has been 
made possible by the autonomy which the Government has allowed the Central Bank.  
However, the Central Bank does not have statutory independence, and its operational 
autonomy could be removed by the Government.  Other economic institutions in the 
Government and budget management are very weak.  Future macro-economic stability 
depends on the continuing centrality of the Central Bank after the May 2000 presidential 
elections. 
The performance of the economy has been very impressive, and economic growth and 
stability have been maintained in spite of a major hurricane in 1998.  However, some areas of 
potential difficulty are worth noting: 
Duality of the economy.  First, strong growth is concentrated in economic sectors which are 
more open to competition and where there are more transparent government policies (e.g. free 
trade zones, tourism, communications).  Growth in other sectors could be limited until reform 
measures are introduced.  Second, some of these high growing sectors have limited links with 
the local economy and/or a limited effect in generating shared growth (e.g. not labour-
intensive).   
Possible sources of vulnerability.  According to the Bretton Woods institutions, the economy 
appears increasingly stable.  However, as in any economy there are a number of potential 
sources of vulnerability: e.g. the fact that macro-stability depends almost exclusively on the 
Central Bank while there is a marked political cycle in the economy.  High interest rates, 
growth in the US economy, and oil prices also affect growth in the Dominican Republic 
significantly.  Similarly, the growth of tourism might depend on environmental measures and 
might be affected by competition from Cuba, while free trade zones might be affected by 
changes in trade rules.    
Social developments: poverty and inequality remain an issue 
While the country as a whole is middle income, there is high inequality (a G i coefficient of 
0.50) – the poorest 40% receive only 12% of income.  The proportion of people living under 
the international poverty line is similar to South Africa (20% below $1 a day and 48% below 
$2 a day, at PPP).17  Moreover, the Dominican Republic shares an island and a porous border 
with the poorest country in the Americas, Haiti, which has a GNP per capita of US$ 410. 
Discussion of poverty is severely limited by the poor knowledge of the extent of poverty (e.g. 
whereas the incidence of poverty is 56% according to ONAPLAN, it is as low as 15% 
according to a recent WB concept paper, using Central Bank data).  Moreover, no donor has 
contributed to reviews of public expenditure in the social sectors.18  Nev rtheless, there is a 
perception that high growth has not benefited the poorest of the poor, in particular unskilled 
workers, individuals with little education, and landless agricultural workers.  Poverty is 
concentrated in the border areas with Haiti, in rural areas especially in the south-west, in 
bateyes, and in the Yuma and Ozama districts in the capital.  The incidence of poverty in rural 
areas may be 4 times as high as in urban areas.   
                                            
16  However, international reserves are quite low. 
17   World Development Report 1999/2000, draft. 
18  A partial exception is the Gasto Publico en Servicios Sociales Basicos en la Republica 
Dominicana: s part of the Initiative 20/20 by the UN system, Dominican Republic 1999. 
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Evidence from Gasto Publico en Servicios Sociales Basicos en la Republica Dominicana- 
taking into account poor transparency and accountability of the budget and weak 
implementing capacity (discussed above) – suggest that Government spending has not been 
an effective tool to reduce poverty.  Expenditure in basic social services has historically been 
low and inefficient and has not targeted the poor (see Box).19  However, the weakness of 
official statistics makes a sophisticated analysis in this area difficult.  Governments have 
given priority to expenditure on infrastructure, and social sector spending has been 
particularly curtailed during stabilisation periods.20   
Immigration from Haiti affects poverty.   Possibly 500,000 Haitian immigrants live in bateyes 
– sugar cane worker camps – in particularly poor physical conditions, with limited access to 
social services.21  While the Government has traditionally had a tough policy on Haitian 
immigrants (see on human rights above), at the same time the economy has used Haitians as 
low-paid agricultural and construction workers, which has depressed wages for the unskilled.  
                                            
19  See also discussion of poor quality education and poorly targeted health services in section 
III.C of the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy. 
20  After the preparation of the draft report of this evaluation, the World Bank published a new 
report, Dominican Republic: Social and Structural Policy Review. 
21  1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Dominican Republic, U.S. Department of 
State, February 2000. 
Low expenditure on basic health and education 1 
Education 
Expenditure on education has risen recently, but expenditure is low, particularly on basic 
education.  Overall spending on education in 1980-1995 averaged 1.7% GDP, and by 1997 had 
risen to 2.3% GDP.  Expenditure is relatively high on tertiary education and low on secondary 
education and non-salary current expenditures.  Expenditure on basic education fell from 0.7% 
GDP in 1980 to 0.3% of GDP in 1991, before rising to 0.9% in 1995 and 0.96% of GDP in 1997.1
While current expenditure per student on primary and secondary education is about US$ 85-92, 
technical education costs US$ 462 and university (US$ 432).  
As a result, although statistics show some improvement in the coverage of primary education, 10% 
of  school children that should attend primary school and 50% of children that should attend 
secondary school are permanently outside the school system (more than 1 million Dominicans).2
Moreover, there is very low coverage of secondary education (particularly in rural areas) and more 
than 50% of Dominicans are defined as functionally illiterate.  Indicators of internal efficiency are 
also very poor: only 2.5% of entrants finish primary education without repetition, and in 1991 31% 
of 15-18 years olds were behind their formal studies, while this proportion increased to 38% in 
1996.  Finally, as a final indicator of poor quality, for each graduated secondary student (11 years) 
the State had to invest 42 years of school fees.   
Health 
Expenditure on health has risen from a 1980-1995 average of 1.1% GDP, to spending in 1997 of 
1.4% GDP.  However, it remains very low, particularly  on basic health services – only 0.3% GDP 
in 1990-1997, rising to 0.4% GDP in 1997.1  This compares with the World Bank’s estimated basic 
health package which requires 1.5% GDP.    As a result,  40% of Dominicans mention health as 
the principal problem in the country.2  
 
1. Source: Gasto Publico en Servicios Sociales Basicos en la Republica Dominicana; Initiativa 20/20: UNDP, 
UNICEF, UNPF. 1999.  Note that the results may be influenced by the fact that the methodology excludes 
expenditure by the Office of the Presidency. 
2. See UN System Report on La Republica Dominicana, 1998, (October 1999), page 55.
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Gender inequality 
The official statistics do not show gender disparities in primary and secondary school.  
However, the Dominican Republic has a poor record on physical abuse of women.  Physical 
violence is the second cause of death for women.22 Laws have been passed in 1994 and 1997 
to prevent violence within the family, but their application is slow.  The trafficking of women 
is also a serious problem,23 and sex tourism is a large and growing industry.  
Crime, drug trafficking and money laundering 24 
A rise in crime rates has been attributed in part to convicted Dominicans living in the USA 
who have been deported to the Dominican Republic.  In 1998, there was a marked increase in 
the number of homicides, with 14 homicides per 100,000 people, compared to 9 in the USA.  
The UN report notes also that the country is severely affected by the activities of international 
drug traffickers (who are becoming armed), illegal persons trafficking, and money 
laundering.25   It is suspected that this is a factor behind the increased crime-rates and drug 
consumption in the country.  As in other countries it could also further weaken institutions 
and encourage widespread corruption. 
Environmental degradation 26 
Environmental problems have increased, in part as a result of the weakness of the 
Government’s planning.  Deforestation i  the last 50 years has reduced the forest cover from 
30% to less than 15%, principally because of the demand for wood for energy and because of 
the expansion of agricultural areas.  There have also been substantial losses from the 
country’s rich biological diversity (for example, 52 vertebrates are threatened with extinction 
as a result of poverty and of tourism development in coastal areas).  Pollution is a major 
problem: 90% of rivers have serious problems of degradation, many rivers are biologically 
dead, and there is inadequate treatment of waste disposal.  There has been a significant 
reduction in water resources, because of increasing demand, deforestation, extraction of sand 
and pollution.   
Solid waste collection and disposal is weak (with disposal in rivers and the sea, and open-air 
combustion) and has a serious environmental impact. This is particularly important given 
population growth, the existence of pockets of poverty and the increasing number of tourists 
in the country.  The supply of drinkable water and sewerage is also weak. 
The country is in the process of preparing a national environmental action plan. 
                                            
22  La Republica Dominicana: 1998.  Vision del Sistema de las Naciones Unidas sobre la 
Situacion del Pais desde la Perspectiva de los Derechos Humanos.   Sistema de las Naciones 
Unidas, Santo Domingo, October 1999.  page 21.   
23  In March 1999, the Government created the Inter-institutional Committee for the Protection of 
Migrant Women (CIPROM), bringing together Government bodies and NGOs, to reduce 
social and economic problems in those regions from which most of the trafficked women 
originate.   
24            See footnote 22, see page 19. 
25  In 1998, confiscations of cocaine doubled. 
26  See footnote 22. 
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Integration into the world economy and into the region: good progress 
The Dominican economy has become increasingly integrated into the world economy, with 
significant investment from abroad (e.g. US$ 1,352 million in 1999) and diversification away 
from primary exports, with very rapid growth of free trade zones and tourism.  Some sectors 
of the economy still have a relatively high level of protection, but a gradual process of trade 
liberalisation was begun in 1991.  On most indicators, the Dominican Republic has been  
successful in its strategy of integration into the world economy.  The present administration 
has made this one of its key policies. 
The Government joined the WTO and the Association of Caribbean States in 1995.  In 1999 it 
signed free trade agreements with CAFTA and in April 2000 it signed another with 
CARICOM.27  It is also active among ACP countries, within the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
and in the FTAA.  Its strategy consists of alliances with smaller countries in the area (Central 
America and CARICOM) in order to gain influence in negotiations with larger trading blocks 
(see next Chapter).   It is argued that these free trade agreements should allow for a gradual 
opening of the economy and increased competitiveness with countries with a similar 
productive structure.28 
The economic links with the USA have always been strong and they have been strengthened 
through the CBI and the Free Trade Zones, and the (possibly) 1 million Dominicans living in 
the USA.29  Politically, in recent years the USA has played an important role in guaranteeing 
the democratic process in the Dominican Republic (e.g. the 1994 election), and is now 
supporting a number of key democratic initiatives and civil movements, e.g. Participación 
Ciudadana.  The USA is also targeting the Dominican Republic in its strategy for the control 
of drug trafficking. 
The signing of the Lomé Convention in 1989 appears to have contributed to an opening of the 
country to Europe, as well as to other ACP countries especially in the Caribbean, including 
Haiti (see Chapter 2.D for further discussion).  The Dominican Republic has worked losely 
with the EU on preferences to ACP countries in the context of the latest WTO negotiations.  
Relations with Haiti: substantial improvement 
Relations with Haiti have historically been difficult, and are strongly affected by the contrast 
between the two countries on the island, with GNP per capita in Haiti at about one quarter of 
the Dominican level and the effective absence of a functioning State in Haiti.  However, the 
two Governments have had better relations since 1996.  A bilateral commission (comisión 
mixta) has met several times.  There is much interaction (Governments and civil society) in 
the design and planning of bi-national programmes within the EC’s Regional Indicative 
Programme – both this and more generally the participation of both countries within ACP 
institutions are likely to have had a positive impact on relations between the two countries 
(see pages 31 to 32).  Furthermore, there has been a recent donor meeting on bi-national 
programmes, presided over by both the Dominican Republic and Haiti.  The Dominican 
Republic also appears to be in the process of approving an immigration law. 
                                            
27  Congressional approval is still pending. 
28  Only 14 products were included in the negative list with CAFTA and 50 products with 
CARICOM.  However, trade with these countries is at the moment very small, e.g. US$ 30 
mill. imports from Guatemala. 
29  In 1998, approximately 2/3 of all exports went to the USA.   
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Donors in the Dominican Republic: low level of aid, new focus on governance, 
weak coordination. 
The level of official development assistance (concessional) is relatively low, at 0.5% of GNP.  
Including lending from multilateral banks such as the IDB and the World Bank,30 this figure 
increases perhaps to 1% of the GNP.  However, relations b tween the Dominican Republic 
and donors – including the EC – are motivated in large part by trade and geopolitical 
concerns, not just by aid objectives.  Indeed, given the relatively small scale of aid, the 
Government is more interested in trade arrang ments (e.g. through membership of Lomé) and 
in attracting foreign investment than in aid.  Because of the low priority given to aid by the 
Government, a number of donors have faced difficulties in securing counterpart funds.  
However, aid is often focused in sectors where Government expenditure is low, and therefore 
its potential impact is higher than would be expected given its relative magnitude. 
The IDB has recently expanded its portfolio significantly and the World Bank has doubled its 
annual comitments.  The World Bank portfolio is relatively new and has expanded 
significantly in the last two years.  Operations have moved from infrastructure to institutional 
development, regulation and the social sectors.  
The country is not under a Bretton Woods structural adjustment programme, and therefore 
monitoring by the IMF is limited.  However, the IMF maintains an informal advisory role to 
the Central Bank.  Article IV consultation documents are not made public by the IMF and 
most other donors seem to have a limited capacity to monitor macro developments (with the 
exception of the IDB).  In the past, neither the IMF, World Bank or the IDB programmes 
have given sufficient focus to the transparency and efficiency of the budget process.  There is 
no Consultative Group for the Dominican Republic and this seems to have contributed to the 
weak degree of donor coordination (see Chapter 3.B).31   
Donors’ new focus on Governance. Th  major donors have recently identified weak 
governance and the political context as k y constraints to development in the Dominican 
Republic. In particular, experience with project implementation, low Government capacity 
and lack of budget planning and transparency is leading key donors to a strategy that includes 
an increasing role for civil society in their programmes and helping the Government to leave 
some sectors of the economy:    
· IDB.  In interviews the IDB indicated that it has recently given priority in its 
programme to budget and civil service reform.  It also recognises the need for 
consensus with all political parties in managing its country programme (in part 
because loans require congressional approval32).   It h s also an important programme 
aimed at strengthening civil society, and supporting local governments.  
· USAID.  As a result of the low transparency and accountability in the Dominican 
budget, USAID channels approximately 90% of its funds through civil society 
organisations.  A major component of this is a democratisation programme. 
· World Bank.  It has chosen the Dominican Republic as one of the pilot countries for 
its Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) approach, showing a recognition 
of the need for consensus on development priorities within the Dominican Republic 
(see page 3 above).  Its CAS (Country Assistance Strategy) not only involved a 
participatory approach (Government, civil society, other donors), but also included an 
analysis of the political economy of the difficulties of reform (see Annex E, CAS).   
The World Bank identified poor public sector management and governance as a key 
                                            
30  Mostly not concessional for the Dominican Republic. 
31  A noteworthy forum for dialogue between donors and Governments in the Caribbean region is 
the Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development (CGCED), coordinated by 
the World Bank.  It meets every 2 years and last met in June 2000.
32  However, in many cases there have been d lays in obtaining this approval. 
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constraint on development.  More importantly, it has closely linked this analysis to its 
strategy by including in its new CAS a Low Case lending scenario that depends on 
the non-approval of the Budget Reform law by January 2001.  The World Bank’s 
strategy focuses on regulatory reform.    
Donor coordination by the Government.  The Government has only weak aid coordination 
mechanisms.  Most aid is handled by the Secretariado Técnico de la Presidencia (STP), but is 
not integrated with the Government budget planning process (which is also very weak).  
Moreover, EC aid is handled by its own Department, which in practice has limited interaction 
with the STP.  By contrast, in an ideal aid coordination set-up all external assistance would be 
coordinated by a single Government unit (normally within the Ministry of Finance) which 
would ensure that assistance fits the Government’s expenditure planning and budgeting.  The 
division of aid between the STP and the NAO is discussed further on pages 12, 40 and 50. 
 
B. Was the EC’s 1996 strategy relevant to the 
country’s needs?  
This section assesses both the strategy preparation process and the documents of the EC’s 
current support strategy for the Dominican Republic (the 1996 Country Strategy Paper and 
the 2nd NIP).  The CSP and the NIP have both been amended, following the Presidential 
elections in mid-1996 and Hurricane Georges in 1998.    
Preparation of the strategy 
Careful processes of consultation and analysis during the preparation of a strategy are needed 
to ensure that the strategy is grounded in analysis of the country, the experience of other 
donors, best practice, and the Commission’s own strengths and weaknesses. 
Consultations with Government 
The EC’s country strategy paper was prepared before the 1996 presidential elections.  
However, it did not include alternative scenarios to cope with the uncertainty of a change of 
Government.  The country strategy was prepared during 1995 and early 1996 under the 
Balaguer administration.  This issue illustrates the need to take the political context carefully 
into account when preparing the strategy.  The CSP was presented to the EDF Committee on 
18 June 1996, between the two rounds of the Presidential election.33   The CSP therefore had 
to be changed a few months later when the new Government stated that its priorities were 
different from those of the Balaguer administration (see Box).34  While there may have been 
little flexibility in the timing of the CSP, given EC aid procedures, the CSP could have 
included  alternative scenarios depending on the direction taken by the next Government. 
                                            
33  The 2 rounds of the presidential election were held on 16th May a d 30th June 1996.  The CSP 
was presented at the meeting of the EDF Committee on 18th Jun . 
34  The EC was not alone in this.  The World Bank, which prepared its CAS in 1995 with the 
Balaguer administration, had to reassess its strategy in 1996 when Fernández was elected. 
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Consultations on the CSP took place with 
the Balaguer administration through 1995 
and early 1996.  The EC provided the office 
of the NAO with funds for TA to help 
prepare a Government strategy document.35  
This facilitated the identification of the 
Government’s priorities for the EC, but it 
may have also reflected weak links between 
the NAO and other Government departments 
and institutional weaknesses of the NAO 
office at the time (see Box on the NAO).  
This affected the Government’s input into 
the 1996 CSP. 
Discussions were held also with opposition 
parties prior to the elections.  During a 
mission to the country in January 1996, the 
Desk Officer held discussions on the EC’s 
future strategy with the Presidential 
candidates for the two main opposition 
parties (PRD and PLD). The discussions 
were informal, and the draft CSP was not distributed.  While this attempt to open up 
discussions with opposition parties was valuable, the EC might have been better able to 
identify realistic alternative scenarios if the process had been more formal. 
After the el ctions the Fernández administration presented to Congress an ambitious reform 
programme.  President Fernández visited Brussels to clarify the new Government’s priorities.  
The EC agreed to revise the CSP – introducing Reform and Modernisation of the State as one 
of the three areas of concentration – but this early change in the strategy reflected the 
insufficient consideration of a reform-scenario (see below).   
Consultations with other donors 
Discussions on the draft CSP were held with Member States in the Dominican Republic while 
consultation with other donors was weaker.  Member States have indicated that while general 
coordination at that time was weak, consultations on the CSP were carried out (see Chapter 
3.B on donor coordination).  
A draft CSP was presented informally in Santo Domingo (February 1996) to the Member 
States and also to the EDF Committee on a visit it made to the Dominican Republic.  In May, 
more consultations were carried out and minor adjustments were discussed prior to 
presentation at the EDF Committee.  In June, before the EDF Committee meeting, the Head 
of Delegation and the Desk Officer travelled to Madrid to discuss the CSP with 
representatives of the Spanish Government.36  
Member States noted that they appreciated these consultations but that they did not feel they 
had much real input into the process.  The CSP itself summarises the activities of other donors 
(Annex 3.a presents summary data by sector) but it does not present an analysis of 
complementarity, and the EC’s choice of se tors and choice of strategy within each sector do 
not appear to have been determined by a need for complementarity with other donors’ 
strategies.   
                                            
35  A draft of the document was received by the EC in December 1995: Estudio para la 
Determinación de los Objetivos y Areas de Desarrollo, Maritza Amalia Guerrero, Oficina del 
Ordenador Nacional para la Convencion de Lomé IV, Santo Domingo, 1995/96. 
36  Representatives of the Ministry of Economics and Finance, the Ministry of Trade and 
Tourism, and AECI. 
CSP and NIP: the timing of 
changes 
The CSP was approved by the EDF Committee 
on 18th June 1996, just 2 weeks before the 2nd
round of the Presidential elections, at which a 
new Government was elected. 
Following discussions with the new 
Government, the CSP was then revised and a 
corrigendum was approved by the EDF 
Committee in November 1996. 
On the basis of the revised CSP, the 2nd NIP 
was drawn up, and was signed in March 1997. 
In the wake of the damage caused by Hurricane 
Georges in September 1998, the NIP too had to 
be slightly revised.  Following requests from the 
Dominican Government, a number of 
amendments to the NIP (changing the 
allocations to different sectors) were approved 
by the EDF Committee in February 1999. 
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Consultations with civil society 
There was very limited consultation with representatives of civil society during the 
preparation of the strategy,37 and the CSP contains no analysis of the development of civil 
society even though its discussion of areas of intervention outside the focal sectors included 
institutional strengthening through decentralisation in order to promote greater participation 
of local communities (CSP, page 14). 
                                            
37  As part of its Comprehensive Development Framework initiative (facilitating the preparation 
of its own country strategy for the Dominican Republic), the World Bank supported the recent 
consensus-building process led by the PUCMM.  While some  concerns have been expressed 
about this initiative, it constitutes an important attempt to draw civil society into a strategy-
setting process (see box on p.3). 
The NAO office in the DR 
Following the accession of the Dominican Republic to the Lomé Convention in 1989, an NAO office 
was established within the Dominican Government.  The office was created by the Balaguer 
administration to deal only with Lomé programmes.  This is an institutional arrangement not usually 
found in other ACP countries.   
Whereas other donors’ programmes are coordinated through the Secretaría Técnica de la 
Presidencia (STP), the NAO office was created as an independent unit, in practice responsible only 
to the President.  The NAO himself was given the title of Government minister with special 
responsibility for the Lomé Convention.  (The first NAO minister was moved to this office from being 
the Finance minister.) 
There is a perception that the current NAO has in many cases facilitated innovative EC programmes 
in support of civil society.  However, a number of donors (including the EC Delegation) and some 
Government officials express concern over the fact that both the NAO office (EC aid) and the STP 
(all other donors) have responsibility for coordinating aid while there is often limited coordination 
between them, and a weak link with the planning and budgeting process.  The weakness of 
Government planning and budgeting, compounded by this institutional fragmentation, limits the 
impact of foreign aid.    The STP is currently responsible for budgeting.   
Initially EC links with plans and budgets were also weakened by the fact that the NAO office and its 
personnel – which now has astaff of about 40, of whom 20 are professionals – were financed by 
EDF funds and not by the Government budget.   At this time, weak internal financial management 
(and weaknesses in the management of counterpart funds) were also identified, concluding with an 
external audit and EC inspection missions carried out in 1996-97.  Responding to this situation was 
a time-consuming activity for the EC Delegation.   
The NAO office states that improvements have since been made to its financial management, and 
the NAO office is now financed through the Government budget.  After initial disagreements, there is 
now a good working relationship between the NAO office and Delegation staff.  However, the NAO 
reports increasing  difficulties with the slowness of EC procedures (particularly since the creation of 
the SCR).  
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Assessing the strategy documents 
Clear country  analysis but insufficient assessment of previous interventions  
The CSP offered a clearly presented 
analysis of the principal constrai ts on 
development in the Dominican Republic, 
placing an appropriate emphasis on 
insufficient social, economic and 
institutional development (see Box).   
This analysis is mostly still valid (see 
country analysis in section A. above).  
However, with hindsight, more emphasis 
should have been put on the difficulties of 
implementing programmes in a context of 
poor public expenditure management and 
weak financial controls.  Only the 
competitiveness of the economy has proved 
to be not such a strong constraint on 
development – the economy has 
experienced very high growth rates with 
minimal structural reform since 1996 
(although it remains a dual economy, see 
p.5).  
The country strategy did not benefit 
sufficiently from assessments of previous 
projects,38 which is partly explained by the 
timing of the projects (most 7th EDF 
projects were still not completed) and partly by weak project monitoring.  Because of the 
insufficient level of information available, in the CSP the EC could only argue that the EC 
should primarily continue working in the same sectors as the 1st NIP, to avoid excessive 
dispersion.  Also the strategy could not be informed by lessons learned from the past (e.g. the 
financial management weaknesses in PRIDEP, or the need to focus more on policies and 
institutions, as seen in PRISA and PROLINO).  However, the CSP correctly identified the 
need to continue the focus on primary health and education in the poorest areas and on 
decentralisation (CSP, page 8).   
Limited justification for the choice of principal sectors
The initial CSP (produced under the Balaguer administration) was not significantly different 
from the previous EC programme.  The expressed aim was to avoid dispersion and to 
maintain a focus on working in the poorest regions (as in PRIDEP, PRISA and PROLINO).  
The CSP also concluded that the possibility of institutional reform and improvements in 
governance was limited because they required a very gradual process of consciousness-
raising.39  The CSP therefore proposed that institutional strengthening and good governance 
should be simply a cross-cutting theme.  
                                            
38  As was noted by the Spanish government in discussions with the EC in June 1996. 
39  See Programación del 8º FED: Estrategia de Cooperación, República Dominicana, Brussels, 
March 1996, page 9  
Analysis in the CSP 
The 1996 CSP identified the following constraints 
on development in the Dominican Republic: 
Social constraints 
- High incidence of poverty in rural and 
marginal urban districts 
- Deficient health and education services 
- Deficient access to water and sanitation 
- Environment damage (waste disposal, 
deforestation, sewage in coastal areas, etc.)
Economic constraints 
- Vulnerability of economic stability, and delays 
in structural reforms  
- Insufficient competitiveness of the productive 
sectors (institutional weaknesses in the public 
sector, low skills of employees, deficient 
provision of electricity and transport, etc.) 
Institutional and administrative constraints 
- Centralisation 
- Institutional weakness of the State 
- Weakness of the judicial system. 
 Evaluation of EC Country Strategy: The Dominican Republic 
  
14
The initial CSP proposed 3 principal sectors: basic services in health and education, 
improving access to water and sanitation in marginal urban areas, and electricity.40  The 
latter 2 sectors match the ‘conservation and use of natural resources’ area of the 1st NIP.  
There was also some continuity in the secondary sectors (private sector development and 
agriculture).  The CSP also mentioned support for regional p ogrammes of cooperation with 
Haiti. 
In the revised CSP and the corresponding NIP, the reform and modernisation of the State 
sector replaced electricity as a principal sector (at the request of the new administration).  It 
had previously been a secondary sector.  However, it would appear that this was done with 
limited analysis of the real prospects of success for the implementation of a reform 
programme41 and without a clear appreciation of the high demands on staff resources made by 
interventions in this area.42  This may significantly affect the performance of the EC 
programme in supporting Government reforms.    
Focus on poverty, and the amended CSP puts governance at centre-stage 
The 1996 CSP included governance and institutional strengthening as key areas in the  
country, but initially as cross- utting areas, given the different priorities of the Balaguer 
administration.  In the corrigendum of November 1996, however, governance was moved to 
centre-stage.  However, this move was perhaps made too quickly, before concrete reform 
actions had been taken by the new Government 43 a d before an assessment could be made of 
the Government’s capacity to implement institutional reforms and of the political constraints 
on reform.   
The initial CSP of 1996 failed to identify a governance programme in partnership with civil 
society and local governments (a ‘bottom-up’ approach to strengthening governance) and 
only included a general call for greater decentralisation (CSP, page 14).  However, the 
subsequent corrigendum included strong support for the process of decentralisation and for 
local communities.44   
                                            
40  With transport infrastructure as a reserve sector, if the condition of restructuring the electricity 
sector were not met (in particular the need for passing of the Ley General de Electricidad, 
which had been submitted to Congress in December 1993 but had not yet been passed). 
41  The IDB studies on the political economy of reform are examples of the form such analysis 
could take. 
42  The Delegation is understaffed.  The area of public administration reform places particularly 
large demands on the time of advisers.  It is very difficult for one adviser, with a number of 
other responsibilities, to provide effective supervision.  
43  The Fernández administration committed itself to provide adequate financial, human and 
material resources to the Comisión Presidencial para la Reforma del Estado (created 30 
September 1996).  However, this Commission has received insufficient Government 
resources, possibly indicating limited political support (see Chapters 2.A and 3.A). 
44  In the event, PARME had a significant component of support for decentralised cooperation, 
including support for civil society. 
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Sectors of concentration in the 1st NIP (1992 ff.) and 2nd NIP (1997 ff.) 
including changes to CSP 1996. 
1st NIP 2nd NIP 
Sector and specific objectives % NIP Sector and specific objectives 
% 
NIP 
Conservation and use of natural 
resources 
· Improving use of water resources 
· Improving infrastructure, including 
rural roads 
· Rural land management, especially 
forestry 
55 % 
Water and drainage in marginal 
urban districts 
· Improve water and waste disposal 
services 
· Strengthen institutions involved and 
promote community participation 
25 % 
Social sectors 
· Health, especially public sanitation 
· Education, especially construction 
and equipment for primary schools 
20 % 
Basic health and education 
· Strengthening institutions, including 
support for decentralisation and 
training 
· Health: institutional reform, with 
priority to primary and preventive 
health care 
· Education: basic and primary 
education, infrastructure, vocational 
education 
25 % 
Sectoral import programme 
(support for structural 
adjustment) 
10 % 
Institutional reforms and 
modernisation of the State 
· Reform of public administration 
· Reform of the legal system 
· Decentralisation 
· Restructuring of public enterprises 
· Modernise the legislature 
· Improve statistical apparatus for 
foreign trade 
25 % 
Outside the sectors of 
concentration 
· Development of trade and tourism 
· Private sector development 
· Financial and technical cooperation 
· Cultural cooperation 
· Support regional programmes 
 
15 % 
Outside the sectors of 
concentration 
· Farming sector competitiveness  
· Private sector competitiveness 
· Support regional programmes of 
cooperation with Haiti 
· TA for studies and programme 
management 
25 % 
 
The 1996 strategy (before implementation) also had a very strong poverty orientation.  Two 
of the focal areas directly targeted poverty (basic social services and water in marginal urban 
districts), absorbing 50% of 2nd NIP funds.  Within the social sectors, the CSP and the NIP 
both explicitly stated that priority would be given to primary and preventive health care, and 
to basic education.  In its geographical focus, the CSP proposed retaining the targeting of the 
poorest regions of the country (in particular, the rural south-west and north-west as well as 
Salcedo in the north-east), and identified support to regional programmes of cooperation with 
 Evaluation of EC Country Strategy: The Dominican Republic 
  
16
Haiti as an area for support ‘outside the areas of concentration’.  The selection of private 
sector development as an area for support corresponds to the weaknesses in competitiven s 
identified in the CSP.  There were doubts at the time as to how sustainable growth would be.  
However, the economy has grown very rapidly since 1996 and the private sector now appears 
much more stable.  With hindsight, support to the private sector appears less urgent.45  
Finally, the CSP did not focus on environmental protection or gender equality.  While the 
CSP contains a brief analysis of environmental problems, the environment only appears 
within the EC’s strategy as an aspect of the water sector, and gender equality is not 
considered.46 
The modified CSP reduces the focus of interventions 
The 1st NIP and the initial 1996 CSP included similar sectors, including water and electricity.  
While the 1st NIP appeared to be heavily concentrated in one area  (‘conservation and use of 
natural resources’), this was in practice a broad area (including projects of integrated rural 
development programme (PROLINO) and electricity (Los Toros).     
The revision of the CSP reduced the focus of the strategy by intoducing ins itutional reforms 
and decentralisation as principal areas.   The 1996 CSP also called for interventions across a 
dispersed range of other sectors: support to the private sector, support to farming, and 
regional programmes with Haiti.   
This dispersion reflects many pressures: the large number of instruments of EC aid (including 
Sysmin and structural adjustment), the interests of different Government departments, the 
EC’s own varied priorities at Headquarters and in the Delegation.  The role of the 
Government in favouring this dispersion is particularly important.  
Strategy lacks realism and does not include alternative scenarios   
Insufficient analysis of the viability of 
key interventions (in institutional 
reform, decentralisation, and financial 
management) and of their demands on 
staff affected the realism of the 
strategy.  Realism was limited by the 
lack of ‘learning tools’ during strategy 
preparation, including consultation 
with beneficiaries and with civil 
society.  Complementarity was limited 
by the weakness of coordination with 
other donors.  The choice of sectors did 
not reflect the EC relative advantages. 
Amendments to strategy documents 
were made: to the CSP in 1996 and to 
the NIP in 1998 (after Hurricane 
Georges – see Box).  While the 
amendments may be seen as an 
                                            
45  However, private sector interventions carefully targeted to reduce poverty may be more 
relevant.  See the recent report, issued after the preparation of the draft report of this 
evaluation, Diagnostic Report: April 2000, Diagnos. 
46  In June 1996 the Spanish Government questioned the EC on its lack of focus on the 
environment in the Dominican Republic, and the EC responded by pointing to the danger of 
spreading its resources across too many sectors.   Mission report, consultation with Spanish 
Government on the CSP, 5 June 1996. 
Hurricane Georges and the NIP 
In response to the damage caused by Hurricane 
Georges, in September 1998, the Government 
requested assistance from the EC for a number of 
specific projects in the reconstruction process.   
In order to accommodate these projects, adjustments 
were made to the sectoral allocation of funds set out in 
the NIP.  In February 1999, the EDF Committee 
approved amendments to the indicative allocations: 
30.5% of programmable funds are now allocated to the 
social sectors, 20% to water and drainage, and 23.5% 
to the reform and modernisation of the State.  The 
allocation to projects outside the sectors of 
concentration has been raised from 25% to 26%.  
The Government also requested expanding the 
decentralisation component (including support to civil 
society organisations) in the proposed State reform 
programme (PARME).   
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indication of flexibility 47 in the EC aid planning process,48 the strategy did not include 
contingencies or alternative scenarios (e.g. changes in Government).49   
 
 
C. EC programme in the Dominican Republic 
The Dominican Republic signed the Lomé Convention in 1989.  Most EC funds have been 
project aid within NIPs.  The 1st NIP included € 85 million of project aid, while the 2nd NIP
(since 1997) amounted to € 106 million.  Under the 7th EDF commitments were also made for 
structural adjustment support and through the Sysmin facility.  Budget line contributions have 
been small. 
The Table below summarises the major 7th and (approved) 8th EDF projects and programmes 
(above € 5 million).  Annex 1 (p.77) contains a more comprehensive version of this table.  
                                            
47  Flexibility is a characteristic of NIPs that is expressly called for in Article 282, paragraph 3, of 
the Lomé Convention. 
48  An effort was made to keep the administrative requirements of the 1998 change as small as 
possible (e.g. by including reconstruction projects within existing focal sectors – s hool 
reconstruction within the education sector, etc.) 
49  Flexibility in the allocation of funds in the case of natural disasters should be facilitated by the 
new programming envelope in the context of the Cotonou Agreement. 
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7th and 8th EDF interventions ( > € 5 million) 
Indicative 
program. Project Amount Main activities 
 7th EDF  
National 
Integrated rural development 
programme on the North-West Line 
(PROLINO) 
€ 23.6 
million 
· Irrigation, water, electricity, roads, schools, 
clinics and the environment in an area in the 
NW, with community participation 
National Los Toros hydro-electric project € 18.9 million 
· Constructing hydro-electric power-station 
and supporting local irrigation 
National Integrated health programme in the south-west (PRISA) 
€ 8.8 
million 
· Strengthening facilities and capacity in 2 
health regions 
· Also primary health care, and water and 
sanitation (through NGOs) 
National Integrated local-level primary education programme (PRIDEP) 
€ 7 
million · Strengthening primary schools in 3 provinces 
Structural 
adjustment 
(SAF) 
Sectoral import programmes, petrol 
products (PROSIP I)  
€ 13.5 
million 
· Balance of payments support through 
sectoral import programmes 
Structural 
adjustment 
(SAF) 
Sectoral import programmes, petrol 
products (PROSIP II)
€ 9.3 
million 
· Balance of payments support through 
sectoral import programmes 
Structural 
adjustment 
(NIP) 
Sectoral import programmes, petrol 
products 
€ 8.3 
million 
· Balance of payments support through 
sectoral import programmes 
Sysmin Geological and mining development programme 
€ 23 
million 
· Stimulating growth of the mining sector, 
while ensuring environmental protection 
Regional Caribbean agriculture and fisheries programme 
€ 22.2 
million 
· 8 components supporting agriculture and 
fisheries across the Caribbean 
Regional Caribbean university leve  programme (CULP) 
€ 21 
million 
· Master’s degree programme with 
scholarships at 5 universities (3 in DR) 
Regional Trade development programme € 14 million 
· Supporting the Caribbean Export 
Development Agency 
Regional Tourism sector programme € 12.8 million 
· Training, support for Caribbean Tourist 
Organisation, strengthening CARIMOS, etc. 
 8th EDF  
National Programme to support the reform and modernisation of the State (PARME) 
€ 29.5 
million 
· Judicial reform 
· Strengthening public administration 
· Support to decentralisation 
National 
Water and sanitation in marginal 
districts of Santo Domingo 
(SABAMAR) 
€ 21.8 
million 
· Water and sanitation supply 
· Solid waste collection (micro-enterprises) 
· Institutional strengthening 
National Programme for reform of the health system 
€ 12 
million 
· Capacity-building (central and decentralised)  
· Restructure medicine regulation / distribution 
· Human resource management 
National Technical and professional education programme 
€ 13.25 
million 
· Institutions and policies in the sub-s ctor 
· Equipment and facilities at polytechnics 
National Reconstruction of schools and disaster relief, San Pedro de Maconis &  Higuey 
€ 7.2 
million 
· Reconstruct hurricane-damaged schools 
· Build local capacity for disaster prevention 
National Reconstruction of road infrastructure in the south-west 
€ 6.5 
million 
· Re-building of hurricane-damaged roads and 
bridges, with preparation of a plan for 
environmental conservation 
  
Chapter 2 Performance of the EC’s programme 
 
21
2. Performance of the EC’s programme 
The assessment of the performance of 7th EDF projects isbased on available mid-term and 
final evaluations.50  Since the implementation of 8th EDF projects has only recently begun, the 
assessment of these interventions is based on their likely impact.  This assessment is based on 
analysis of the quality of project pr paration and some indications of implementation.   
Performance is assessed in terms of i pact on EC objectives such as governance and 
democratisation, poverty, gender equality and the environment.  Key factors contributing to 
the EC’s performance are analysed in Chapter 3 (institutional strengthening, the degree of 
donor coordination, and the Commission’s resources and procedures). 
 
A. Governance and the rule of law 51
The post-Lomé negotiations saw the EU taking a leading role in linking cooperation to 
governance and the rule of law.  Also, in a number of countries EC aid has had an impact in 
this area.52  In the Dominican Republic, until recently few EC interventions have addressed 
governance and the rule of law, while some other donors have interventions suppo ting the 
electoral process, civil society groups (as a bottom-up approach to improving governance) 
and public administration reform – see box. 
 
                                            
50  A report compiling some of the results of EC development cooperation in the Dominican 
Republic, carried out at the same time as this evaluation, was available to the evaluators.  
However, the current evaluation has had access to more documents and interviews than did 
the compilation exercise.     
51  Including democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. 
 
Other donors’ governance programmes 
Given the importance of this area for the dev lopment of the country (see Chapter 1), some other 
donors have chosen to work in this area.   
· USAID has supported the electoral process through its support to Participación Ciudadana, an 
important civic movement (see Chapter 3.A.2).   
· Although the lack of transparency and accountability of the budget process has been known 
for a number of years, the World Bank and the IMF have done little work in this area.  The 
World Bank has now realised the importance of the budget to good governance (and to the 
efficient delivery of social services to the poor) and has identified non-approval of a budget 
reform law by January 2001 as one of the triggers for a ‘low-c se’ lending scenario.   
· The IDB has been the only donor trying to focus on the budget process, mainly through the 
Integrated Financial Management Programme (PAFI, DR-0094), and through its 
comprehensive Programme of Support for Reform and Modernization of the Executive Branch 
(DR-0073).  The IDB, however, has encountered a number of difficulties and implementation 
of the programmes has been delayed by lack of congressional approval.   An IDB programme 
supporting institutional capacity and budgeting in municipalities (especially in Santo Domingo) 
appears to be in a position to make faster progress. 
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1st NIP programmes did not focus on Governance interventions 
The EC programmes from the 1st NIP were not targeted at governance or the rule of law.53  
However, the weaknesses of the Government budget process, financial controls and 
duplication of functions contributed to implementation problems in a number of EC 
interventions (particularly PRIDEP, structural adj stment counterpart funds, and support to 
the NAO office).  Problems in financial management also affected the EC’s relationship with 
the NAO office in 1996 and were very time-consuming for Delegation staff.    
Other projects appear to have had more successful financial management (e.g. PRISA and 
PROLINO), but this was in part because of the use of implementation units that were given 
considerable autonomy.  However, this approach does not contribute to institutional 
strengthening and the projects were limit d by weak links with weak government departments 
(SESPAS and SEA) – see  Chapter 3.A.1.  
2nd NIP includes two major programmes in Governance  
PARME was introduced after a request from the Fernández administration in late 1996 for 
support for its state reform and modernisation programme (the initial 1996 CSP did not 
envisage governance as a focal sector).   PARME was only approved in November 1999, and  
has become the flagship project of the 2nd NIP in the area of governance and the rule of law.  
The design of PARME includes components for judicial reform, reform of the central public 
administration, and decentralisation – which is the largest component (see Box).  The 
financial proposal specifically sets as a general objective the aim of ‘deepening democracy 
and fostering respect for human rights and building institutions more conducive to human, 
social and economic development’. The judicial component is expected to address 
governance and human rights directly (e.g. through support to the Ombudsman and care for 
young offenders), while elements of public administration reform are designed to have a 
direct or indirect impact on governance.   
SABAMAR (water and sanitation in Santo Domingo) is the second largest project in the 2nd 
NIP and has been innovatively designed to incorporate components in support of linkages 
between local government and community organisations (e.g. juntas barriales and micro-
enterprises), and to strengthen the capacity of central and local government to respond to 
community demands i  the sector.  The approach was made possible in large part because of 
the collaboration in design with highly regarded NGOs: IDDI (with experience in service 
                                            
53  An important exception is the support to civil society in local development and 
decentralisation through a relatively small project in Puerto Plata province (€ 1.6 mill on).  
See chapter 3.A.2 
PARME: targeting governance 
The judicial component of PARME is expected to support citizen’s rights and participation 
(including support for the office of the Ombudsman) for greater oversight of the executive, and 
improved management of  prisons (including care for young offenders, an import t human right 
issue in the Dominican Republic) as a means of improving rehabilitation and human rights.   
The public administration reform component aims to improve both the efficiency and neutrality of 
the public administration (including increasing information to the public).  
The decentralisation component is intended to strengthen the capacity of city halls and other 
bodies that can support decentralisation (e.g. provincial development boards), as well as 
supporting the role of public, private and civil society institutions in decentralisation (as seen in 
Puerto Plata and Salcedo).  Support includes municipal legislation, training systems, information 
systems, and support for the Dominican Municipal League and the Institute for Municipal 
Administration Studies.  Key geographical areas for support are the municipality of Santo Domingo 
and local development in Salcedo and Puerto Plata, with replication to other provinces. 
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delivery) and Centro Montalvo (with a long history of links with community-based 
organisations and local government).  SABAMAR is consistent with a bottom-up approach to 
improving governance – increasing transparency and accountability in the delivery of services 
and empowering and supporting  pro-poor institutions.54 
…but PARME and SABAMAR might be ov r-ambitious 
While PARME and SABAMAR are relevant to governance and the rule of law, their designs 
appear over-ambitious and complex (with too many distinct components) and there are a 
number of issues which could curtail the impact of these interventions – discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3:    
· These interventions would place large demands on staff time and  there is insufficient  
back-up from expert staff.  Also, the political context (including commitment of 
stakeholders) has been insufficiently analysed, and coordination with other donors 
(including the donor with the largest involvement in some of these areas 55) has som  
weaknesses (see page 54).  Commission procedures are slow and have limited 
flexibility, and, while Government counterparts are weak, these interventions 
contemplate significant use of international consultants and implementation units.   
Particular care is needed in interventions in this area.  See, for example, Civil Service Reform: 
a Review of World Bank Assistance (World Bank OED, 1999), and Aiding Democracy 
Abroad (see footnote 23). 
 
B. Poverty reduction 
In a middle income country such as the Dominican Republic where the incidence of poverty 
is presumed to be high,56 a strategy to reduce poverty consistent with best practice (see box) 
requires: measures to increase empowerment (including decentralisation), actions to protect 
the poor from sources of vulnerability (e.g. in terms of natural disasters), and to increa e their 
access to physical and human capital and the return to their assets (including infrastructure, 
education and health investments, and targeting growth in areas with a high poverty-
incidence). 
                                            
54  See Aiding Democracy Abroad, T. Caruthers, Carnegie Endowment, Washington DC, 1999, 
and World Development Report 2000-1. 
55  The IDB has a project implemented by INTEC (‘Strengthening Civil Society Organisations in 
the Dominican Republic’), which has produced key documentation (e.g. inventory of civil 
society organisations), and a project to support the transparency and accountability of the 
budget process in the municipality of Santo Domingo.   
56  As noted in Chapter 1, there is only limited understanding of poverty in the Dominican 
Republic, both in Government and among donors. 
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1st NIP interventions focused on poverty, but impac s likely to have been limited 
Programmes targeted the poorest areas, especially those bordering on Haiti, in the South west 
(PRISA, PRIDEP, Microprojects) and also in the rural north-west (PROLINO) – see box on 
1st NIP projects.  The support of structural adjustment was also intended to support 
Government expenditures on education and health.  However, the weakness of Government 
institutions and poverty reduction policies may have limited the impact of these interventions 
(see Chapter 3).  Moreover, th  weakness in financial controls and in implementation units 
severely affected the poverty impact of PRIDEP and structural adjustment interventions.  
PROLINO and PRISA, while relatively more successful, have seen their poverty impact 
limited by the weak c pacity (and policies) of Government departments (SEA and SESPAS) 
and a somewhat greater emphasis on construction than on institutional components (see box 
Reducing poverty: Pillars to attack poverty (WDR) and Making aid work for 
the poor (OECD) 
According to the draft World Development Report 2000/1, the pillars to attack poverty are:
Empowerment:  
· make institutions pro-p or.  This involves strengthening formal democratic 
processes, and more detailed processes of accountability, especially legal 
procedures.  
· remove the social barriers to poverty reduction.  This requires strengthening 
the social institutions of the poor, reducing social barriers against particular 
groups (e.g. through building up assets of poor women), stopping their 
exclusion from the market place, and increasing their voice through legal and 
other steps.  
Security: protect the poor against negative shocks, and manage these shocks.  
This requires a broad safety net (but with modular implementation), and a pro-
poor macroeconomic policy where there is volatility. 
Opportunity: make it possible for the poor to increase their access to physical 
and human capital, and increase the rates of return of these assets.  This may 
involve land reform, rural and urban infrastructure investment, and investments 
in education and health.  
The recent OECD report, Making Aid Work for the Poor, advises that the mainstreaming of 
poverty reduction requires: changes in donors’ own policies, procedures and organisational 
culture; changes in their country assistance strategies and interventions; and improving country-
level dialogue to effect changes in developing countries’ institutions, policies and socio-cultural 
environments. 
In particular, aid agencies should assess their incentive-systems and internal organisation (do they 
reward poverty reduction?  Are country programme managers held accountable for their 
performance in reducing poverty?), and their monitoring and evaluation systems (are they poverty-
oriented?).1 
The OECD report also argues that country assistance strategies are the main vehicle for 
translating poverty reduction goals into effective actions on the ground, but that their success in 
this requires:  
· participation by partner governments and civil society - loser cooperation with selected 
governments and building partnership with civil society 
· strong mechanisms of coordination and dialogue. 
· targeting, particularly in the productive sector (private sector interventions)   
· a return to area-base interventions   
· decentralisation measures 
· high quality poverty data and analysis, and the monitoring of progress
 
 
1.  ‘The contribution of monitoring systems towards accountability and lesson-l arning is currently seriously 
constrained by their widespread failure to provide evidence on how the poor in particular have benefited 
from outputs or impact.’ 
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for evaluation findings). However, according to its evaluation, the relatively small Puerto 
Plata project appears to have achieved a number of positive results (both in governance and 
poverty reduction objectives).  Similarly, while Microprojects is only now beginning to be 
implemented, it is likely to have a significant  impact on poverty. 
Private sector support had limited poverty impact 
Some other recent 1st NIP EC projects linked to the private sector – such as Sysmin, PASP, 
Los Toros and some regional programmes which supported the private sector (CEDA and 
tourism) – have not targeted poverty (conrary to the recommendation of the OECD report 
quoted above) and appear to have had a limited impact in this area – see box on private sector 
projects. 
 
 
Poverty impact of interventions  (1st NIP) 
PROLINO is an integrated development programme supporting poor households in a deprived 
rural area in the north-west of the country, close to the border with Haiti.  The mid-ter  evaluation 
argued that the impact of the project was considerably less than initially intended (PROLINO:
Evaluación Medio Termino, Informe final, Nethconsult, 1997): that it benefited a smaller area than 
it should have been done (only 2 to 3,000 families, rather than the 23,000 envisaged at the time of 
the reorientation of the programme in 1995 – see executive summary 5c) and that the 
implementation of construction components was given more priority than the involvement of 
beneficiaries in identifying and prioritising activities (4a, 5a, 5b).  However, the Delegation has 
disputed the findings of this evaluation.  An attempt has been made since the mid-term evaluation 
to expand the impact of the programme and to ensure it works closely with decentralised 
Government institutions. 
PRISA targeted some of the poorest provinces in the country (in the south-we t), and according to 
the mid-term review (Informe de Evaluación Intermedia del PRISA, Euro Health Group, 1997) had 
some significant successes in basic sanitation (working with NGOs in improving drinking water 
systems and constructing latrines) and primary health care (in particular the provision of solar-
powered refrigerators).  However, institutional strengthening may not have been given sufficient 
weight, although there was some success in training and decentralisation (pp.39, 46-47), and the 
weakness of SESPAS created important constraints.  A subsequent DGVIII mission reported that 
the impact of PRISA was lower than the MTR suggested, with low levels of real access to facilities 
and under-usage of new infrastructure (DGVIII Mission Report, May 1997).  
PRIDEP was intended to have a strong poverty focus, but had serious implementation 
weaknesses.  It targeted basic education, at decentralised level, in 3 of the poorest provinces of 
the country (all near the Haiti border).  However, the audit reported ‘a lack of fin ncial,
administrative and organisational discipline’ (Coopers & Lybrand, draft audit, 1997).  And 
according to the evaluation (Carl Bro Management, Informe final, 1997), contrary to programme 
design, the programme focused on construction and equipment (although these were in fact well 
behind target), rather than community participation.  Weak monitoring, weak TA and a poor 
commitment from the ministry (SEEC) meant that these problems were not addressed.  Therefore, 
impact on poverty was probably low.   
Micro-projects.  The Micro-projects Programme (for which implementation only began in 
September 1999, after long delays in selecting and appointing the Project Director) will focus on 
projects with strong beneficiary involvement in the rural south-west of the country and the border 
area with Haiti.  Priority will be given to the needs identified in 2 previous studies carried out for the 
EC: one on possible projects in the border-zone with Haiti (some of these were then agreed upon 
with the NAO), and the other on ways to improve the quality of life in bateyes in Barahona 
province. 
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2nd NIP interventions continue the poverty focus but with more policy and institutional 
components 
The poverty impact of more recent EC interventions cannot be assessed yet since 
implementation is only now beginning.  However, their design gives some indication of their 
likely impact.  These interventions maintain a relatively strong poverty focus and now include
much stronger policy and institutional components.  This is intended to improve the poverty 
impact of 1st NIP interventions. 
The institutional focus can be seen in the health, education and water sectors (see box) as well 
as in interventions focused on governance (including support to local governments and civil 
society, as discussed in the previous section, through PARME and also SABAMAR).  If 
successful, these interventions would have a significant impact on poverty.  This would be 
through an improvements in the efficiency of the Government’s service delivery, through 
allowing a more efficient delivery of services by local governments with the participation of 
civil society, and through helping citizens to pressure Government for better services 
(empowerment, making institutions ‘pro-poor’).  
Innovative intervention: SABAMAR 
SABAMAR is a key innovative intervention in this area, supporting local government-civil 
society partnerships and targeting the poor.  It targets water supply and sanitation (sewage d 
solid waste) for approximately 480,000 inhabitants of 16 marginal districts in Santo 
Domingo.  Water and sanitation have been identified as one of the most important problems 
facing the poor and are a pre-condition for effective health-c re.  If successful (see discussion 
on difficulties in chapter 3), this project would have a very high impact on poverty.  
Poverty impact of support to the private sector (1st NIP) 
PASP (Programa de Apoyo al Sector Privado): The recent evaluation 1 did not focus on the 
project’s impact on poverty.  However, the institutional component was weak as a result of the 
absence of a Government counterpart, and the component providing financial support to SMEs 
excluded micro-enterprises.  
Los Toros involves principally the construction of a hydroelectricity scheme but as a by-product 
provides water for a regional irrigation project supported by the World Bank (Ysura project) and the 
sale of power generates funds for reinvestment in development projects.  The evaluation and the 
Delegation note that this has been a self-financing project (and therefore could have received 
funding from the EIB).  It does not appear to be an efficient way to target poverty reduction.  
Sysmin: The evaluation – which a number of Commission staff consider to be of insufficient 
quality – did not assess the impact on poverty.2  The institutional and policy components and 
sustainability appear weak.  A number of the components support the mining industry, and have 
little direct impact on the poor.  
Regional programmes:  (1) Regional trade development programme (CEDA): the mid-t r  
review finds only a very small positive impact on trade.3  (2) Regional tourism programme: the 
recent mid-term review did not assess the programme’s impact on poverty, and argued that ‘it is 
too early to try to determine if the 7th EDF programme has had any quantitative effect on European 
visitors arrivals’ which would boost revenues from tourism.4  
 
1. Evaluación del PASP y elaboración de las bases para identificar un nuevo proyecto de apoyo al desarrollo del sector 
privado, BMB, draft report, January 2000. 
2. Evaluation of the Dominican Republic’s SYSMIN Programme, De Souza Investments Ltd, October 1997. 
3. 1% increase in growth-rate of targeted export products.  The impact in terms of economic growth and employment is 
reported to be minimal, Evaluation of the European Commission’s Caribbean Regional Trade Sector Programmes, Geo ar 
International, August 1998, p.56 
4. The project covers a range of activities – historic site restoration, marketing, training, trade fairs.  Final Evaluation of the 6th
EDF Tourism Programmes and Mid-Term Review of the 7th EDF Tourism Programme, draft final report, December 1999, 
p.37 
 
Chapter 2 Performance of the EC’s programme 
 
27
Poverty impact of a number of smaller projects
A number of somewhat smaller projects have recently been designed by the EC and are likely 
to have a positive (although localised) impact in reducing poverty.  There are a number of 
new projects that support reconstruction (Reconstruction of Schools, € 7.2 mill, and 
Reconstruction of Road Infrastructure, € 6.5 mill) which compensate for negative shocks on 
the poor (e.g. hurricanes) and some of which include important education components.  Bi-
national DR-Haiti projects in the regional programme also belong to this area and they appear 
to have a considerable scope for replication (see Box).  Given the poverty in Haiti and in the 
border areas, these interventions seem to merit priority consideration from a poverty reduction 
point of view.  They also require particular care in their design (including financial controls). 
Poverty impact of interventions (2nd NIP) 
Health 
The Health Sector Reform programme reinforces institutional strengthening in the health sector 
(both central and decentralised – continuing support to the provinces targeted in PRISA).  The 
largest component involves reform of the system of regulation and distribution of medicines (€ 
6.2 mill).  The second largest component supports strategic planning, decentralisation and 
information systems (€ 3.2 mill).  The third component addresses human resource management 
and training systems (€ 2.6 mill).  Implementation is in 2 phases, th  first phase (two years) 
focusing on design and the second on practical application, with a mid- erm evaluation after the 
first phase.  The poverty impact of the programme could be limited by weak capacity in SESPAS 
and a limited commitment to reform.  
Education  
The Technical and Professional Education project involves building capacity in polytechnics (to a 
large extent through providing equipment - € 8 mill out of € 11.8 mill of allocated funds), 
preceded by a 1st phase in which a ‘Master Plan’ will be developed for the sub-sector.  The 
project has only just been approved by the EDF Committee.  However, support of Technical 
Education is not an area which targets poverty.    
Water and sanitation  
SABAMAR is concerned with the supply of water and sanitation in 16 marginal districts in Santo 
Domingo, and with the strengthening of associated institutions (central and local government and 
civil society).  It has a high potential impact on poverty, given the large numbers of urban poor 
(though the incidence of poverty in rural areas is higher).  It is an innovative programme following 
a demanding approach (decentralised cooperation), but project design could have been made 
simpler (and more support from other donors could have been achieved).  Impact could also be 
limited by: (a) a large and complex range of activities, and a danger that (as often happens) 
priority will be given to ‘hardware’ components, (b) a requirement for highly sensitive and time-
consuming involvement with local government, NGOs and community associations, and (c) the 
choice of counterparts.  (See chapter 3 for more detailed analysis of these institutional aspects.)  
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Poverty impact: other projects 
Post-hurricane projects. As noted in the recent World Development Report, a key area for 
poverty reduction work is security, protecting the poor against negative shocks.  In the Dominican 
Republic, this requires not only reconstruction after the damage done by Hurricane Georges, but 
also increasing preparedness for future hurricanes.  A number of EC projects are supporting 
hurricane reconstruction.  One of the largest is the Reconstruction of Schools project.  The project 
is principally concerned with re-building damaged primary schools, but also includes a component 
of community training in disaster preparedness (implemented through NGOs) and at least 20 
micro-projects in disaster prevention and mitigation, involving community-based organisations. 
Cross-border projects.  There are several components of regional programmes which focus on 
cross-border relations with Haiti.  While it is too early to evaluate these projects, they appear to 
have been prepared in a participatory manner and to target poor areas.  Not only is the incidence
of poverty far higher in Haiti than in the Dominican Republic, but also the border region is one of 
the poorest regions in the Dominican Republic.  Potential for expansion of these types of projects 
exists given the severe poverty in Haiti.   
The two new components of the Regional Agriculture and Fisheries Programme both have a 
poverty focus: PROCREBI (offering credit in the rural frontier area) and classical swine fever 
eradication (of strong concern to many poor rural households).  In addition, the Environmental 
Cross-Border Programme, though its focus is on the environment, offers scope for local economic 
benefits in a very poor frontier region through the development of eco-tourism. 
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C. Environment and gender 
Insufficient focus gender equality and environment protection  
The evaluators found still insufficient focus on gender equality and on the protection of the 
environment in EC aid programmes in the Dominican Republic.  Analysis, policies, 
monitoring and evaluation in these areas were found to be weak.  However, the recent 
interventions of the 2nd NIP show a greater inclusion of gender equality components and   
SABAMAR could contribute to environmental protection.   
This weak focus on gender and environment objectives is attributed partly to the high 
workload of Delegation staff, weak support from headquarters and  lack of specialised 
expertise and clearly defined responsibilities in these areas.  It also reflects the Government’s 
weak focus in these areas 57 – including the weakness of environmental institutions and 
regulation.   
…but some recent progress in gender equality.  Recent steps at headquarters to mainstrea  
gender equality have not yet had an impact on projects.  However, a number of recent EC 
projects include some components which address in part this priority objective (e.g. 
SABAMAR, PARME and Technical education – see Box).  Also, in a few programmes 
gender equality indicators are being used to monitor the Government’s progress relative to its 
policy commitments (e.g. Technical and Professional Education and PARME).   
…and SABAMAR could contribute to environmental protection.  The Dominican Republic 
faces significant environmental problems (see Chapter 1) but the EC programme has had a 
weak environmental focus in both the 1st and 2nd NIP.  Little evidence was found of a strategy 
for integrating environmental objectives into the programme or into specific project .  
Moreover, few lessons have been learned through evaluations (q.v. weakness of the Sysmin 
evaluation – see page 27above).  
                                            
57  The recent World Bank Country Assistance Strategy ranks the Fernández administration as 
giving gender issues a low priority and environmental issues a moderate priority.  A law has 
recently been approved on the protection of women and the Government has  created a 
Ministry for Women.   
Gender activities in EC projects 
SABAMAR.   In some of the education and awareness-raising activities, it is proposed that a 
special emphasis will be placed on gender issues.  A small number of training courses will be 
specifically targeted at women in the areas of nutrition, the environment and leadership, with for 
example the aim of increasing women’s participation in the juntas barriales.   
PARME  As a condition of the programme, the Government and other institutions involved 
committed themselves to an active gender equality policy in implementing the programme.  
Monitoring indicators will be established within the programme to assess progress in this area. 
In addition, specific activities are (a) In the support for INAP (responsible for training civil servants), 
a 6-month research project (one researcher) will analyse the gender situation in the public 
administration at both central and municipal level. (b) Within the sub-components for institutional 
strengthening in the provinces of Puerto Plata and Salcedo, support for Oficinas Provinciales de la 
Mujer will be included. 
Technical and Professional Education The Government has a policy commitment to promote 
gender equity across the education system.  One of the first tasks of the PMU is to establish a 
monitoring system that includes monitoring the Government’s progress with regard to this policy 
commitment (within technical education), although implementation will not be conditional on 
progress. 
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Environmental impact assessments have been carried out in a number of programmes, but 
they have not been applied systematically.   Los Toros received a full Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) in 1996, one of only 3 EIAs undertaken by DGVIII in 1996.58   The mining 
studies carried out with Sysmin funds have included a number of EIAs (see box).  Also, the 
preparation of the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Road Infrastructure programme 
included an EIA and measures to reduce the potential damage done by natural disasters,59 
while the financial proposal for PASP specified that the criteria for selecting projects for 
funding should include their environmental impact.  Financing proposals address the 
environment as one of the ‘factors ensuring sustainability’ but this is often treated at a cursory 
level.  
The recent approval of an urban environmental programme (SABAMAR) could contribute to 
beginning to redress the weak environmental focus.  It addre ses key urban environmental 
problems linked to sewage and solid waste and may have an important positive impact,60  
although its feasibility study includes limited analysis of the potential environmental impact.    
Specific project activities targeting the environment 
A number of  EC projects include specific activities targeting the environment (see Box).  
Most notably, the new Environmental Trans-Border Project (a € 4 mill regional programme) 
addresses environmental protection and sustainable development (particularly through eco-
tourism) of the region of the Enriquillo Lake and the Etang Saumatre lake (which lie in the 
Haiti border region).61   
 
                                            
58  Evaluation of the Environmental Performance of EC Programmes in Developing Countries -
Synthesis Report, December 1997, ERM. 
59  The project includes environmental measures, including the removal of the make-shift ords
currently being used to cross rivers. 
60  In addition, the decentralisation component of PARME is intended to support local planning 
processes, which may facilitate protection of the local environment.
61  The design work for a regional environment programme has been under way for several years, 
but this project was approved only in January 2000. 
Environmental activities in EC projects 
SABAMAR In addition to the general objective of improving waste management and improving the 
quality of water, specific small environmental actions are included in the programme: (a) 
environmental education at community level (€ 60,000), and (b) a 4-month TA to the Instituto 
Nacional de Protección Ambiental (INPRA) to help seek appropriate solutions for the 
decontamination of the rivers Isabela and Ozama. 
Sysmin  Of the 10 studies funded through Sysmin, one has an exclusively environmental focus, 
while the various feasibility studies for new mining operations have included environmental impact 
assessments.  The environmental study (study ‘I’) examines the possible reforestation of the sites 
of old bauxite mines on the Si rra de Bahoruco in the province of Pedernales, as well as analysing 
the legal and institutional framework for environmental protection in the mining sector.  The 
evaluation was weak and involved limited analysis of environmental i pact.  Sysmin I is now being 
restructured and Sysmin II is in preparation.  The EC must work to ensure that lessons from 
Sysmin I contribute to a greater environmental focus in these interventions.  
PROLINO One of the major components of PROLINO was the construction of earth dams, 
facilitating irrigation for agriculture, and environmental protection measures were envisaged in 
connection with these earth dams.  According to the mid-t r  evaluation, the environmental 
measures had ‘limited’ impact (PROLINO: Evaluación Medio Termino, Informe final, Nethconsult, 
1997, executive summary 3.2h), but it is not clear that the evaluation examined this aspect in    
detail.  PROLINO also aimed to reduce deforestation, through establishing village woodlots and 
introducing  improved wood-burning stoves in order to limit the use of forests for domestic use, as 
well as through replanting previously forested areas.  
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D. Regional cooperation 
Commitment to regional cooperation appears higher in the Caribbean than in other regions 
where the EC has supported regional cooperation.  In this context, the accession by the 
Dominican Republic to the Lomé agreement, and the EC’s regional programme in the 
Caribbean, appear to have contributed positively to:62 
a) improved cooperation with Haiti  
b) the Dominican Republic’s strategy of integration into the world economy (which 
includes free trade agreements with CARICOM and Central American countries 
(CACMA), and their membership of the WTO, ACS and work for the FTAA).
a) Improved cooperation with Haiti  
The EC’s programme is likely to have had a positive impact on relations between the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti, which in the past have been poor.  In part, this is a result of 
the accession of the two countries to the Lomé agreement, their work in CARIFORUM and 
their experiences in the management of a number of bi-national projects in the Regional 
Indicative Programme (RIP).63 
The accession of both countries to Lomé in 1989, and their subsequent joint membership of 
CARIFORUM,64 have brought the Dominican Republic and Haiti into closer cooperation, 
particularly since 1996.  The Dominican Republic’s support for cross-border relations with 
Haiti has also been recently strengthened through the consensus-buildi g ational agenda 
meetings organised by the PUCMM (see Chapter 1).  The work of the Church and civil 
society organisations in the area have also assisted in defining priorities for EC interventions.  
The most recent regional strategy, prepared in 1996, included an emphasis on support for bi-
national programmes of cooperation between the Dominican Republic and Haiti.  The 
Governments of the two countries argued forcibly within CARIFORUM for the importance of 
bi-national programmes.  This request received the backing of the Joint EU-ACP Assembly in 
September 1996.65  The 2nd NIP for the Dominican Republic also supported these bi-national 
regional programmes.66    
Cross-border programmes 
Preliminary evidence from bi-national (regional) cross-b rder programmes indicates likely 
benefits from joint project identification and implementation efforts – see B x.  These 
programmes require high-level contacts between Government ministers and officials of the 
two countries.  There are bilateral technical meetings between officials, as well as regular 
meetings between the Heads of the EC Delegations and the NAOs from the two countries.  
Initially, much of the coordination work for these programmes appears to have been 
supported by the NAO office, though more recently there has also been an important 
involvement from the STP (seen in the February 2000 donor meeting – see b low). 
                                            
62  The findings in this section are based mostly on interviews in the Secretaría de Estado de 
Relaciones Exteriores, in the NAO’s office, and with experts on Haiti from the Facultad 
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, as well as review of Delegation files.   
63  However, the funds available and the size of these projects have been relatively small. 
64  For the programming and implementation of the EC’s regional programme in the Caribbean. 
65  Resolución sobre los esfuerzos conjuntos de desarrollo de la República Dominicana y Haití, 
EU-ACP Joint Assembly, Luxemburg, 26 September 1996. 
66  Bi-national regional programmes are one of the possible areas for support ‘outside the areas of 
concentration’ in the 2nd NIP.  
 Evaluation of EC Country Strategy: The Dominican Republic 
  
32
It is expected that the cross-border nature of the projects will also foster cooperation between 
communities on either side of the border.  The on-going p licy support from the Governments 
and civil society organisations (including the Church, NGOs, universities and the PUCMM-
WB consensus-building exercise) should favour programme sustainability. 
Bi-national projects have so far been relatively small in size, and limited by the EC’s regional 
funds available for this purpose.  Given that they could target an area where the incidence of 
poverty is very high,67 it would appear that there is a strong case for more EC support in this 
area.  To stress the need for more funds for cross-borde  projects, in February 2000 the 
Governments of the Dominican Republic and Haiti convened a joint-me ting with the leading 
bilateral and multilateral donors in Santo Domingo.  In this meeting, both countries presented 
a range of possible cross-b rder projects across a wide range of sectors (agriculture, 
environment, transport, communications, electricity, water, health, education and sport, and 
pre-investment studies), to a total value of US$ 280 million.
 
b) Greater integration into the world economy and free trade agreements 
A strategy for integration into the world economy supported by Lomé 
The Dominican Republic under the Fernández administration has been developing a strat gy 
of integration into the world economy through a series of free trade agreements, in p rticular 
with regional groupings.  It has adopted an innovative strategy of initial alliances with 
relatively small groupings (e.g. with CARICOM and the Central American Common Market) 
as an intermediate step (which includes the improvement of the negotiating position of the 
region) towards negotiation with larger trade agreements or groupings (e.g. FTAA and the 
WTO).  The Government also believes that these free trade agreements allow them to obtain 
trade benefits without the constraints of becoming a full member of the trade groupings 
                                            
67  Relative to the r st of Haiti, the rest of the Dominican Republic, and also relative to other 
member countries of CARIFORUM. 
Recent cross-border interventions 
The Environmental cross-border project (€ 4.8 million) was approved in January 2000.  The 
project preparation process was very slow.  The initial design was prepared in 1995-96 for a 
Caribbean-wide environmental programme.  However it  was rejected as being too complex and 
lacking a regional dimension to pull together the national components.  It was then proposed to 
design two separate programmes, for DR-Haiti and for the rest of the Caribbean.  While the focus 
of the project is environmental, it may also strengthen bi-national cooperation: both Governments 
were closely involved in project preparation, and the participatory involvement of the local 
population is foreseen in the component of preparing a regional development plan. 
Regional Agriculture and Fisheries Programme.  After a number of criticisms in the Mid-Term 
Review in 1999, a major programme component (the € 9.8 mill Revolving Credit Fund) has been 
stopped and the funds reallocated.  In response to the new emphasis on bi-national DR-Haiti 
programmes, some of the funds are now allocated to two cross-border projects.  Both these 
projects have a strong poverty focus: 
· PROCREBI (€ 2 mill) is a rural credit fund for the DR-Haiti border region, which is just 
beginning implementation.   
· The Eradication of Classical Swine Fever is a cross-border agriculture project which is now 
at the study stage.  
Puerto de Manzanillo.  This transport infrastructure project, currently at the feasibility study stage, 
involves the development of a border port, which should facilitate the shipping of exports from both 
sides of the border. 
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(CARICOM or the CACM).  It also believes that this approach will help meet its objective of 
further opening the economy in a gradual way, while increasing domestic competitiveness 
and attracting more foreign investment.   
This Government strategy of integration into the world economy through regional blocks is 
subject to considerable debate inside and outside the Dominican Republ c.  The Fernández 
administration has however been very committed to this strategy and has appreciated the 
supportive role played by EC aid. 
The Government argues that membership of Lomé has supported the Government’s trade 
integration goals by building the country’s economic and political relationship with the EU 
and other ACP countries, and to some extent counter-balancing the very strong political and 
economic dependence of the Dominican Republic on the USA.  Aside from the important 
trade arrangem nts it brings with other ACP and EU states, membership of Lomé has 
contributed to newer and greater contacts with the other Caribbean states, which has 
facilitated negotiations with CARICOM (e.g. through the management of regional 
programmes in agriculture and tourism). 
The negotiations on the free trade agreement with CARICOM (signed on 28 April 2000) 
appear to have benefited from experiences derived from working within the Lomé framework 
(e.g. the use of negotiating machinery which allows for a significant partic pation by civil 
society and the private sector – Foro ACP model) and from the trade studies carried out for 
the Post-Lomé negotiations.  In addition, the Government holds that CEDA improved its 
information on Caribbean trade and therefore supported the formulation of its trade strategy. 
The NAO office believes that the EC’s Caribbean regional programme as a whole has 
strengthened the Dominican Republic’s links with other Caribbean states.  Interaction 
between Caribbean Governments in CARIFORUM and withi  specific projects may have 
brought the diffuse but important benefits of greater mutual understanding.  This cooperation 
may have facilitated the adoption of a common Caribbean position in the FTAA and the 
WTO.  Caribbean countries – including the Dominican Republic – have supported the EU 
positions in WTO negotiations on the customs and protocol waivers embodied in Lomé.   
Regional programme has a number of weaknesses which limit its support to regional 
integration 
The analysis of the role of Lomé and the regional programme should also include the  
analysis of specific interventions within the Caribbean regional programme and of their 
management institutions.  In this area, recent evaluations have found a number of weaknesses 
which limit the impact of the Caribbean regional programme on regional integration (see 
Box). 
While the Caribbean regional programme might have contributed to greater understanding of 
countries in the region (see above), it appears that the programme is appreciated by 
Governments mostly for its contribution to their national interests rather than for its 
contribution to the region as a whole.68  Project designs are often fragmented, with limited 
regional links between different components, and complex project management structures 
(with multiple programme management offices, in part reflecting political motivations).69  
Some weaknesses can be attributed to the implementation machinery.  A recent evaluation 
found CARIFORUM (see Box) to have a weak capacity and an unclear institutional ole ( n 
the context of other Caribbean bodies).
 
 
                                            
68  The bi-national DR-Haiti projects may constitute an exception (see above). 
69  See Box below. 
 Evaluation of EC Country Strategy: The Dominican Republic 
  
34
 
CARIFORUM 
CARIFORUM was established soon after the Dominican Republic and Haiti signed the Lomé 
Convention in 1989, to provide a mechanism for the preparation and implementation of regional 
Caribbean programmes. 
Previously, the EC’s regional counterpart had been CARICOM, which at the time included only the 
English-speaking Caribbean countries.  However, Haiti recently joined CARICOM 1 and the 
Dominican Republic has just signed a free trade agreement with CARICOM.  In functional terms, 
CARICOM is the more significant of the two institutions.  In addition, the Dominican Republic is 
particularly close to Central American countries and has signed a free trade agreement with them.  
In this context, the role of CARIFORUM and its political support appear unclear.  CARIFORUM 
received a critical evaluation in 1997, in which the need for CARIFORUM as a separate entity was 
questioned.2  
 
1. With the exception of the Dominican Republic, the memberships of CARIFORUM and CARICOM are now 
the same. 
2. CARIFORUM Evaluation Study: Final Report, Rambøll, October 1997, page 40. 
Impact of regional programmes on regional integration 
CULP (Caribbean University Level Programme).  While recording some successes in establishing 
Master’s courses, the mid-term evaluation questioned the sustainbility of the programme (on the 
grounds of limited policy support), and argued that the most obviously ‘regional’ component (joint 
research projects and academic exchanges) has, with a few exceptions, had ‘disappointing’ results 
(p.7).1  In addition, the valuation felt that the complex management structure (divided between the 
Dominican Republic and Jamaica) should be made more ‘robust’ but that this was made difficult by ‘the 
complex politics of the region’ (p.7).  The evaluation questions the degree to which the CULP is a 
‘regional integrated programme’ (p.7).  However, the NAO of the Dominican Republic has argued that 
there are regional benefits arising from the interaction of academics and students from across the 
region.   
Regional Tourism Sector Programme. While holding that the programme has had some success in  
facilitating regional integration, the mid-term review (MTR) noted that the programme has a number of 
weaknesses, in particular weak links between components.2  Thi  follow up programme ‘was driven 
mainly by political considerations – primarily the need to include the Dominican Republic, Haiti and 
Suriname as both beneficiaries and implementers of the programme’, with a complex management 
structure (p.4), and no clear rationale holding the various components together (the MTR describes the 
programme as ‘a ‘mixed bag’ of activities with no clear focus’).  The MTR suggests that during project 
identification there was not sufficient attention to whether components were best at regional or national 
level. 
Regional Trade Development Programme.  According to the mid-term review,3 while there has been a 
slight positive impact on trade, there has been minimal perceived impact from CEDA activities to 
promote regional economic integration (in part because of the limited length of time elapsed, p.18), and 
the large institutional development component (€ 5 mill) would have been more efficiently implemented 
through national programmes (p.vi).  Part of CEDA’s weakness is attributed to the lack of political 
backing through CARIFORUM – the previous 6th EDF programme (CTDP) received stronger backing 
through CARICOM (see Box on CARIFORUM). 
Caribbean Agriculture and Fisheries Programme.  The recent mid-term review describes the 
programme as ‘a project on the verge of paralysis, affected by a large number of problems that 
included: poor preparation, large time overruns and procedural and implementation inefficiencies’.4 The 
evaluation was critical of both the project design and the project management structure, with weak 
coordination and weak links with stakeholders. 
 
1. The CULP supports Master’s degree programmes at three universities in the Dominican Republic and two in 
Jamaica.  Caribbean University Level Programme (CULP): Mid-Term Evaluation, draft final report, Proman, 
January 2000. 
2. Two components directly involve the Dominican Republic: various training programmes implemented through 
PUCMM, and support for CARIMOS, which is based in Santo Domingo (although the specific heritage sites that 
have received extensive support are not in the Dominican Republic).  Final Evaluation of the 6th EDF Tourism 
Programmes and Mid-term Review of the 7th EDF Tourism Programme, draft final report, December 1999. 
3. Evaluation of the European Commission’s Caribbean Regional Trade Sector Programmes, Geomar 
International, August 1998. 
4. Caribbean Agriculture and Fisheries Programme: Mid-Term Review, final report, Agrotec, September 1999, 
summary p.1 
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3. Explaining the performance of the 
EC’s aid programme 
This chapter examines the key determinants of the performance of the EC’s aid programme in 
the Dominican Republic: the role of EC aid in strengthening institutions, both Government  
and civil society; donor coordination, and the Commission own resources and procedures.70 
 
A. Strengthening Government and civil society 
institutions 
Strengthening Government institutions 
The focus on strengthening Government institutions has increased considerably in  2nd NIP 
interventions but considerable care in implementation is still needed.
Governance has been identified as a key constraint on sustainable development in the 
Dominican Republic. However,  strengthening Government institutions is a difficult activity.  
A recent global evaluation of civil service reform programmes carried out by the World Bank 
between 1980-1997 concluded that such interventions were largely ineffective.71  Success is 
hampered not only by political difficulties but also by adopting a narrow technocratic 
approach, with insufficient institutional analysis and without a coherent framework for 
intervening in administrative systems (see Box).  Interventions in this area in the Dominican 
Republic require Government leadership and demonstrable commitment but also quality (and 
time-consuming) support from donors.      
                                            
70  This discussion refers also to the EC’s efficiency in aid management. 
71  Civil Service Reform: A Review of World Bank Assistance, Operations Evaluation Department, 
August 1999.  A summary of this report can be found on the World Bank’s web-site.  See also 
the recent review Aiding Democracy Abroad, T. Caruthers, Carnegie Endowment, 
Washington DC, 1999.  
The difficulty of civil service reform 
The World Bank’s recent evaluation of civil service reform programmes identified four key factors 
which explain the weakness of such interventions: 
1. Institutional and labour market constraints were insufficiently appreciated.  
2. Institutional arrangements for coordination between government bodies, or for providing 
checks and balnces against arbitrary action, were neglected (e.g. civil service hiring 
remained a primary mode of dispensing patronage).  There was insufficient civil society 
participation. 
3. The role of strategic management (reorganisation of work) and cultural change in 
improving incentives to perform was neglected (e.g. detrimental impact of expatriate 
consultants and project implementation units). 
4. Poor monitoring (and information) of performance (which contributed to a lack of 
accountability) 
Source: Civil Service Reform: A Review of World Bank Assistance, Operations Evaluation Department, August 1999 
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1st NIP interventions had limited success in strengthening Government institutions  
Interventions such as PRIDEP, PROLINO, structural adjustment,72 or in support of the 
private sector (e.g. Sysmin, PASP, Los Toros) – placed little emphasis on improving the 
policy environment or the institutions of central Government, either by their design or 
through their implementation.  This probably contributed to the limited impact and 
sustainability of these interventions, while some of them also faced financial management 
problems (see Chapter 2). 
However, in the case of PRISA, important components of the programme were intended to 
strengthen the process of decentralisation of health services towards the provinces.  The mid-
term evaluation reported successes in training in management skills and improvements in 
planning and budgeting at a decentralised level,73 whil  the internal programme report noted 
that the provinces supported by the programme were at the forefront of the process of health 
decentralisation in the Dominican Republic.74  The mid-term evaluation also argued that 
capacity remained constrained by limitations in the process of decentrali ation and in the 
resources made available by the Government.75 
2nd NIP interventions increase the emphasis on strengthening Government institutions and 
the policy environment.76  
Most of the programmes reviewed by the evaluators included institutional streg hening 
components.  In particular: 
· PARME – the largest programme in the 2nd NIP.  One component of PARME is 
concerned with the strengthening of the State administration as a whole, through 
improving the law on public administration, improving information systems, 
supporting the management of personnel, and strengthening civil service training by 
INAP (the National Institute of Public Administration).  Another component – 
judicial reform – also involves considerable institutional strengthening, through 
helping institutionalise the office of the Ombudsman, training judges and magistrates, 
and improving the management of the prison system. 
· Health Sector Reform.  As a result of the lessons learned by the PRISA evaluation, 
this new intervention focuses more strongly on institutional strengthening.  This 
intervention supports: (1) institutional strengthening at central and provincial level 
(including support for strategic planning and information systems); (2) restructuring 
the system of regulation and distribution of medicines (contracting with the private 
sector); and (3) human resource management (including systems for planning, 
evaluation and accreditation).    
· Education.  The Technical and Professional Education project involves an 
institutional strengthening component (including capacity-building within the 
relevant Directorate General within the Ministry, and the preparation of a Master Plan 
for the sub-sector) that will take place before the construction and equipment phase 
                                            
72  PROSIP I and II and a SIP were intended to support social expenditures in the budget.  
However, the budget process is poor in the Dominican Republic, and the programmes have 
also faced difficulties in the management of counterpart funds.  The mission found little 
analysis or evaluations of these programmes. 
73  Informe de Evaluación Intermedia del Programa de Salud Integrado en el Suroeste (PRISA), 
Euro Health Group, 1997, p. 39. 
74  Informe Final del Prog ama Integrado de Salud en el Suroeste 1994 – 199, PRISA, August 
1999, p. 20. 
75  P. 39-40.  No other evaluation was available.  
76  The strengthening of the institutions of civil society and local government – for instance
through SABAMAR and through the dec ntralisation component of PARME – is addressed in 
the next section.   
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begins (except for pilot works).  This marks a change from PRIDEP, which was 
largely concerned with construction. 
Factors limiting the effectiveness of EC efforts to strengthen 
Government institutions 
Given the difficulty of institutional interventions, the impact and sustainability of these 
programmes will depend on the capacity of the EC to follow ‘best practice’.  The discussion 
below identifies some elements which, if not corrected, could limit the impact of these 
interventions:  
· Insufficient analysis of institutional and political cons raints
· Reforms at sector level depend on overall public administration reform 
· Difficulty in selecting appropriate Government institutions for support 
· Over-complex designs, excessive use of PMUs and international consultants 
· Slowness and lack of flexibility of EC procedures for institutional support 
1) Insufficient analysis of institutional and political constraints  
Success in public administration reform depends on demonstrable political commitment from 
the Government and some consensus in society, rather than on the narrow technocratic 
approach of conventional civil service reforms.  In this context, the EC’s support to public 
administration has been weakened by the lack of analysis of the political economy of reforms 
(see Chapter 3.C).77  This could affect the success of most of the key projects in the 2nd NIP
(e.g. PARME and Health Sector Reform).   
Studies in these areas have been carried out by the IDB 78 and the World Bank 79 and have 
influenced the design and implementation of their interventions.  For example, the IDB study 
advised that no financing of public administration reforms should be available until the 
Government takes concrete reform actions.  As a consequence, the IDB and the World Bank 
(independently) have strategies in which support to the D minican Republic in this area is to 
be contingent on the adoption of a budget reform law.  The benefit of this analysis has not 
influenced the design or implementation of EC interventions (see section on donor 
coordination below – pages 49 to 55). 
Use of international consultants weakens the analysis of institutional constraints 
There is some evidence that the insufficient consideration of institutional and political 
constraints in EC interventions is also a consequence of the use of international consultants in 
designing projects.  For example, in the formulation of the Technical and Professional 
Education project, the consultants tended to underestimate the institutional and pol ical 
constraints on the project.  It was necessary for a Delegation adviser to intervene forcefully in 
order to include these considerations in the project.  Similarly, the initial consultants for 
SABAMAR – which involves support for local government a d civil society – adopted an 
over-technical approach that neglected political and institutional considerations.  Such 
considerations were only included at the insistence of a Delegation adviser.  These are 
                                            
77  Such assessments would address questions such as: which groups would lose more from a 
more transparent budget process?  Who are the most politically strong forces that could 
introduce reform?  What is the likelihood of success in reforms? 
78  See for example two studies carried out during preparation of the IDB’s State reform and 
modernisation programme by the University of Maryland (see footnote 116). 
79  See the work carried out in September-October 1998 by a political economy consultant, 
interviewing political leaders’ attitudes towards economic reform (summarised in Annex E of 
the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy).  
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important contributions.  However, Delegation advisers do not have the time to follow project 
preparation closely and systematically, given limited staff resources, time-c nsuming 
administrative procedures, and limited focus in the EC’s programme (see pages 59 to60). 
Location of the NAO office weakens the Delegation’s understanding of political constraints 
The fact that the EC’s counterpart in Government (Oficina del Ordenador Nacional) is a 
ministry dedicated exclusively to the Lomé Convention has also contributed to reducing the 
exposure of the Delegation to sectoral policy discussions with line ministries and to public 
expenditure management (planning and execution) – see Box.  This may have limited the 
EC’s understanding of institutional and political constraints in the Dominican Republic. 
Towards public administration reform and a national development agenda 
The Fernández administration has placed the reform of public administration and the budget 
on the national agenda.  However, actual progress has been very limited.  Key donors argue 
that this reform can only succeed with the support of the main political parties.  Recent 
consensus-building processes (including the PUCMM-WB CDF exercise) are making small
contributions to this process. Given the partnership and political dimension embodied in 
Lomé and relations with EU countries, EC support for consensus-building processes would 
contribute to public administration reform.    
2) Reforms at sector level depend on overall public administration reform  
One difficulty which may constrain EC interventions aimed at institutional strengthening is 
the inter-dependence of reform measures.  The Government’s long-standing institutional 
weaknesses mentioned in Chapter 1 (lack of transparency and accountability in the budget, 
fragmentation and duplication in Government departments, politicisation and low capacity of 
civil servants) mean that the success of sectoralreforms is dependent on the overall reform of 
the budget process and civil service reform.  Institutional strengthening in specific sectors, for 
instance in technical education, is only likely to succeed if reforms are carried through to 
wage structures and career paths throughout the civil service, for example.  Specific sector 
reforms (health or education) are unlikely to be effective if implemented in isolation. 
For this reason, close monitoring of the budget process and civil service reform, as well as 
strong coordination with other key donors engaged in institutional strengthening, are essential 
to ensure that the minimum conditions for effective sector reform are present and that all 
donors complement each other’s efforts (see section 3.B). 
The location of the NAO within central government 
The NAO is the EC’s main counterpart in the Government and in a number of cases has relatively 
high ownership of EC projects.   
However, given the fragmentation and duplication in Government institutions, the institutional links 
of the NAO office with line ministries and the Secretariado Técnico de la Presidencia (STP) appear 
to be weak.  The STP is institutionally responsible for budgeting and for coordinating line 
ministries.  However, budget planning and implementation is also very weak.  The funds of other 
donors are coordinated bythe Secretariado Técnico de la Presidencia.   
The location of the NAO thus appear to weaken the integration of EC projects in national 
development plans and the budget process.  The limited interaction of the EC delegation with the 
STP and the line ministries would also appear to reduce the EC Delegation’s understanding of the 
institutional capacity and developments in different ministries.     
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3) Difficulty in selecting appropriate Government institutions for support 
Donor interventions to support public administration reform should work with institutions that 
are demonstrably committed and have the highest political support.  Donors should support 
the reform process only after the Government has taken decisive reform actions.  In sector 
reform, it is important that the EC works with counterparts that have the capacity to manage 
reforms (e.g. absorbing funds efficiently and with ownership) and have demonstrated  
commitment to reform.  
The difficulty of selecting the appropriate institution for support is compounded in the 
Dominican Republic by the high institutional fragmentation and duplication of offices within 
Government (which includes, in addition to line ministries, the Office of the President, which 
operates across sectors, and presidential commissions for reform) together with weak donor 
coordination.  This applies both to support for overall public administration reform and to 
support for sectoral reform (see Box on health sector reform).   
Donors working in the same sector with different counterparts 
In this context, the EC and the IDB have chosen different counterparts in a number of areas 
(see also Chapter 3.B).  In some cases, the fact that the EC works with the NAO office and 
not the STP has meant that EC programmes work with counterparts that do not have the 
highest institutional support.  While there may be a discussion as to which is the most 
appropriate counterpart, it is clear that donors should work with the same counterpart when  
supporting sectoral reform within a single sector.  Donors should meet together on a regular 
basis to see how they can each best fit in with the Government’s reform programme. 
Supporting sector reform only when reform actions have been taken 
This is very difficult for donors given their internal pressures to disburse aid.80  Donors often 
support sectoral reform processes even when commitment and Government ownership are 
weak.  The EC’s record in this area is mixed: 
· The EC incorporated State reform and modernisation (PARME) into its strategy 
before the Government had carried through actions demonstrating its commitment to 
reform.81  Meanwhile, the Government has not implemented budget reform or the 
IDB programme for public administration reform. 
· In the health sector, the EC decided to support reforms even though there were 
already two large donor-supported sector reform programmes (IDB and World Bank).  
However, the ministry (SESPAS) appears not to be institutionally capable of 
managing this process, and both the IDB and the Worl  Bank note that few reform 
measures have been taken (see Box).  
· In the agriculture sector, where the institutional weakness of the ministry (SEA) was 
recognised in the PROLINO evaluation, the EC included a new project (Technical 
Support for the Banana Sector) which is to be implemented by a producer’s 
organisation (the JAD – the Junta Agroempresarial Dominicana).  
 
                                            
80  Note, however, that the IDB made approval of its State reform programme conditional on 
Congressional approval of its PAFI programme. 
81  The Corrigendum to the CSP (November 1996) notes that the Government committed itself to 
financial support for CPRyME.  However, the Government appears not to have given 
CPRyME sufficient financial and staff resources for its activities, possibly indicating limited 
political support 
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Difficulties in identifying Government institutions to strengthen 
PARME.  PARME has 3 very different components and supports a large number of counterpart 
institutions – the Financing Proposal specifically mentions 13 major institutions directly involved in the 
implementation of the programme.  This alone introduces management and monitoring difficulties.   
While public administration reform is inevitably a complex area which impacts on many institutions, the 
EC could possibly have designed a more focused programme with fewer areas of intervention. 
In the public administration component, the EC is working principally with CPRyME, the Commission 
established by the Fernández administration to push the State reform agenda.  The IDB, in its 
comparable programme, has chosen to support the STP, mainly because of its higher political and 
institutional status.  CPRyME was meant to have  a wide representation and has  certainly had a positive 
impact in helping to put State reform on the national agenda.  However, the Commission members have 
met very infrequently and CPRyME has received little Government financing, which may indicate limited 
political support.  In a programme such as PARME, it is important both that the EC should only support 
an institution that has the clear backing of the Government (with an exit strategy if there is not sufficient 
commitment), and that support should be carried out jointly with other donors (particularly the IIDB).   
The EC and the IDB should be working through the same counterpart.  
Health sector reform.  Several donors have programmes to support health sector reform, including the 
IDB (€ 60 million) and the World Bank (€ 30 million), as well as the EC (€ 20 million), in spite of few 
reform actions in the sector and perceptions of limited capacity to absorb these funds efficiently.  The EC 
was aware of the difficulties of working in the sector before preparation of its programme began –  a DG 
VIII health unit mission in 1997 reported that there was not clearly a strong will to reform within SESPAS, 
and that there was a lack of policies for translating overall objectives into practice. 
The EC is working with a different counterpart from the IDB and the World Bank.  Whereas the EC’s 
direct counterpart is SESPAS, the IDB and World Bank’s counterpart is the CERSS – the Comisión 
Ejecutivo para la Reforma del Sector Salud. (CERSS includes representatives of the STP, SESPAS, 
IDSS, CPRyME, other ministries, NGOs, etc.)  While there may be a discussion as to which is the most 
appropriate counterpart, it is perhaps more important that donors choose the same counterpart.
Technical and Professional Education.  The EC has designed a project to support the Directorate 
General (DG) for Technical and Professional Education within the ministry (SEEC).  This is in a context 
of weak management within the DG (and SEEC more widely), with little coordination with other sub-
sectors and no coherent sub-sector policy.  The EC programme recognises these institutional 
constraints, but it expects that the 1st phase of the programme – preparation of a Master Plan for the 
sub-sector (drawing stakeholders together into a National Council) and capacity-building within the DG –
will overcome these problems.   
However, the DG has not yet demonstrated either its commitment to reform or its capacity to manage 
this process of institutional development.  The feasibility study identified a wide range of weaknesses: 
the DG has poorly defined objectives, its lack of human and financial resources results in failure to 
implement projects, it has difficulties communicating with regional directorates and with other 
educational institutions at the centre, it has administrative weakness, lacks information, and is weak in 
supervision and control.  In such an environment (without progress in a comprehensive civil service 
reform or reform of the budget process), it is not clear how effective or sustainable the EC’s institutional 
strengthening measures will be. 
SABAMAR.  SABAMAR is a complex programme in which half the components should contribute to 
institutional development of local government, civil society and micro-enterprises.  It also works with 
CAASD and SESPAS.  The project has benefited from design contributions from important NGOs, but 
the knowledge within the Delegation of ADN and the political context are limited (e.g. many difficulties 
were experienced in bringing the ADN on board).  Given the complexity of the project and the number of  
institutions involved, the choice of main counterpart was difficult (CONAU, the Consejo Nacional de 
Asuntos Urbanos).  However, a number of stakeholders suggested that the political and institutional 
strength of CONAU was not commensurate to the importance of the project.  CONAU has few 
permanent staff and basically consists of project personnel from other donors (e.g. RESURE financed by 
UNDP).  For the success of the programme, the counterpart will need to coordinate closely with both 
ADN and CAASD.  A smaller number of project components might have facilitated coordination with the 
various institutions involved. 
Private sector (1st  NIP).  The PMU for PASP had no effective Government counterpart at all, o her 
than the NAO.  The institutional set-up of PASP as a separate operation with no operational, policy-
related Government counterpart clearly made any impact on policies difficult, significantly weakening the 
policy dialogue component of the project.  The evaluation (carried out by BMB) stresses explicitly that 
the lack of a genuine Governmental counterpart has had a serious effect on the sustainability of the 
project.  
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4) Over-complex designs, excessive use of PMUs and international consultants 
Over-complex design of institutional strengthening interventio s 
Project and programme design is often over-complex and includes too many components, 
contributing to complex management structures and to difficulties in monitoring performance 
(and therefore to amending projects).82  While both PARME and SABAMAR (see box on 
p.42) operate in complex institutional environments, they could have benefited from 
addressing a smaller number of activities.  PARME, for example, has 3 components and 17 
sub-components, with 13 counterpart institutions,83 covering many areas of intervention. 
Evaluations of EC projects have also shown that where construction / equipment components 
are combined in a single programme with capacity-building components (rather than the best 
practice of stand-alone institutional TA projects),84 there is a high risk that the ‘hardware’ 
components will be given priority, since they are more readily monitorable.   
The evaluation of PRIDEP, for example, noted that although the programme was intended to 
be ‘integrated’ (with community participation), in practice the emphasis within the 
programme was given to the physical infrastructure and equipment components, with little 
involvement of the community, teachers or pupils (pp. 10, 33-36).  In part as a response to 
this problem, new interventions divide the programmes into phases, with ‘hardware’ 
components only beginning on completion of an initial ‘software’ phase (e.g. Technical 
Education, Health Sector Reform). 
Implementation through PMUs and the use of international  consultants 
Evaluations have identified a number of donor practices that have a detrimental impact on 
institutional strengthening.  Most importantly, the use of international  consultants and project 
management (or implementation) units (PMUs) has a detrimental impact on standard 
government procedures and on the morale of civil servants.85  A further negative practice 
which some donors engage in is giving salary ‘supplements’ to civil servants to facilitate the 
implementation of their own projects. 
                                            
82  This is particularly problematic in regional programmes.  Complex project management 
structures in regional programmes are driven by the political necessity of having programme 
managers in several different Caribbean countries.  The mid-term review of the Caribbean 
University Level Programme criticised the complexity of its management structure (divided 
between the Dominican Republic and Jamaica), but recognised the political difficulty of 
changing this. 
83  The financing proposal lists the following as the main parties involved in the programme: the 
Presidential Commission for Reform and Modernisation of the State (CPRyME); the 
Commissioner to support the Reform and Modernisation of the Justice System; the Supreme 
Court of Justice; the Ombudsman; the Attorney-General’s Office; the Presidential 
Commission for the Definition, Execution and Supervision of the Prisons Policy; the 
Governing Body of the System for the Protection and Justice of Children and Adolescents; the 
National Office for the Administration of Staff (ONAP); the National Institute for Public 
Administration (INAP); the Dominican Municipal League; the Association for the 
Development of the Province of Salcedo; the Social Forum of  Puerto Plata; the City Hall of 
the National District (ADN). 
84  It is now generally recognised that successful strengthening of Government capacity depends 
on an existing commitment to reform and not on the pressure or leverage of donors (e.g. 
offering increased volumes of aid).  See, for example, Civil Service Reform: A Review of 
World Bank Assistance, World Bank OED Report No.19599, August 1999. 
85  See the global evaluation, Evaluation of European Aid to ACP Countries, Montes, Migliorisi, 
and Wolfe, European Commission, November, 1998 (ref. 951338, available on the web-site of 
the Evaluation Unit, SCR, European Commission also on the DG Development web-site), 
Civil Service Reform: A Review of World Bank Assistance and Aiding Democracy Abroad (see 
footnote 23). 
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This is important in the Dominican Republic, because the EC’s increased focus on 
institutional strengthening has not resulted in a shift away from the use of PMUs.  In fact, few 
projects focus their support only on the civil service.  This is a reaction to the weakness of 
financial controls in Government institutions.  However, it does not contribute to institutional 
strengthening or sustainability, but to more fragmentation.  Within the Government, 
ONAPLAN notes that donors are always in favour of creating new institutions or units rather
than supporting existing ones.  All donors use implementation units and require use of their 
own procedures.86  Even the IDB state reform programme includes a number of units and 
consultants that are only to be integrated into the civil service (Government payroll) at a latter 
stage.  The requirement to use donor procedures places a burden on civil servants, and 
reduces the pressure to improve Government procedures. 
These problems are compounded by the use of consultants (in particular international ones) 
by donors, who receive relatively high fees from donors, affecting the morale of the civil 
service as well as the labour market.87   
5) Slowness and lack of flexibility of EC procedures for institutional support 
The Delegation and the Government hav  noted that EC procedures for the selection of 
consultants are often slow and unreliable (with high variation in the quality of consultants).88  
This affects the likely impact of institutional interventions by the EC.  Moreover, in the 
Dominican Republic the EC is constrained relative to other donors because it normally cannot 
recruit Latin American consultants.89   
A number of Government officials emphasised  that while they appreciate the EC’s openness 
to dialogue, the slowness of procedures (particularly since the formation of SCR) has created 
a number of problems for the implementation of the reform programme – see Section 3.C.  
Particularly serious problems were noted in the support to the justice and public 
administration reform components of PARME.  In justice reform, the Government argues that 
the EC has performed poorly compared to other donors (e.g. Spain) and has contributed to 
delays in  the implementation of key actions (e.g. introducing a system for the care of young 
offenders).   
The problems created by the slowness of procedures is compounded by insufficient back-up 
resources or and insufficient flexibility in the use of resources either for reacting to 
Government requests or for monitoring closely the political and technical evolution of 
programmes (see section 3.C).
                                            
86  However, see Box below on how the IDB and the World Bank integrated their PMU into 
SEEC. 
87  Also note that the use of international consultants i  the design of EC projects has resulted in a 
number of cases in an insufficient emphasis on the political and institutional context (as 
discussed above). 
88  The IDB has been able to recruit high quality consultants for a number of its interventions and 
studies.   
89  Except in the case of PARME, where the EC obtained a derogation from country of origin 
rules (EDF). 
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Strengthening civil society and local government 
The Cotonou agreement has opened EC development cooperation to civil society.  It is 
recognised that civil society can play an important role both in supporting better governance  
and in supporting efficient service delivery to the poor, complementing Government efforts to 
reduce poverty.90  In the Dominican Republic, donors (see Box) and the main political parties 
increasingly recognise the importance of civil society. 91  
                                            
90  The draft World Development Report 2000-2001 also focuses on the importance of civil 
society and the process of empowerment. 
91  The classification of civil society organisations used here reflects that proposed recently by 
consultancies for the INTEC-IDB programme of support to civil society,  Clasificación actual 
y agrupación de las Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil Dominicana (OSC): Descripción de 
sus características.  Itdivides Dominican civil society organisations into 4 groups: 
organisations delivering services to third parties, organisations for civic participation and the 
defence of human rights, community-based organisations, and ‘corporative’ organisations 
(defending the interests of their own members, e.g. professional bodies, trade unions). 
Civil society support 
Possible roles in support of civil society and local government  
· building the capacity of local governments in the poorest areas and supporting partnerships with 
civil society organisations. Civil society organisations may help Government agencies to 
develop more participatory and pro-po r approaches and to pilot innovative projects that the 
Government can then replicate.1 
· building the capacity of community-based organisations in poor areas as a means of ensuring a 
pro-poor focus to interventions, through their knowledge of local conditions, and as a means of 
empowerment, strengthening the social institutions of the poor. 
· supporting advocacy organisations and civic groups – in particular those trying to make State 
institutions more pro-p or and those involved in focusing on issues of better governance, 
democratisation, environment and gender issues. 
Support of other donors in the Dominican Republic 
The increasing role of civil society in the Dominican Republic (see Chapter 1) has led other donors 
to see civil society as an essential element in reform.   
USAID (which has chosen to channel 90 % of its funds through civil society because of low 
transparency and accountability in the Government budget) has been financing Participación 
Ciudadana (as part of its democratisation programme) and PUCMM(as a channel to finance civil 
society organisations).   
The IDB has a programme to strengthen civil society organisations through INTEC.  This has 
included work on an inventory of civil society organisatio s, their mechanisms of articulation and 
the legislative framework in which they operate.  The IDB also has a programme for the 
institutional strengthening of municipalities, in particular Santo Domingo, which includes TA to help 
restructure service dlivery, investment financing, rationalising the legal and regulatory framework, 
and improving the accountability and transparency of municipalities.   
In addition, while the recent consensus-building exercise initiated by the PUCMM, forming part of 
the World Bank’s CDF, is mostly directed at political parties, it has also included a number of key 
civil society organisations and representatives of the private sector.   
Civil society organisations are also increasingly being consulted by donors during strategy 
preparation and project design (e.g. consultations as part of the World Bank’s Country Assistance 
Strategy – see Annex D of the CAS).   
 
1. Such support must not duplicate or undermine Government efforts – the aim is to support collaboration between 
Government and non-governmental service providers.  See ‘Strengthening DFID’s Support for Civil Society’, P. Scothland 
and S. Phillips, report of responses to the Consultation Paper, February 1999.  See also ‘Thinking strategically about 
politics and poverty’, M. Moore and J. Putzel, CIIR, London 1999. 
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EC interventions in the 1st NIP and particularly the 2nd NIP include programmes that 
provide important support to civil society, but the EC lacks an overall strategy in this area 
However, while the EC does not yet have an overall strategy to strengthen civil society 
organisations in the Dominican Republic, it has a number of experiences which, if properly 
evaluated, would provide an important basis for a future strategy in this area.  Moreover, 
consultations with civil society have not been carried out in a systematic manner,92 and 
Delegation staff do not have sufficient time to devote the necessary resources to this area.93   
A number of 1st NIP interventions provided support to civil society organisations, 
including a few programmes which according to their evaluations have had some success in 
supporting the role of civil society in the delivery of social services, particularly Puerto Plata 
and PRISA (see Box).  The Puerto Plata project was not only about delivery of services 
through civil society organisations but also promoted a process of participation and 
concertation between local authorities and different actors in civil society and the private 
sector (though this process faced some challenges as a result of the newly created Consejos de 
Desarrollo Provincial, CDP).94  PROLINO has attempted to achieve a high level of 
involvement of beneficiaries in planning and implementation and to work closely with 
decentralised Government institutions.95  In a number of 1st NIP projects, infrastructure  
components often took priority at the expense of community participation elements (e.g. 
PRIDEP). 
                                            
92  However, the Delegation reports that in October 1999 a consultancy was recruited to promote 
decentralised cooperation in the Dominican Republic, and a number of meetings were held 
with key stakeholders, at provincial and national level. 
93  Other donors have used resource in INTEC and the Centro Montalvo to help prepare strategies 
for interventions in this area (e.g. IDB).   
94  The evaluation noted that the institutional strengthening of provincial planning and of local 
health services were weak relative to other components. 
95  However, the mid-term evaluation questioned the effectiveness of community participation 
within the programme, arguing that beneficiaries had remained ‘beneficiaries’ and had not 
EC projects with components implemented by civil society 
organisations 
Reconstruction of Schools  (2nd NIP) 
One important component of this post-hurricane project is community training in disaster 
preparedness which will be implemented through NGOs.  Twenty disaster prevention and mitigation 
micro-projects will be implemented and executed by communities.  
Technical Support for the Banana Sector (2nd NIP) 
This project, still in preparation, is to be implemented through the Banana Producers’ Committee of 
the JAD (Junta Agroempresarial Dominicana) –  producers’ organisation – in conjunction with the 
Government.  The strong role of JAD in the sector reflects the institutional weakness of the ministry of 
agriculture (SEA) (reported in the PROLINO evaluation).  The beneficiaries (producers – many of 
them small-scale) will be involved in directing the project (through the JAD) and will also be financially 
involved (supplying 1/3 of funds).   
PRISA  (1st NIP) 
The mid-term review of PRISA praised the collaboration with NGOs with well-known technical and 
organisational capacities, which were able to mobilise social participation (particularly for 
environmental health activities, e.g. basic sanitation).  According to the evaluation, success in this 
area benefited from not having to work with SESPAS’s political and institutional constraints (although 
mobilising social participation was itself reported to be a tim -consuming process).1  However, an 
internal evaluation written at the end of the programme noted that the criteria for selecting NGOs were 
not transparent and that the monitoring of community activities was insufficient.2  
 
1. In addition, preparation of the feasibility study had included two working groups which included civil society 
representatives, to test the feasibility of community involvement. 
2. Reflexiones sobre la experiencia: Lecciones aprendidas del Programa Integrado de Salud del Suroeste –
PRISA 1994-1998, PRISA/SESPAS, p.22. 
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2nd NIP interventions have increased support to local government and civil society, 
particularly through PARME and SABAMAR. 
The experiences in the 1st NIP have led the EC to reinforce its support to local governments 
and civil society, principally through PARME.  In addition, some SABAMAR components 
build capacity in civil society organisations, through using community-based organisations 
and NGOs for implementation.  The EC has prepareda number of interventions which are 
implemented through civil society organisations (see Box), partly because the weaknesses of 
Government institutions has in the past reduced the impact of its interventions  (e.g. PRIDEP, 
PROLINO, PASP). 
PARME offers significant support to civil society and local government:   I itially the EC 
had been considering components to support not only decentralisation but also civil society 
(NGOs and CBOs, political parties and trade unions).  However, in the end, the civil society
component became incorporated as a cross-cutting theme with the general aim of increasing 
the ability of citizens to challenge the actions of the State, and strengthening community 
involvement in local politics.96 
The largest component of PARME is support for decentralisation (about 60% of funds), 
although other components also include some small support of civil society:   
· Decentralisation component (the largest PARME component, with €14 million): 
The bulk of funds (€ 10.3 mill) are for institutional strengthening of local 
government and civil society (including partnerships between the two) in the 
provinces of Salcedo and Puerto Plata, with replication of successful projects in 
other provinces.  Funds are also allocated to institutional strengthening of the 
municipality of Santo Domingo (€1.2 mill) and to providing training, information 
systems and technical support for all municipalities (€2.4 mill). Puerto Plata and 
Salcedo were selected for support since they were perceived to have high 
capacity and potential for further development.97   
· Justice component: Activities aimed at strengthening civil society include 
improving the legal framework for monitoring administrative activity (€ 0.4 mill), 
strengthening the Ombudsman’s office (€ 0.4 mill), and increasing civic 
involvement in the administration of justice (€ 0.5 mill). 
· Public administration component: support for civil society consists of increasing 
public awareness of the activity and services of the public administration (€ 0.2 
mill). 
SABAMAR offers innovative support to local government-civil society partnerships.  This
programme includes an innovative approach to improving access to water, sanitati n and the 
collection of solid waste.  The main project components are:  
· construction and rehabilitation of water and sanitation infrastructure (about 70% 
of funds).  This component includes a training and health education element as 
well as sub-components for the legalisation of illegal outlets, the construction of 
latrines and rain water drainage, all of which will be implemented by NGOs (in 
total about half of this component).  
                                                                                                                         
become ‘actors’ (PROLINO: Evaluación Medio Termino, Informe final, Nethconsult, 1997, 
executive summary 5a).  This has been  disputed by the Delegation.     
96  It should also be noted that during the design of PARME, although there were a number of 
difficulties, a significant effort was made to use workshops with active participation by civil 
society actors. 
97  However, in its comments on our evaluation draft report, the Delegation noted that this choice 
of provinces is somewhat arbitrary and is the result of insufficient planning and national 
strategy. 
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· support for interaction between community based organisations and local 
government (about € 2 mill, estimate).  This includes not only support for 
capacity-building in communities (to foster the participation of civil society 
organisations in public debate, through democratic education at community level 
and support for the legal recognition of the Juntas Barriales) but also financial 
support for micro-enterprises for the collection and elimination of solid waste.  
· support to organisations responsible for basic services.  This component includes 
a small element of TA support for ADN.98 
SABAMAR  is to be managed by a PMU, but about half of the activities will be implemented 
either by NGOs or micro-enterprises or will support the capacity of community-based 
organisations and their partnership with the municipality (ADN).99   This should contribute to 
empowering institutions such as the community-based District Committees (Juntas Barriales), 
while the use of micro-enterprises for solid waste management should contribute to 
sustainability.  This approach was possible thanks to the collab ration in the design with 
organisations with experience in this area.100  Int rnational consultants initially presented an 
over-technocratic approach with limited role for civil society in implementation or for 
ensuring the sustainability of the project.  Del gation advisers were able to give directions to 
change the initial approach.   
Success in SABAMAR will depend on good working relations with the civil society 
organisations involved in the project design.  Also the roles of CONAU and a PMU with 
(possibly) insufficient support from the municipality raise potential difficulties and will need 
to be addressed at a later stage.  Project should be more integrated to broader plans to reform 
in the water sector (IDB support). 
 
Factors limiting the effectiveness of EC efforts to strengthen civil 
society and local government 
· Limited EC expertise in the analysis of civil society and decentralisation in the 
Dominican Republic (including knowledge on the institutional and political environment 
affecting the municipality of Santo Domingo).  This is necessary to  reduce the likelihood 
of difficulties (e.g. such as the initial reluctance of the ADN to endorse SABAMAR).  A 
closer monitoring of developments in local government and civil society, as well as more 
systematic consultations with civil society are essential.  This is not a once-off event, but 
a time-consuming process.  The development within the Delegation of specific expertise 
will require the building of on-going relationships with civil society organisations.   
· Limited EC coordination with other donors active in this area(e.g. with the IDB’s 
support for the ADN, in particular its budget management).   More coordination  should 
also facilitate gaining knowledge of civil society organisations – les ons could be learned 
through monitoring the INTEC-IDB programme and the PUCMM-WB consensus-
building exercise. 
                                            
98  Support is also given to central government agencies such as INPRA (examining waste in 
rivers) and SESPAS.   
99  Given that the counterpart for this p oject is CONAU and that the PMU appears to have been 
given considerable autonomy, the EC will have to work hard to gain a more comprehensive 
endorsement from the ADN.   
100  For example, IDDI has worked with CONAU’s RESURE, another water and sanitation 
project in marginal areas of Santo Domingo.  The Centro Montalvo (which has a long history 
of involvement with community-based organisations in the area) also contributed to the 
project design.  Indeed, the intermediation of Centro Montalvo seems to have prevented a 
serious impasse between the EC and the municipality of Santo Domingo.   
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· Slow and insufficiently flexible EC procedures (see previous section) a d weak 
monitoring of performance and financial management.   
· Need to adopt  a new system to select  civil society organisations for support.   
The selection of appropriate civil society organisations to support (in particular those likely to 
have some sustainability beyond the life of an EC intervention) is usually labour-intensive.  
This is a problem for the EC given its insufficient staff resources.  Civil society organisations 
often require small levels of support from donors.101  While the EC Microprojects disburses 
small volumes of funds, using a PMU to assist beneficiaries, the programme requires EC 
approval for each project selected.102   
Selection criteria should also ensure a fair basis for the allocation of funds to civil society 
organisations.  This requires transparent and widely-support d funding criteria.  For example, 
in the Reconstruction of Schools programme, the EC will use national NGOs as 
intermediaries through which to reach local NGOs and community-based organisations.  This 
should allow interaction with only a small number of national NGOs, but the need to ensure 
the selection of appropriate national NGOs still remains. 
These difficulties – workload and the difficulty of selecting civil society organisations to 
work with – could be addressed by the use of intermediate funding organisations which have 
operational independence from the EC.103  Under this system, funds are channelled to civil 
society organisations through a widely-resp cted organisation that applies transparent and 
widely-supported funding criteria, and the EC is then not itself required to assess the merits of 
each organisation to be funded.  The EC’s role remains selecting the appropriate funding 
intermediary and monitoring its choice and application of funding criteria (which should be 
coordinated with other donors as much as possible).  The EC has worked with this model in 
South Africa, through the EU Foundation for Human Rights.  In the Dominican Republic, 
USAID channels funds to civil society through an intermediary by working with the 
PUCMM. 
 
 
B. Donor coordination 
The need for effective donor coordination has beeemphasised by the European Union (and 
other donors) in recent years.  Donors need to be concerned with the quality of all public 
expenditure management and aid interventions, not just with their own interventions.  
Coordination is particularly important in the Dominican Republic since the areas which 
require most support are also the most difficult areas to obtain results (governance, 
institutional reform and support to civil society).   It is also important given the extreme 
institutional fragmentation of the Government, the confrontational nature of political 
competition, and the lack of a national development agenda.   
In the Dominican Republic, only a few Member States have large programmes (Spain and 
Germany have the largest) and USAID remains an influential donor.  The largest programmes 
                                            
101  Some of the civil society organisations which the mission visited (e.g. women’s advocacy 
groups) noted that donors are often unable to provide the small levels of fundingnece sary for 
their activities.   
102  In other countries, Microprojects have been found to have a significant impact on target 
groups, but given that Commission approval is required for each project, they are still time-
consuming. 
103  This funding mechanism might need more flexibility in the rules governing the use of EDF 
funds. 
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are those of multilateral banks (primarily the IDB, but more recently the World Bank too) and 
the EC.      
This section examines the Dominican Government’s role in  donor coordination, and 
coordination between donors at strategy and at intervention level, before pointing to the 
difficulties that stand in the way of effective coordination in the Dominican Republic.104 
i) The Government’s framework for coordination 
Weakness of the Government’s  institutional capacity affects donor coordination 
The weakness of the Government’s institutional capacity and policy framework is a key 
constraint to better donor coordination.  The Government does not have a strong planning and 
budgetary process in which donor initiatives could be integrated.  The weakness in budget and 
sectoral policies contributes to donors’ difficulties in coordinating their interventions in 
support of different sectors.  Moreover, there is no single Government department that 
coordinates all donor aid.  In practice, the STP (Secretariado Técnico de la Presidencia) is in 
charge of all donors except for the EC, which has a special ministry dedicated to it.105   
Location of NAO office affects the coordination of EC programmes 
The lack of a Government coordination unit is further compounded by the extreme 
institutional fragmentation and poor inter-departmental coordination.  While some innovative 
programmes may be carried out with the support of the NAO office (e.g. SABAMAR, Puerto 
Plata),  the location of the NAO office ten makes it more difficult for the EC to be involved 
in general or sectoral reforms, reforms of the budget and policy dialogue (see Box on page 
40).  The STP, in charge of (weak) budget planning and implementation has more 
institutional links with line ministries.  The STP is in a stronger position than the NAO office 
to ensure coherence of donor interventions.   At sectoral level, the duplication of Government 
institutions and their overlapping responsibilities have l d different donors to work with 
different Government units on similar tasks (see Section 3.A.1 above on the parallel roles of 
the STP and CPRyME in public administration reform, and the parallel work of SESPAS and 
the CERSS in reform of the health sector).  
Donor competition in the Dominican Republic 
Some donors argue that the Government actually prefers donors to act separately, so that 
funds can be accessed with fewer conditions and transparency, and so that institutions may 
allocate their funds in a clientelistic manner (e.g. local consultancies, PMUs, etc).  At the 
same time, a number of Government officials recognise that many donors have incentives to 
compete with one another because they are trying to disburse loans and grants as fast as they 
can and may be especially eager to support a country as economically successful as the 
Dominican Republic and one in which donors have strong commercial interests.  
Donor support for consensus on a broad national agenda 
Donors are increasingly recognising that for effective institutional reforms in a country such 
as the Dominican Republic, the development agenda needs to reflect a consensus within the 
country, and should not be determined solely by either the current Government or donors 
themselves.  In this context, the World Bank’s CDF initiative has been supporting the recent 
                                            
104  The findings in this section are based on interviews with key donors. 
105  Recently, the Spanish Government has been supporting an office within the STP (International 
Cooperation Directorate) to be the counterpart of all donors.  However, the department has 
very limited staff resources.  Donors should work together to support a single institution that 
coordinates all aid and that has a direct and transparent link to the planning and budgeti g 
process.   
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mesas de trabajo initiated by the PUCMM (see Chapter 1).  The World Bank has so far 
played a background role, allowing the main focus of the process to be the building of 
consensus betw en the political parties.106  While the World Bank’s approach may have aided 
consensus-building, a number of donors mentioned during interviews that they felt excluded 
from the process, so there is scope for greater use of the process in facilitating donor 
coordination.  The second phase of this exercise should extend the involvement of other 
donors  (e.g. for the second phase of the process the PUCMM has already requested financial 
support from the EC for work on cross-bo der integration with Haiti and decentralisation).   
ii) Donor coordination at strategic level  
Coordination has been very weak but has improved since 1998.  Sectoral meetings have 
begun only now 
Coordination or even exchange of general information between donors had been extremely 
weak.  However, coordination between the EC and other donors has gradually improved since 
1998 (coinciding with the arrival of the new Head of Delegation)  with coordination meetings 
at Ambassadorial level carried out more or less once a month.  The high level of these 
meetings however has limited their usefulness.  At the time of our mission, this problem was 
being addressed through the introduction of sector meetings, with lead donors selected in each 
sector. 
Weak coordination has resulted in little complementarity between most key donors (not just 
the EC).  There appears to be insufficient donor specialisation, and in many areas there 
appears to be a duplication of donors’ interventions (see Table).  This is also the case for the 
EC’s strategy (see first Chapter), contributing to the work-load of Delegation staff (see 
section 3.C below) and to some duplication with the work of other donors, particularly the 
IDB.    The political mandate to enhance coordination with Member States is contributing to 
greater interest in strategy consultations.  A number of donors have expressed their interest in 
further coordination at strategy level.107   
                                            
106  The relatively low profile that the World Bank is keeping in the Dominican Republic is 
positive, as consensus-building initiatives such as this need to be locally-driven.  However, 
more generally, the limited role of the IMF and the World Bank in the country (including the 
absence of consultative group meetings) may have contributed to weak donor coordination, 
and to poor donor knowledge of macro issues.  The World Bank only recently opened a 
Resident Mission and has not yet shared its social sector studies and other economic and 
social sector work with other donors.  Its poverty assessment work has so far received little 
input from other donors, even though the WB expects that other donors will support its 
recommendations.   
107  The sharing of country analyses (e.g. the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy) should  
contribute to strategy-l vel coordination.   
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Sectors of activity of different donors 
 EC Spain Germany France Italy UK IDB WB USAID UNDP 
Education           
Health           
Water           
Governance/ 
civil society 
          
Justice           
Energy           
Environment           
Private 
sector 
          
Source: Delegation, Dominican Republic Mid-Term Review Presentation, February 2000 
 
iii) Donor coordination in specific interventions 
The relations between the EC and other donors appear to be generally good, particularly since 
1998, and there is some exchange of information on their interventions.  However,  
interventions are still designed with little coordination among key donors and donor 
competition is sometimes present.    Donors focus on the design and implementation of their 
own interventions, with limited involvement in monitoring the overall performance of the 
sector they are working in or the interventions of o her donors.  This is the case even when 
EC projects and those of other key donors have the potential of becoming complementary or 
of overlapping.  Similarly, each donor requires its own implementation procedures, and little 
emphasis has been given so far to strengthening the Government’s own budgetary and 
implementation procedures.   
Discussion of EC financing proposals 
A number of Member States expressed their satisfaction with the system by which financing 
proposals are presented in the Dominican Republic b fore they are sent to the EDF 
Committee at Headquarters.  They also noted that, given the time they have in which to 
analyse these projects, they can only have a very limited input into project preparation.   
Little progress in designing  projects with other donors 
The absence of Government sector strategies affects donor coordination in specific 
interventions.  Donors, including  the EC (see main Box on coordination during EC project 
preparation), have made little progress in design g projects together.  In some cases, projects 
are designed separately and there is little coordination during implementation even though 
they share the same problem analysis and actions (e.g. in the health sector reform 
programmes of the EC, the IDB and the World Bank, or in the reform and administration of 
the state, for the EC and the IDB).  
In other cases, separate project designs are in part attributable to differences in analysis ( .g. 
in technical and professional education, the EC is supporting polytechnics through the SEEC 
while the IDB is supporting the Ministry of Labour, for a greater role of the private sector).  
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However, in most cases there has been limited contact between donors, and projects are 
insufficiently integrated into a sector strategy.   
Coordination between USAID and IDB 
This is facilitated by close links between their headquarters.  In the Dominican Republic, the 
USAID and IDB routinely take each other’s projects into account during the design phase, 
with relevant management and technical staff meeting regularly both in-cou try and at 
Headquarters for each project where both donors are involved.  Coordination along these lines 
between other key donors is obviously difficult to achieve but would significantly enhance aid 
effectiveness.   
The EC is trying  to coordinate its support to the private sector with other donors 
In the preparation of a new private sector project, the EC appears to have used extensive 
consultations with other donors (including the sharing of diagnostic and pre-appraisal 
reports).  The EC also tried to coordinate with the IDB, and EC officials visited Washington 
for this purpose.  The EC is also working towards enhanced coordination on health sector 
reform. 
Consequences of poor project coordination: overlap of activities and donor competition for 
Government resources 
· overlap of activities.  Donors may design projects that to some extent overlap.  This is 
made more likely by the high institutional fragmentation within the Government, which 
makes it possible for two donors to have different counterparts for similar work (e.g. the 
EC and IDB in public administration reform and health sector reform).  Moreover, the 
overlap of support to these reform programmes (if implementation is not coordinated 
between the donors) could contribute o the fragmentation of the reform effort (not one 
but many reform programmes in one 
sector) and allow the Government not to 
take clear reform actions while still 
receiving support from one of the many 
uncoordinated donors in the sector. 
Donors should consider co-financing or 
parallel financing.  The EC has not been 
involved in co-financing in the 
Dominican Republic as yet.108   
· donor competition for Government  
resources.  Donors establish PMUs to 
ensure the effective implementation of 
their own projects.  Where donors 
design related projects separately, PMUs 
are likely to be in competition with each 
other for the attention (and personnel, 
given the PMU salaries) of the 
department concerned (though see Box 
on PMUs in the education sector for a 
story of positive change).  This further 
fragments Government institutions.  
                                            
108  The request of the IDB to the EC to co-finance its public administration reform programme 
was not accepted.  On co-financing, note the significant steps taken by the EC programme in 
Mozambique (Evaluation of EC Country Strategy: Mozambique 1996-2000, forthcoming). 
PMUs in the education sector 
The IDB and World Bank have had 
programmes supporting primary education 
through the department of education (SEEC).  
They have recently cooperated in order to 
reduce the distortions that were previously 
created by their implementation units. 
In the 1st phase of their programmes, the IDB 
and World Bank had separate implementing 
units.  Even though both programmes fitted 
into the department’s 10-year plan, according 
to SEEC officials the fact of having two 
separate units reduced coordination and their 
wage policies affected morale within the 
ministry, making integration with Government 
structures difficult.   
However, in the 2nd phase, the IDB and World 
Bank have integrated their implementing units 
and  brought in a uniform salary policy for 
those inside and outside the implementation 
units.  According to SEEC officials, this has 
enhanced coordination and has facilitated 
integration of project activities into the 
department. 
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Donor coordination in EC interventions 
Public Administration Reform.  The EC and the IDB both have major programmes in support of State 
reform.  Consultations were held between the two donors, but while the EC component for public 
administration reform and the IDB target similar objectives, the programme designs are not linked, and 
they work with different counterparts (CPRyME for the EC, and the STP for the IDB).     
By the time the EC’s feasibility study began, the IDB had already developed considerable in-country
expertise, which should have benefited EC project preparation more strongly.  In July 1997, the IDB 
formally approached the EC for co-financing of the IDB programme.  This was not accepted by EC 
headquarters.  
Initially, the IDB chose to work with CPRyME as its counterpart, as the EC is now doing.  However, the 
IDB subsequently changed its strategy and decided to work with the STP instead.  The IDB has stated 
that CPRyME did not have sufficient political support to be an effective implementing institution. 
(Implementation of the IDB’s programme is currently blocked – see p.19). 
Health sector reform.   The EC intervention seems to have closely followed the analysis and activities 
of the IDB.  (The EC consultant had attempted to design a project which would fit into the ‘gaps’ left by 
the IDB and WB programmes, though this was seen as a weakness from the perspective of the PRISA 
implementation team.)  The EC has some expertise in the health sector (through PRISA and support 
from Headquarters).  However,  the IDB questions the need for yet another significant support to reform 
in the sector, particularly given SESPAS’s perceived low commitment to reform (see Section 3.A.1).   
Moreover, while the EC Delegation is keen to i crease coordination in the sector, coordination has so far 
been relatively weak.  The programmes also have different counterparts.  Whereas the EC is working 
with the ministry (SESPAS), the IDB and WB are working with the CERSS (Comisión Ejecutivo para la 
Reforma del Sector Salud).1  Ideally, donors should work together to support the same institution and 
should target their support where a commitment to reform has been demonstrated. 
In this context, the Government (STP) organised a meeting in May 1999 which brought together 
Government bodies (including SESPAS, the CERSS and the EC NAO) and donors (including the IDB, 
WB, EC, USAID and Spain).  It was agreed that coordination should be led through an Inter-agency 
Coordination Committee, and through a joint technical committee for monitoring and evaluation of health 
sector reform projects. 
SABAMAR.   The EC consultancy preparing SABAMAR seems to have benefited from information on 
the IDB programme, and SABAMAR includes the conditionalities of the IDB programme – the third 
phase of SABAMAR is conditional on (i) the Ley de Agua Potable y Saneamiento, which is supported by 
the IDB programme, and (ii) the capitalisation and reform of CAASD, also supported by the IDB.  
(However, other relevant IDB programmes, e.g. support to local development – in particular to the 
municipality of Santo Domingo – do not seem to have been taken into account.)  
However, while the IDB has a number of operations in the sector (Consolidation of Water and Sanitation 
Sector and TA for Consolidation of Water and Sanitation Reform, Modernization of the Potable Water 
and Sewerage Sector and Legal Framework of the Water and Sanitation Sector), interviews indicate that 
the IDB’s level of information on the EC project seems to be limited.  Coordination of EC and IDB 
activities appears weak.  The link with the UNDP RESURE programme can also be improved (with the 
help of CONAU).  
The fact that the coordinating counterpart of the EC programme is CONAU (and the NAO office) may 
create difficulties as many of the conditionalities and activities of SABAMAR require commitment and 
support from the central Government and the Santo Domingo Municipality. 
Technical education.  In technical education too, preparation of the EC programme began after the IDB 
had begun preparing a major programme in the area.  There was consultation between the EC and the 
IDB, and the EC put effort into avoiding overlap between its feasibility study and the IDB’s sub-sector 
study, the IDB’s background analysis being relevant also tothe EC. 
In the end, the two donors have designed rather different programmes, with different philosophies 
underlying them.  While the IDB is supporting vocational education through the private sector, with the 
Ministry of Labour as its counterpart, the EC programme is supporting technical education through the 
largely Government-run polytechnic system, with SEEC as its counterpart.  However, it seems that the 
EC’s project design reflects the analysis of the IDB’s sub- ector study, which the IDB itself went on o 
reject.  The differences between the projects in part reflects the weak sectoral policies of the 
Government.  It is important that during implementation of the programme, there should be effective 
coordination with the IDB.   
Post-hurricane reconstruction.  In some countries (e.g. Papua New Guinea, Liberia), donor 
coordination is improved when donors try to address urgent difficulties.   In the case of Hurricane 
Georges, however, donors seem to have responded with separate interventions to support pot-
hurricane reconstruction, with limited coordination.  
 
1.  The CERSS includes representatives of SESPAS (as well as the STP, IDSS, CPRyME, other ministries and NGOs). 
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Factors limiting donor coordination 
The principal constraints on effective donor coordination in the Dominican Republic are the 
Government’s institutional weaknesses, including the institutional pos ion of the NAO, and 
limited consensus on the development agenda.  However, factors linked to the donors’  
organisational set-up are also important : 
· The EC Delegation has limited decision-maki g power, whereas other donors (e.g. IDB) 
have much more flexibility for in-country decision-making. Moreover, the slow pace of 
the EC’s procedures makes coordination difficult, since the EC is unable to move at the 
same speed as other donors (see next section).   
· The EC Delegation has limited staff to supprt coordination, given burdensome 
procedures and a large number of projects per staff member  
· EC aid projects are generally designed by international consultants, with limited 
supervision from the Government (given its institutional weakness) or the EC Delegation 
staff (given their workload)109.  By contrast, the design of programmes by the multilateral 
banks and other donors is more closely supervised by staff-members.  A consultant does 
not have a strong incentive (or capacity) to ensure that the project is well coordinated 
with other donors.110  Consultants do not have decision-making power to be credible 
coordinators with other donors, nor do they generally have enough knowledge of other 
donors’ procedures.  
· Coordination also depends on the personal relationship between different donors’ staff 
members.  
 
Improved donor coordination in the future? 
Donors such as the EC, IDB and USAID expressed to our mission a clear willingness to 
extend coordination further, particularly given the need to support institutional reform and  
civil society (though at the same time they recognise that coordination may sometimes be 
limited by donors’ different commercial and ideological interests). 
 
 
                                            
109  However, note that Delegation advisers have made important contributions during the 
preparation of certain projects (see p.40).  
110  In recent interventions, however, the EC has insisted on consultants carrying out workshops 
with a number of stakeholders. 
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C. The Commission’s resources and 
procedures 
Institutional strengthening and donor co rdination require that Delegation staff have 
sufficient time and resources to carry out analysis and dialogue.  This is only possible if the 
EC programme maintains a strong focus, changes its resources and procedures and puts 
greater emphasis on monitoring and learning systems.  The EC’s weaknesses in these areas 
are well known,111 but if changes are not made it will not be possible to implement an 
effective country strategy. 
This section examines three factors which have made it difficult for the EC to become a 
‘knowledge-based donor’,112 constraining its ability to carry out essential analysis and to learn 
from past experience: i) weak focus of the EC programme, ii) staff resources are being over-
stretched (in part by time-consuming and inefficient procedures) and; iii) weak learning 
systems within the Commission. 
i) EC programme shows a weak focus 
The EC is preparing or implementing projects in a wide range of sectors (programmable aid  
adds to  € 204.5 million in the first two NIPs).  The Table shows all the sectors in which the 
Delegation is active (with only 3 advisers).  In this context, ea h d legation adviser manages 
a portfolio of projects often in a wide range of sectors.  For example, the Economic 
Councillor is responsible for monitoring economic developments, for projects in the health 
sector and in private sector development.  This may result in a skills mismatch and may make 
it more difficult for advisers to develop sectoral expertise.  Given that donor aid is small 
relative to the Dominican Government budget or its economy, not only is the work-load of 
advisers difficult to manage but also the EC’s impact is diluted. 
 
                                            
111  See the Evaluation of EU Aid to ACP countries,  Montes, Migliorisi and Wolfe, European 
Commission, November 1998 (ref. 951338, available on the web-site of the Evaluation Unit,  
SCR, European Commission and also on the DG Development web-site. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/scr/evaluation/reports/acp/951338.pdf.  
112  Current thinking suggests that donors will have an impact principally through the ideas they 
contribute (e.g. through innovative, replicable projects), rather than the mon y t ey bring (see 
Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why, World Bank, 1998).  Donors are in 
principle in a strong position to act as intermediaries in the transfer of ‘best practice’ 
knowledge, supporting the creation, transfer and adaptation of knowledge to recipient 
countries (see World Development Report 1998-99: Knowledge for Development, World 
Bank).  However, effective technical advice and TA can only given if the Commission itself is 
able to manage in-country knowledge (political, economic, technical, sectoral), knowledge of 
the success of its own interventions, and ‘best-practice’ sectoral knowledge. 
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Active sectors for the EC in the Dominican Republic 1 
Sector Volume of EC aid 
Governance & civil society € 29.5 mill 
Rural development € 26.6 mill 
Sysmin € 23 mill 
Water supply € 21.8 mill 
Education € 20.45 mill 
Energy € 18.9 mill 
Health & population € 12 mill 
Transport & communications € 6.5 mill 
Banking, finance & business services  € 4.2 mill 
Agriculture € 1.5 mill 
Regional and bi-national 2  
Agriculture (regional) 
 
€ 22.2 mill 
Education (regional) € 21 mill 
Tourism (regional) € 12.8 mill 
Trade (regional) € 14 mill 
Environment (bi-national) € 4 mill 
1. Sectoral classification follows the one used in The European Community External 
Cooperation Programmes: Policies, Management and Distribution, EC/ODI, 1999.  
Sectors included in the table are those in which the EC currently has programmes or 
projects open (approved, not yet closed). 
2. Only a proportion of regional and bi-national programmes are overseen by the EC 
Delegation in the Dominican Republic. 
 
2nd NIP further reduced the focus of the EC aid programme 
The 2nd NIP moved from programmes with a relatively narrow geographical scope (e.g. 
PROLINO, PRISA, PRIDEP) to programmes involving institutional strengthening at the 
centre as well as support for civil society (PARME, SABAMAR, Health Sector Reform).  
This move has made the portfolio of projects more complex and more time-consuming.   
Moreover, some of these programmes re complex, including very different components (e.g. 
PARME has 3 distinct components, covering 17 distinct activities, while SABAMAR has 6 
areas of activity, the largest of which includes 12 distinct activities with a range of different 
implementing agents and supervising bodies) 
The EC has also begun work in new sub-sectors, e.g. the shift in education from primary to 
technical education.  While some of these changes may be justified, they further expand the 
range of EC activity.  However, some continuity has also been maintained (see table below). 
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Continuity of project components from 1st NIP to 2nd NIP   
Sector 113 1st NIP projects / components Continuity 2nd NIP projects / components 
  PARME (justice) 
  PARME (public admin) 
Governance 
and civil 
society 
Puerto Plata è PARME (decentralisation) 
Water 
supply 
  SABAMAR 114 
PRIDEP (è) Reconstruction of schools 
Education 
  Technical education 
PRISA è Health sector reform 
(institutional strengthening at 
central and decentralised lev ls)
  Supply of medicines 
Health and 
population 
  Management of human 
resources 
PROLINO   Rural dev / 
agriculture   Banana sector support 
Energy Los Toros   
Transport 
& 
communics 
  Reconstruction of road 
infrastructure 
Str. adj. PROSIP I and II   
Sysmin Geological and mining 
programme 
  
 
                                            
113  Sectoral classification follows the one used in The European Community External 
Cooperation Programmes: Policies, Management and Distribution, EC/ODI, 1999.  
114  Some components of PRISA had involved water and sanitation. 
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ii) EC staff resources are over-stretched 
Compared to staff from other donors,  EC staff have little time to devote to project design and 
to monitoring projects and wider developments in the country.   This is a result of the pressure 
of a high commitment and disbursement requirement, and burdensome EC procedures (more 
time is often spent on procedures for procuring consultants than on conducting project 
preparation studies).  Delays often lead to  criticism from the Government (.g. in the support 
of justice reform). 
High commitment and disbursement requirement.  The difficulty of incorporating best 
practice in institutional strengthening projects (including projects such as PARME and 
SABAMAR) arises from the need to get projects approved speedily.  In some cases, projects 
are approved even where the policy framework or implementation structures are not clear.  
For example, SABAMAR was approved by the EDF Committee before the final report of the 
feasibility study was fully completed and before discussions with the municipality of Santo 
Domingo were resolved.  More recently, the Delegation noted that the recent private sector 
intervention runs the risk of being approved by the EC before real internalisation by the 
Government.  
Time-consuming administrative procedures.  The complexity and inefficiency of EC 
administrative procedures is well-documented.  The speed of implementation and the pressure 
on staff would be considerably improved by reducing the extent of ex an controls, and 
making more comprehensive use of ex post audits of projects.  A more comprehensive use of 
audits could also address the difficulties created by the weaknesses in financial management 
within the Government and PMUs (e.g. PRIDEP, structural adjustment counterpart funds, 
etc.), which are very time-consuming for the Commission to resolve.   
Complex projects.  Designing projects with several diverse components may be seen as a way 
of reducing the workload involved in project preparation, but the effect may be that individual 
components are not examined on their own merits sufficiently.  Complex projects are also 
harder to monitor, so they are likely to contribute less to knowledge in a given sector for both 
the EC and the Government.  Oversight of complex projects is typically the responsibility of 
large committees which tend not to meet regularly and not be very effective, e.g. mid-term 
reviews of PRIDEP and PRISA reported that monitoring committees had met irregularly, with 
the National Committee for PRISA having met only once. 
Excessive reliance of consultants of variable quality.  Given the shortage of EC staff, 
consultants often play too large a role in the design and implementation of EC programmes, 
and it is difficult for both the Government and the EC to monitor he  sufficiently.  This 
affects project quality (local knowledge is weak) and donor coordination.   Consultants also 
have limited time in which to design projects (given the delays in the selection of 
consultants)115.    
Both the Government and the Delegation have noted that the quality of consultants recruited 
by the EC is highly variable, and in some cases poor quality consultants are recruited.  The 
low fees and delays in payments seem to be important factors.  Limited competition may be 
an additional factor.  Other donors with more flexible contracting arrangements and which 
have more programmes in the region seem to have fewer problems in this area.  Project 
                                            
115  However, project documents show the contribution that Delegation staff have made to 
improving the quality of project design by consultants, through pointing out the institutional 
weaknesses of consultants’ designs, or through requiring consultation with civil society 
through workshops (e.g. in PARME and SABAMAR).  See previous discussions on the role 
of advisers in SABAMAR and Technical and Professional Education (to include analysis of 
the institutional context). 
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design, sectoral analysis and capacity-building require the recruitment of high quality 
expertise.     
Shortage of staff with specialist skills in areas of central importance in the Dominican 
Republic: institutional strengthening and support for civil society, as well as poverty, gender 
and the environment.  It is essential that Delegation advisers should have expertise in these 
key areas.  Only in some areas has specialist support been given by Headquarters, e.g. in the 
health sector.  Staff do not receive the support of peer reviewers on projects, and there is little 
quality support within the Delegation.  (In the South Africa Delegation, for example, a 
‘Quality Support Group’ has been established at Delegation level.)   
iii) Weak learning systems within the Commission 
Insufficient analytical work 
As a result of the pressure on staff time, insufficient analytical work is carried out by the EC 
in the Dominican Republic.  Most analysis is tied to projects, so there is only limited time for 
wider analysis of the political and economic situation, and because of resources, consultants 
are not commissioned to carry out this work on behalf of the Delegation.  Evaluations show 
that it is this wider knowledge, and not the technical aspects of design, which facilitates 
institutional reform.  Other donors (e.g. the IDB and the World Bank) devote more resources 
to gaining an understanding of political and institutional factors that affect the process of 
reform in the country.116 
Monitoring and evaluations are not carried out systematically  
Project evaluations and monitoring – which are essential if the Commission is to learn from 
its experiences and design more effective interventions – have not been carried out 
systematically: 
· Final evaluations have only been carried out for a few EC projects: Puert  Plata and 
PASP – see table.117  There is no available evaluation on the support to structural 
adjustment (PROSIP and SIP) – see footnote 61.  Quality of evaluations is variable.  
For example, a number of Commission staff noted inadequate quality of the Sysmin 
evaluation.  On the other hand, the evaluation of PASP included participatory 
elements.  No evaluations have been carried out jointly with other donors or with the 
participation of civil society.  
· Mid-term reviews are often carried out too late in the project, restri ing useful 
changes to the project.  For example, in the case of PRIDEP, the Financing Proposal 
had specified that there should be an annual evaluation as well as a final evaluation.  
In the event, there was only one evaluation.118  Th s was carried out towards the end 
of the project, too early to be a final evaluation but too late to allow for substantial 
reorientation of the programme – even though the evaluation was highly critical.119  
· Use of impact indicators is weak.  The development and use of simple and 
measurable indicators for monitoring the impact of programmes and projects (rather 
                                            
116  A good example of a report commissioned by another donor that analyses the political and 
institutional context of State reform is Reform and Modernization of the Stat , a study 
prepared for the IDB in October 1997 by the Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal 
Sector, University of Maryland. 
117  See footnote 120. 
118  Evaluación del Programa Integrado de Desarrollo de la Educación Primaria a Nivel Local 
(PRIDEP), Carl Bro Management, October 1997. 
119  However, there have been a number of rightly timed recent mid-term reviews of regional 
programmes. 
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than indicators for monitoring ‘physical’ project results) is weak.  This is particularly 
the case for large projects that have complex logical frameworks with a large number 
of indicators. 
· Important gaps in audits.  While many projects receive regular audits, there appear to 
have been important gaps.  For example, PRIDEP began in 1994 and should have 
been audited annually.  However, the first audit was carried out only in 1997.  The 
audit pointed out a number of weaknesses in financial management, illustrating the 
need for more regular audits.  PRISA also was not audited until 1997, in spite of 
implementation beginning in 1994.  The NAO office was audited in 1997-98 and a 
number of weaknesses were identified.   
 
Evaluations available (mid-term and final) – EDF 7 only 
Project / programme Mid-term review Final evaluation 
PRIDEP ü û 
PRISA ü ? 120 
PASP û ü 
PROLINO ü –  
Micro-projects – – 
Puerto Plata ü ü 
Structural adjustment û ? 121 
Regional: 
Carib. University Level Programme 
Tourism sector programme 
Trade development programme 
Carib. Agric. & Fisheries Programme 
Environmental trans-border project 
 
ü 
ü 
ü 
ü 
– 
 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
Note: ‘ –  ‘ implies project not yet completed.     
Feedback from mid-term reviews and evaluations is gradually improving   
In a number of cases the mid-term reviews and evaluations have given important feedback to 
Commission staff, who appear to have actively discussed and in some cases acted on this 
information.  In the case of PROLINO, a mid-term evaluation that was critical of some 
components of the programme gave rise to a strong debate on how the programme should be 
reoriented to increase its impact.  In the case of PRISA, the mid-term r view recognised that 
many of the weaknesses of the programme resulted from the institutional weaknesses of 
SESPAS and therefore it was recommended that a subsequent programme should focus more 
on management systems, including support for sectoral reform at central level.  This led to th  
Health Sector Reform programme.  More recently, evaluations of regional programmes seem 
to be contributing to a re-thinking of the direction of these activities (e.g. the Caribbean 
Agriculture and Fisheries Programme).   
                                            
120  A final evaluation of  PRISA was not available to the evaluators.   
121  The Evaluation Unit inventory shows the existence of the evaluation Programa de 
Importación de Petroleos, Dominican Republic, 1994.  However, copies of this evaluation 
were not found.  
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However, institutional learning is often limited by the extensive use of consultants.  Not only 
is it hard to ensure that consultants take into account the lessons the EC has already learned 
from past experience, but the experience that the consultants themselves gain may primarily 
remain with them, rather than being internalised within the Commission.   
Given the weakness of Government institutions and budget procedures, it is important that  
evaluations are independent and that both evaluations and audits are carried out to 
international standards and in a more systematic manner.  There has been progress in this 
area, as there is a more consistent requirement for evaluations and audits in recent financial 
proposals.  Evaluations and audits should also be used as an exercise to build these capacities 
in the Government.  
D. Explaining EC performance, by sector 
The following table summarises the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 and aims to present 
schematically (but tentatively) the EC’s performance (or likely performance) in its sectors of 
intervention in the Dominican Republic.    
 
 
Sector 1 / 
criterion 2 
Relevance 
3 
Prior 
successful  
experience 
in the 
country 4 
Focus 
in the 
sector 
5 
EC relations 
with 
institutions – 
Govt & civil 
society 
Likelihood 
of donor 
comple-
mentarity 
Likely 
impact 6 
Health,  
population + + + +/- +/- +/- 
Governance,  
civil society + +/- - +/- - +/- 
Agric.,  rural 
development + +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- 
Water supply + - +/- +/- +/- +/- 
Education +/- - - - +/- - 
Energy - - + +/- +/- - 
Banking, bus. ss. 
(private sector) - - + +/- - - 
Sysmin  - +/- +/- +/- - -/+ 
1. Sectoral classification follows the one used in Th  European Community External Cooperation Programmes: Policies, 
Management and Distribution, EC/ODI, 1999. 
2. Ratings range from + (high) to – (low). 
3. Relevance to country analysis (see ch.1), on the basis of Maastricht priority objectives (good governance, poverty reduction, 
gender equality and environmental protection). 
4. History of prior EC involvement and success of prior EC projects in the sector (in the Dominican Republic). 
5. Focus of EC interventions within the sector (including focus of components within single programmes). 
6. Preliminary assessment based on quality of project preparation and mid-term or final evaluations when available. 
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4.  Recommendations 
These recommendations should assist the EC in preparing its Country Support Strategy for 
the Dominican Republic.  They take into account the Cotonou Agreement and its emphasis on 
good governance, on a new partnership that embodies the participation of civil society, and on 
poverty reduction as the central objective of the new partnership.  The recommendations also 
take into account the Commission’s guidelines on the 9th EDF programming process. 
Ensuring relevance of the strategy 
1. Objectives: good governance and the reduction of poverty.  The EC’s country support 
strategy in the Dominican Republic should focus on two principal objectives:122 
· Firstly: good governance, including democratisation and the rule of law  
· Secondly: the reduction of poverty. 
2. Flexibility needs to be uilt into the new strategy.  The new programming framework 
allows scope for flexibility in the financial allocation to each country, with a ‘base case’ 
and a ‘high case’ scenario.   The country support strategy should set out the risks 
associated with different scenarios regarding the country and the EC programme, as well 
as the appropriate EC response to these scenarios.     
Flexibility is also needed in response to possible negotiations on a Regional Economic 
Partnership Agreement with the EU.  
3. The strategy should be closely linked to specific actions in institutional reform and 
the Government’s focus on poverty, .g. implementation of the budget reform law, or 
specific actions and progress in the reform of public administration.  These actions (or the 
absence of them) should trigger the ‘high case’ (or ‘base case’) scenario.123  The trigger 
actions should be agreed between all major donors, and could also cover:  
· governance (including predictability and openness of policy-making, 
accountability of the executive, the rule of law, and the code of good practice for  
fiscal transparency) and the efficiency of Government’s service delivery (e.g. 
through tracking studies of education and health expenditures). 
· the Government’s commitment to poverty reduction (e.g. approval of specific 
measures within a poverty reduction action plan)  
4. The trigger actions should be assessed critically and should help determine both 
amounts of aid and type of interventions:  
a) Amount of aid to the country.  Strong performance should reult in additional 
funds being made available.    
                                            
122  These objectives draw together the objectives of ACP-EC cooperation identified in the 
Cotonou Agreement and the key characteristics of the Dominican Republic identified in 
chapter 1. 
123  The ‘high case’ scenario should also ‘cover unforeseen needs such as emergency assistance, 
contributions to internationally agreed debt relief initiatives and support to mitigate adverse 
effects of instability in export earnings’. (Working Document from the Commission: The 9th 
EDF Programming Process, Part II: Background Material, Guidelines on Specific Issues and 
Thematic Guidelines, p.62). 
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b) Type of interventions.  The weaker is the central Government’s performance on 
these indicators, the greater should be the emphasis on developing interventions 
supporting local governments and civil society.124  This is consistent with the  
focus on good governance in the Cotonou Agreement (e.g. Articles 9 and 10). 
5. Preparation of the country support strategy should be linked to civil society 
consultation processes (Cotonou Agreement Article 4).  The next EC stra egy hould be 
linked to the results of civil society processes – with the involvement of the main political 
parties – that are working to build a consensus around a national development agenda 
(e.g. the PUCMM-led mesas de trabajo, F ro Ciudadano, etc).  The EC should monitor 
developments in civil society closely and maintain an on-goi g dialogue  with the main 
political parties and with representative civil society and private sector organisations.   
Increasing the focus of EC aid 
6. Focus the aid programme, to increase expertise and influence.  The EC must reduce 
the number of its areas of intervention in the Dominican Republic, if it is to increase its 
expertise in those areas where it intervenes and if it is thereby to have a greater impact.  
Greater focus i  essential if the EC is to devote sufficient resources to monitoring 
macroeconomic, political and sectoral developments, to donor coordination, and to 
consultation with civil society – all of which are time-consuming.  The process of 
focusing activities (which implies leaving some sectors or activities to other donors) is a 
difficult one, but it is now understood as the only way to ensure a greater development 
impact. 
7. Identify a small number of areas of comparative advantage.  The EC should focus its 
interventions in a small number of narrowly defined areas in which it has – or can 
develop – a comparative advantage vis-à-vis other donors.  It is important that reducing 
the number of areas of intervention does not imply expanding the scope of each area. 
8. Suggested principal areas of intervention: health sector and strengthening 
governance and civil society.  This is a tentative recommendation, however our analysis 
suggests that the EC should focus its programme in two areas:125 (1) sectoral reform in the 
health sector, and (2) strengthening governance, civil society and local governments.  
These areas are examined in some detail in sections C and D below where the choice of 
actors and processes is discussed.  
9. Secondary area of intervention: bi-national projects with Haiti.  In addition, (3) 
increased support should be given to bi- a ional programmes of cooperation with 
Haiti126).  Such support could follow the framework of supporting partnerships between 
government and civil society, and of direct support for civil society organisations (see 
                                            
124  Though, as noted below, it is recommended that an important component of the EC 
programme should be in support of local governments and civil society even if Government 
performance is relatively strong. 
125  According to the new EC programming guidelines, ‘there should be no more than two clearly 
identified focal sectors in a medium to large size indicative programme (above € 40m), with 
as few activities as possible within each sector’ (Working Document from the Commission: 
The 9th EDF Programming Process, Part II: Background Material, Guidelines on Specific 
Issues and Thematic Guidelines, p.44). 
126      Which is also consistent with the identification of ‘regional integration and cooperation, 
including tackling of transboundary economic, social and environmental problems’ as an area 
of global concentration for the EC. Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament: The European Community’s Development Policy, COM(2000) 212, 
April 2000, p.25. 
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section D below).  In all cases, given the difficulty of these programmes, a realistic plan 
and close monitoring of project results, impact and financial management are essential.   
10. Caution in the use of programme aid (and use of evaluations).127    
The use of structural adjustment funds is not contemplated for the new strategy because 
the country is not currently eligible.128  If this was to change, the EC’s first step should 
then be to carry out a careful evaluation of its previous ex erience in support of structural 
adjustment (e.g. PROSIP).  It is recommended that budget support should only be used in 
a joint approach by major donors 129 which focused on simple and clear benchmarks of 
progress in the transparency and efficiency of the budget and public administration 
reform.  Such an intervention could be linked with EC support for health sector reform 
(see section C below). 
If Sysmin and Stabex funds are to be used in the Dominican Republic in the new country 
strategy, they should also be targeted to good governance and poverty reduction and 
should support local governments and partnerships with civil society (see section D 
below).   The use of Sysmin funds would also benefit from a more systematic evaluation 
of previous interventions. 
11. Areas of intervention to re-consider: education and private sector support 
a) Education.  While the EC has some experience of education support in the 
Dominican Republic, its projects have been varied, with mixed results and with 
often a limited poverty focus.  Moreover, the EC has not been involved in 
sectoral reform, and backstopping support from EC Headquarters has been 
limited.  This suggests that the EC should focus on the health sector instead.  
b) Private sector support.  The analysis of the key constrai ts in the country (see 
chapter 1) and the need for the EC to focus its interventions do not provide a clear 
case for the need of EC support to the private sector.  However,  particularly  in 
the context of a possible Regional Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU, 
private sector support may be seen as necessary.  If private sector support were to 
be included in a new strategy, it should focus on targeting poverty reduction. 
12. Focus the strategy but maintain some continuity.  The recommendations call for a 
strategy which appears to be very different from the past.  However, there is continuity, 
both with the analysis in the 1996 Country Strategy Paper (which emphasised the need for 
institutional reform of the State and for an increased emphasis on decentralised 
cooperation) and with the EC’s past and current portfolio of projects in the country (see 
Table on page 71, after section D). 
EC support to health sector reform 
13. The EC should have a lead role in supporting health sector reform, if the 
Government shows commitment and capacity.  Th s recommendation is based on the 
analysis of the EC’s relative advantage in this area, which is summarised in the table on 
page 62).  However, support should be based on assessments of progress in management 
capacity and commitment to reform within the health sector (including progress in 
decentralisation and results of expenditure tracking surveys).  These assessments should 
                                            
127  Under the Cotonou Agreement, previously separate instruments are incorporated in a single 
(flexible) financial envelope 
128  The Dominican Republic does not currently have an agreement with the IMF.   
129  See recent proposal on joint structural adjustment funds in Mozambique.  Evaluation of EC 
Country Strategy: Mozambique 1996-2000, forthcoming. 
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help identify the strength of counterparts, incentive systems for reform, and potential 
areas of resistance.  Sectoral progress will also depend on the monitoring of 
improvements in the budget process and public administration reform at central level 
(using specific performance indicators).    
14. … but the EC should support other donors which take the lead on public 
administration reform.  Donors should work jointly on the rationalisation of 
Government institutions, civil service reform and the transparency and accountability of 
the budget process.  Progress in these areas should be monitored jointly by key donors 
through the use of specific performance indicators (including expenditure tracking 
surveys).130  The EC should continue its support to core areas of governance refrm ( s in 
the PARME programme), but it is suggested that it should only do so through supporting 
larger reform programmes that draw together several key donors, and in which donors 
other than the EC take the lead.     
 
Ways to support health sector reform 
15. The EC should work jointly with other donors in a participatory health sector 
reform process.  Donors should decide jointly their support to health sector reform and 
work together with the same Government counterpart.  Programmes should be simple, 
participatory and flexible, so as to build local ownership and consensus.  Support should 
allow for the provision of health services by the state, market and civil society (with the 
possibility of different providers in design, delivery and supervision) and should support 
partnerships between central and local Governments and civil society. 
16. Health sector support should work within existing Government structures.  The EC 
and other donors, should avoid creating new institutions 131 (e.g. project management 
units), even if this initially slows down implementation.  The success of institutional 
reform interventions depends on building an internal consensus for reform, and not on 
creating temporary ‘islands of excellence’.     
17. Institutional support should focus on incentive systems and local structures, not on   
international consultants.  Whenever possible, institutional strengthening should be 
designed as stand- lone projects and should focus on comprehensive change to local 
incentive systems (for staff retention), rather than simply on training.  International 
consultants should be used as little as possible and should be selected carefully, as much 
on the basis of their skills as facilitators (and capacity to integrate with and train 
Government departments) as on the basis of their technical skills. 
18. Support for health sector reform should include clear impact indicators.  Project 
design should include clear and simple indicators of impact (not just ‘physical’ project 
results), as well as baseline service delivery surveys that could be used to monitor 
progress.132   
                                            
130   See footnote 132. 
131  Note that the rationalisation of key Government institutions and further decentralisation may 
be important conditions for support for health sector reform. 
132  On this see ‘Using Surveys for Public Sector Reform’, Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management Network, PREM Notes, The World Bank, May 1999.  
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EC support to governance and civil society 
19. The EC should support good governance through:   
a) local government – civil society partnerships: support to the institutional 
capacity of local governments in the poorest regions (e.g. budgeting, 
accountability and efficiency in service delivery, and civic participation) and 
support to the capacity of civil society organisations as partners in service 
delivery to local (s well as central) government.   
b) supporting civil society (independently of Government)133 as a way to 
strengthen governance from the bottom up, through pressuring for greater 
democracy, human rights and more efficient service delivery.   
20. The EC should support other donors’ programmes in justice and public 
administration.  Support to justice reform and public administration reform (currently 
components of PARME) should continue as part of a new EC strategy, but should be 
integrated into other donors’ programmes.   
21. Local government-civil society partnership interventions hould focus on one sector 
– possibly either water and sanitation or sustainable rural development – the choic  of 
sector depending on evaluations of EC projects in these areas.134   Cross-cutting themes 
(institutional strengthening and natural disaster preparedness) should be maintained.  
22. Civil society interventions – through funding intermediaries (s e below) – could be 
across many areas but should focus on good governance (including democratisation, 
human rights and the rule of law) and the reduc ion of poverty:   
· civic processes for building consensus on a national development agenda 
reduction of poverty (e.g. PUCMM-WB mesas de trabajo nd Foro Ciudadano). 
· advocacy organisations and civic groups  
· the capacity of community-based organisations in poor areas – strengthening their 
internal organisation and testing delivery mechanisms. 
· NGO activities that test innovative mechanisms for service delivery, and which 
aim at poverty reduction, particularly in remote areas.135   
 
                                            
133  In a move to broaden the partnership concept in EC-ACP relations, the Cotonou Agreement 
allows non-State actors to have direct access to EDF funds (Articles 4, 58).   
134  Note that there may be an a priori preference for sustainable rural development given the 
identification of ‘food security and sustainable rural development strategies’ as an area of 
global concentration for the EC.  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament: The European Community’s Development Policy, COM(2000) 212, 
April 2000, pp.26- 7. 
135  The rationale for support in this area could be to test mechanisms for subsequent adoption by 
local or central government. 
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Ways to support governance and civil society 
23. Partners should be chosen according to sector characteristics and assessments of 
institutional capacity.  First, the (country-specific) characteristics of a particular 
service/sector 136 should influence the decision as to whether the EC should support 
market, state or civil society providers.137  Secondly, joint donor assessments of 
institutional capacities and commitment should be pre-conditions for support to local 
governments and civil society organisations.   
24. The EC should focus on local de ivery systems and incentives and should limit the 
input of international consultants, when strengthening local governments and civil 
society organisations.  Project management units should be accountable to decentralised 
institutions or community-based organisations, and should be subject to regular external 
financial audits and evaluations.     
25. The EC should channel support to civil society organisations (for both advocacy and 
service delivery) through intermediary funding organisations with operational 
independence from the Commission and clear and transparent funding criteria (see Box).  
This would limit both the administrative burden on the EC Delegation and the sectoral 
knowledge required, and should therefore allow the EC to support civil society 
organisations across many sectors.  The EC should try to work with other donors to 
channel funds through the same intermediary (see below).
                                            
136  For example, a different type of service delivery for pharmaceutical and epidemiological 
surveillance.  See discussion on ‘Reforming Institutions for Service Delivery’, Policy 
Research Working Paper 2039.  OED and Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 
Network and Human Development Network.  January 1999.  The World Bank. 
137  And different providers may be appropriate at different stages of projects: design, delivery and 
supervision. 
Intermediary funding organisations 
Where an intermediary funding organisation is used, civil society organisations apply for funds to 
the intermediary, which then selects which organisations to fund on the basis of clear criteria.  The 
intermediary then disburses funds, and monitors and audits the execution of projects.  The 
intermediary may be a pre-existing organisation, or it may be established specifically for this task 
by the EC (and other donors).  The EC (preferably jointly with other donors, and in close 
consultation with beneficiaries) should be involved in the selection/design of the intermediary, in 
selecting appropriate funding criteria, and in monitoring and auditing the performance of the 
intermediary.   
Channelling funds through an intermediary has a number of advantages: 
· It allows the EC to support many small interventions, possibly across a large number of sectors, 
while itself only preparing and implementing a small number of projects.  Provided the 
intermediary has operational independence from the EC, this keeps the administrative burden 
low. 
· It may allow greater transparency in funding criteria, if the intermediary is required to publish 
and follow closely its criteria.  Joint donor support through a single interm diary is particularly 
beneficial to the transparency of funding criteria (it also contributes to the harmonisation of 
procedures). 
This system has been used in South Africa, where the EC established the European Union 
Foundation for Human Rights to act as an intermediary in channelling EC funds to civil society 
organisations engaged in human rights and governance ‘watchdog’ projects.  The procedural 
requirements of such an organisation might be different in the Dominican Republic given the need 
to adhere to EDF rules. 
Source: Evaluation of EC Country Strategy: South Africa 1996- 9, Montes, Migliorisi and Wolfe, European 
Commission, 1999 (ref. 951477, available on the web-site of the Evaluation Unit, SCR, European 
Commission also on the DG Development web-site)  
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EC interventions (or components) which fit the proposed new country support 
strategy 
8th EDF 
interventions                   
Proposed elements of a country support strategy 
SABAMAR · Support for local government and partnerships with civil society 
in the water sector, in an area with a high incidence of poverty 
PARME · Judicial reform component supports go d governance (but should 
follow a lead donor) and also civil society (for governance and 
accountability)  
· Public administration reform component supports central 
government reforms (but should follow a lead donor) 
· Decentralisation component supports local governments and 
partnerships with civil society 
Health Sector 
Reform 
· Government sectoral reform, in the health sector (if clear 
commitment shown first)
Reconstruction of 
Schools 
· Component supporting civil society organisations in community 
education for disaster preparedness involves government 
partnership with civil society 
Banana support (in 
preparation) 
· Supports partnership between Government and civil society 
(producers’ organisation), in food security / rural development.  
7th EDF 
interventions 
Proposed elements of a country support strategy 
Micro-projects · Supports civil society in poor rural areas 
Puerto Plata · Innovative partnership between local government and civil 
society  
PROLINO · Partnership between government and civil society, in rural 
development, in area with high incidence of poverty 
PRISA · Component supporting NGOs and community participation in 
basic sanitation, in rural area with high incidence of poverty, 
involves a partnership between government and civil society in 
the health sector 
Regional 
programmes with bi-
national DR-Haiti 
components 
· The Environmental Trans-Border programme, PROCREBI, and 
the Classical Swine Fever Eradication programme all support bi-
national programmes focusing on rural development in the border 
region 
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Improve aid coordination practices 
26. The EC, together with key donors, should support reform of the Government’s aid 
coordination (including the NAO office) and the budgetary process. Ideally, external 
assistance by all donors should be coordinated by a single Government unit with a direct 
link to budget planning and implementation.  In the Dominican Republic, this should be 
done together with strengthening of the efficiency, accountability and transparency of 
public expenditure management.  In this context, the NAO offic could be made part of 
this Government department 138.    
27. The EC should allocate more staff resources for more efficient coordination at 
technical level (e.g. using web-sit s) not only with Member States but also with other 
key donors (in particular the IDB, the World Bank and USAID).  This is particularly 
important given the weaknesses in aid coordination by the Government.  Information 
should be exchanged more systematically with regular sectoral technical meetings (not at 
head of representation level), and through using web-sites on which donors share sectoral 
and programme information.  Donors should also pilot a knowledge network exercise (see 
box). 
28. Donors should jointly support the development of a national agenda.  Jointly with 
other donors, the EC should support processes that help build consensus on a national 
development agenda (such as the PUCCM-WB exercise or the Foro Ciudadano).  While 
there are likely to be weaknesses in any such process, they are important developments 
that should be monit red and supported by donors.  Donors should try to use these 
processes to support consensus around the emerging country agenda.   
29. EC should continue its support to the recent process of selecting lead donors for 
each sector, possibly revising the current s lections to ensure that the choice of lead 
donor reflects relative sectoral capacities.  In sectors where the EC does not have 
                                            
138  As in South Africa, where the NAO is part of the directorate for International Development 
Cooperation within the Ministry of Finance. 
An example of knowledge-based coordination through a network 
In a given sector, the lead donor and the relevant Government department should co-ordinate a 
small sector knowledge network, comprising key donors in the sector, government 
representatives and NGOs.  We use the concept of a network rather than a group, a committee or 
a meeting to underline the informal nature of the tool and the fact that it should use a c mbination 
of meetings (frequently one-to-one), internet tools (e.g. databases containing data on aid in the 
sector, a complete list of projects,  electronic copies of key sector studies or evaluations, and 
online discussion forums), studies, focus groups, workshops, joint field visits, as well as informal 
meetings.  The use of several instruments should allow flexible participation by donors or 
government officials who might not have the time to attend formal meetings.
The Health Knowledge Network, for example, might be led by the lead sector donor and 
SESPAS.  As a first step, the network might decide to prepare an inventory of all donor 
programmes and all studies carried out on primary health care in the Dominican Republic.  A 
consultant could be contracted to carry out the inventory and the results could be discussed 
informally, hard copies circulated to all network members and posted on the Network’s web-site.   
A team comprising two donors, a consultant and a director from SESPAS might then be formed to 
visit key projects and report back to the network.  This team might then consider how a new pilot 
project could be developed on the basis of innovative donor projects.  The donors involved in the 
sector could then decide to appraise the pilot jointly and might eventually agree to fund it jointly 
using common procedures. (Example adapted from the South Africa CSE, August 1999, ref. 
951477, available on the web-site of the Evaluation Unit ,SCR, European Commission also on the 
DG Development web-site .) 
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significant capacity, and where it shares goals with the lead donor, it should integrate its 
projects  with the lead donor’s activities.  Support for public administration reform and 
the justice sector are strong candidates for this (see section D above). 
30. Sectoral coordination meetings should be carried out in the health sector, wher  i  is 
recommended that the EC should play a lead role (see section C above).  
Complementarity in the sector should be sought.   
Towards joint donor interventions 
31. The EC should work towards joint pools for technical assistance, common funds to 
support sector reform, and cofinancing:   
· joint pools of technical assistance with other donors: rather than TA being 
linked to individual donors and recruited separately, TA should be recruited and 
funded jointly by all donors in a given sector.   
· move towards channelling sector support funds through a common fund. If 
the Government meets benchmarks of progress in the transparency and efficiency 
of the budget and in public administration reform, donors should look to provide 
budget support through a common funding pool.139 
· co-finance other donors’ programmes, or encourage other donors to finance 
programmes jointly (e.g. in funding civil society organisations through a common 
intermediary).140    
32. The EC should support joint monitoring of macroeconomic developments and 
evaluations.  Systematic consultation on project eparation should be piloted. 
· Enhanced EC capacity for monitoring macroeconomic developments and the 
budget process should be shared with other donors, particularly Member States. 
· Joint exercises to formulate donors’ country strategies should be encourage (e.g. 
both the EC and the IDB will soon begin to formulate their new country 
strategies, and both could also benefit from the work carried out for the World 
Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy). 
· Systematic consultation with other donors on project design shoul  be piloted.  It 
is recommended that the design of new EC projects should require detailed 
consultation with the IDB, USAID and Member States which have projects in the 
sector.141  Reciprocal consultation should occur during the design of other donors’ 
programmes. 
· Joint monitoring and evaluations with other donors.   
 
                                            
139  In Mozambique, the EC has taken the lead in efforts to establish a common funding pool in 
the agriculture sector (PROAGRI) and in channelling its funds through that pool.  Evaluation 
of EC Country Strategy: Mozambique 1996-2000, forthcoming. 
140  Co-financing is encouraged within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement (Article 65). 
141  During interviews, the EC and also the IDB and USAID expressed their strong interest in 
closer coordination.  The Delegation is also in the process of analysing ways to improve 
coordination with other donors. 
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Using EC resources and procedures more efficiently 
If the EC is to support institutional development effectively and is to allocate sufficient time 
to donor coordination, changes are needd in the Commission’s resources and procedures for 
the management of aid to ACP countries.  Most of the recommendations in this report can 
only be implemented in the context of internal restructuring within the Commission.  Internal 
restructuring should include changing staff incentives away from disbursement levels to the 
quality and sustainability of EC interventions. 
Using procedures more efficiently 
33. Flexibility between programme components is needed in order to respond to changing 
conditions in a sector.  For example, in the health sector, programmes should be designed 
in such a way that the EC can move from support for central government sectoral reform 
to support for actions by local governments and civil society if minimum conditions for 
successful sector reform are not met.     
34. Simplification of procedures through de-concentration, systematic ex post audits, 
service delivery standards, and facilitating the recruitment of international 
consultants.    
· Given the weakness of implementation procedures in the Dominican Republic, 
initially only a cautious deconcentration of authority from Headquarters to the 
Delegation is recommended.142      
· Rigorous and systematic ex post audits on all projects (by accredited 
international audit companies, when necessary) should replace existing inefficient 
ex ante controls on projects. 
· Simpler and more flexible procedures are particularly needed to ensure timely 
recruitment and quality of international consultants (e.g. by allowing recruitment 
of consultants from the region), to allow more flexibility in the duration of 
projects, and to allow support for civil society organisations through independent 
intermediaries. 
· Service standards to EC aid recipients should be developed and communicated  
(e.g. a limit of 10 days for approval of tender documents). 
Strengthening resources  
35. The EC should reinforce specialist skills in Delegations and provide Delegations with 
rapid funds to support their own technical capacity (including non-project support). 
Reinforced skills in local government, good governance,143 and the environment are 
particularly important.  To facilitate this, the projects for which an individual staff 
member is responsible should all be related, and within his/her area of expertise.  
                                            
142  See Evaluation of EC Country Strategy in South Africa 1996-1999, Montes, Migliorisi, Wolfe 
(ref. 951477, available on the web-site of the Evaluation Unit, SCR, EC also on the DG 
Development web-site, www.europa.eu.int/comm/scr/evaluation/reports/acp/951477.pdf) for 
recommendations on deconcentration.  Where deconcentration is pursued, Headquarters 
should define project norms, certify accounting, procurement and disbursement systems, and 
carry out annual inspections of the Delegation, while deconcentrating all decentralised 
functions.  The outsourcing of administrative procedures could also be pursued by both the 
Delegation and Government/implementing agencies. 
143  Including the budget process and civil society support. 
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36. The EC should create the position of programme administrator to focus on financial 
administration, with responsibility for monitoring standardised indicators of programme 
performance,144 including the timeliness and quality of financial and/or operational audits, 
mid-term reviews and final ev uations 
37. Mainstreaming gender and environment analysis using contact points staff.  Contact 
points within the Delegation should be designated on gender and the environment, and 
should have responsibility for assessing all programme designs for their likely gender and 
environmental impact.   
38. A quality support group at Delegation level should be introduced o ensure that all 
project design work receives effective peer review.     
Learning processes within the Commission 
39. The EC should have access to funds for analytical work which is not directly linked 
to the preparation of new projects, in areas such as: 
· institutional assessments of political, economic and social institutions 
· the process of budget reform 
· the capacity of different State institutions (e.g. through service delivery surveys), 
as well as the potential for resistance to reforms 
· efforts to build consensus around a national development agenda 
· developments within civil society 
· the development of performance/outcome monitoring indicators. 
40. Delegation advisers should become more involved in (and have greater ownership 
of) project design, and ensure closer supervision of consultants’ work so as to  
incorporate (a) institutional assessments, (b) lessons from previous evaluations, (c) 
international best practice, and (d) systematic coordination with key donors.  These key 
elements should be explicitly required in the Terms of Reference for consultants. 
41. The EC should avoid complex projects or projects with too many components, in 
order to facilitate implementation, monitoring and evaluation.  Pr jects should specify 
only a small number of readily identifiable performance indicators.  
42. Systematic monitoring and evaluation, including rigorous audits of all key 
interventions with participation of other donors and civil society.  Projects and 
programmes should be monitored on an on-going basis (see recommendation on a 
‘programme administrator’ above), and mid-term reviews and independent final 
evaluations should be carried out on time even when projects are delaye.  The 
Government – and also other donors and civil society – should be part of monitoring and 
evaluation processes. 
 
 
                                            
144  Programme log-frames should have standard performance targets, e.g. on delays in 
disbursement compared to targets and sector averages, on % of inputs and outputs achieved, 
and on risk levels. 
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Annex 1: EC interventions 
 
7th and 8th EDF (approved) ( > € 1 million) 
Indicative 
programme Project Amount Main activities 
 7th EDF  
National 
Integrated rural development 
programme on the North-West Line 
(PROLINO) 
€ 23.6 
million 
· Supporting irrigation, water supply, 
electricity, roads, schools, clinics and 
the environment in an area in the NW, 
with community participation 
National Los Toros hydro-electric project € 18.9 million 
· Constructing hydro-electric power-
station and supporting local irrigation 
National Integrated health programme in the south-west (PRISA) 
€ 8.8 
million 
· Strengthening facilities and capacity in 
2 health regions 
· Also primary health care, and water 
and sanitation (through NGOs) 
National Integrated local-level primary education programme (PRIDEP) 
€ 7 
million 
· Strengthening primary schools in 3 
provinces 
National Private sector support programme (PASP) 
€ 4.2 
million 
· Support for institutions supporting 
small- and medium-sized enterprises 
· Improving the legal framework 
National Micro-projects programme € 3 million 
· Micro-projects in the rural south-west 
and border regions with Haiti 
National Puerto Plata provincial development programme 
€ 1.6 
million 
· Decentralised cooperation programme 
supporting participatory local 
development in health, education, 
community development and 
provincial planning 
National Rehabilitation programme in the south-west (PRESUR) 
€ 2 
million 
· Post-hurricane rehabilitation 
(containing wall, aqueducts, etc.) 
National (& 
regional) 
Prevention of HIV/AIDS support 
programme (PREVIHSA) 
€ 1.6 
million 
· Information, training and education on 
HIV and AIDS 
Sysmin Geological and mining development programme 
€ 23 
million 
· Stimulating growth of the mining 
sector, while ensuring environmental 
protection 
Structural 
adjustment 
(SAF) 
Sectoral import programmes, petrol 
products (PROSIP I)  
€ 13.5 
million 
· Balance of payments support through 
sectoral import programmes 
Structural 
adjustment 
(SAF) 
Sectoral import programmes, petrol 
products (PROSIP II)
€ 9.3 
million 
· Balance of payments support through 
sectoral import programmes 
Structural 
adjustment 
(NIP) 
Sectoral import programmes, petrol 
products  
€ 8.3 
million 
· Balance of payments support through 
sectoral import programmes 
Regional Caribbean agriculture and fisheries programme 
€ 22.2 
million 
· 8 components supporting agriculture 
and fisheries across the Caribbean 
Regional Caribbean university level programme (CULP) 
€ 21 
million 
· Establishing Master’s degree 
programme with scholarships at 5 
universities (3 in Dominican Rep.) 
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Regional Trade development programme € 14 million 
· Supporting the Caribbean Export 
Development Agency 
Regional Tourism sector programme € 12.8 million 
· Training, support for Caribbean 
Tourist Organisation, strengthening of 
CARIMOS, etc. 
Regional Environmental trans-border project Dominican Republic – Haiti  
€ 4 
million 
· Trans-border environmental training 
centre, regional development plan, eco-
tourism pilot interventions 
 8th EDF  
National Programme to support the reform and modernisation of the State (PARME) 
€ 29.5 
million 
· Judicial reform 
· Strengthening public administration 
· Support to decentralisation 
National 
Water and sanitation in marginal 
districts of Santo Domingo 
(SABAMAR) 
€ 21.8 
million 
· Water and sanitation supply 
· Solid waste collection (micro-
enterprises) 
· Institutional strengthening 
National Programme for reform of the health system 
€ 12 
million 
· Institutional strengthening at central 
and decentralised levels 
· Restructuring medicine regulation and 
distribution 
· Human resource management 
National Technical and professional education programme 
€ 13.25 
milion 
· Strengthening institutions and policies 
in the sub-sector 
· Equipment and facilities at 
polytechnics 
National 
Reconstruction of schools and disaster 
relief in San Pedro de Maconis &  
Higuey 
€ 7.2 
million 
· Reconstruction of hurricane-d maged 
schools 
· Building local capacity to prevent and 
mitigate disasters 
National Reconstruction of road infrastructure in the south-west 
€ 6.5 
million 
· Re-building of hurricane-damaged 
roads and bridges, with preparation of 
a plan for environmental conservation 
National Technical support for the banana sector € 1.5 million 
· TA to help prepare a sector 
development plan 
· Training small producers and exporters 
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Annex 2: List of interviews 
Delegation of the European Commission 
Head of Delegation,  R. Leenders 
Economic adviser, Sylvie Millot 
Primer Consejero, Roelf Smit  
Adviser, Gabin Hamman 
Junior Expert, Günther Liepach 
 
Member States 
Spain, Agencia Espanola de Cooperacion Internacional, Coordinador General, Eugenio 
Arranz 
Spain, AECI, Adjunto al Coordinador General, Carlos Cavanillas  
France, Consejero de Cooperación y de Acción Cultural, Maurice Nahory,  
Germany, Primer Secretario, Helmut Piegeler
Italy, Ambassador Stefano Alberto Canavesio 
United Kingdom, Ambassador David Ward 
 
Other donors 
USAID , Acting Director, Leopoldo Garza 
USAID, Economic Policy Coordinator, Luis Gonzalez  
IDB,  Representante, Stephen McGaughey 
IDB, Especialista Senior, Hugo Pirela,  
IDB (Washington DC), Country Economist, Jose Juan Gomes 
IDB (Washington DC), Country Coordinator, Hector Morena 
IMF (Washington DC), Deputy Division Chief, Mexico/Latin Caribbean Division, Philip 
Young 
IMF (Washington DC), Policy Development& Review Department, Werner Keller 
IMF (Washington DC), Western Hemisphere Department, Alessandro Giustiniani 
IMF (Washington DC), Asesor del Director Ejecutivo, Julio Estrella 
World Bank, Representante Residente, Marco Mantonvanelli 
World Bank, Economista,  Philippe Auffret  
World Bank (Washington DC), ex-Country Economist, John Panzer 
UNDP, Coordinador Residente, Paolo Oberti 
UNDP, Representante Residente Auxiliar (Programa) Carmen de Gómez 
 
Government and PMUs 
  
Oficina del Ordenador Nacional  
Ordenador Nacional, Max Puig 
Ordenador Delegado, Renso Herrera 
Asist. Proyectos, Rosalina Ynoa
 
Secretariado Técnico de la Presidencia  
Vice Minister for International Cooperation, Rosa Ng de Eberle 
Asesor (Unidad de Seguimiento de Proyectos con Recursos Externos), Victor Ventura 
ONAPLAN, Rafael Camilo 
 
Banco Central de la Republica Dominicana 
Asesor Económico de la Gobernación, Hector Guiliani 
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Secretaría de Estado de Finanzas 
Programa de Reforma y Modernización de la Administración Financiera del Estado – 
Coordinador Nacional,  Damián Santos 
 
Secretaria de Estado de Educacion y Cultura 
Oficina de Planificacion Educativa, Director General de Planificación, Rafael de Lancer  
Oficina de Planificacion Educativa, Directora de Proyectos y Búsqueda de Fondos, Milta 
Ladys Lora González  
 
Secretaria de Estado de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social 
Dirección General de Planificación y Sistemas de Salud, Virgilio Rodr guez  
 
Secretaría de Estado de Relaciones Exteriores  
Emabajadora Tecnica, Maritza Amalia Guerrero 
 
Secretaria de Estado de Industria y Comercio  
Dirección General de Minería, Asesor Minería y Medio Ambiente, Walther Eberle 
  
Comisión Presidencial para la Reforma y la Modernización del Estado  
Secretario Ejecutivo, Onofre Rojas  
 
Comisionado de Apoyo a la Reforma y Modernización de la Justicia  
Secretaria de Estado, Coordinadora, Aura Celeste 
 
Consejo Nacional de Asuntos Urbanos (CONAU)  
Secretaria de Estado  
RESURE.  Pablo Morel 
RESURE coordinator, UNDP.  Oscar Barahona  
Miembro Consejo Directivo, Francisco Gonzalez 
 
Programa de Apoyo al Sector Privado  
Director Ejecutivo,  Peter Alter  
 
Private sector 
Asociacion de Industrias de la República Domnicana  
Presidente, Nassim Alemany  
Vice-presidente ejecutivo, Juan Daniel Valcarcel  
 
Consejo Nacional de Empresas Privadas  
Frank Castillo 
 
Confederación Dominicana de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa  
Director Ejecutivo - Franklin Vásquez 
 
Consejo de Promoción Turistica 
Vice Presidente Ejecutivo – Arturo Villanueva,  
Director de Relaciones Institucionales, Alan Ramirez Risk 
 
OGM 
Director, Prof. Frank Moya Pons
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Civil society and political parties 
 
Pontificia Universidad Catolica Madre y Maestra 
Rector, Monsignor Agripino Nuñez 
Vicerrector Ejecutivo, Radhamés Mejía, 
 
Senado de la República Dominicana,  
PRD, Asesor Economico,  Frank Guerrero Prats,  
 
Ayuntamiento del Distrito Nacional   
Secretario Técnico Municipal,  Roberto Castillo Tió,  
 
Coordinador de Rd de Redes,  
Instituto Dominicano de Desarrollo Integral, Director Ejecutivo,  David Luther,  
 
Centro de Estudios Sociales Padre Juan Montalvo S.J.  
Padre Jorge Cela, S.J. 
 
Centro de Planificación y Acción Ecuménica  
Directora Ejecutiva – Carmen Perez 
Maria Diaz, Coordinadora de ONG para la Mujer 
 
Instituto Tecnologico de Santo Domingo-IDB 
Program de Fortalecimiento de Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil, Ana Selman 
 
Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Programa Republica Dominicana.  
Director. Ruben Silie 
Investigador Asociado. Eddy Tejeda 
 
Participacion Ciudadana  
Isidoro Santana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
